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Carl Erik Koehler

The Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army in the Army High Command

By: General der Kavallerie Carl Erik Koehler

Translator: H.J.BAERWALDT and W. LUETZKENDORF

Editor: L. F. SCHAEFER

Review: Major F.D. CRONIN

HISTORICAL DIVISION
EUROPEAN COMMAND

The Author

Carl Erik KOEHLER
General der Kavallerie
Date of Birth: 3 December 1895
Place of Birth: Mannheim.

Early in 1914, KOEHLER joined the German Army, entering the 11th Uhlan* Regiment as an officer candidate noncommissioned officer. Throughout World War I he served with the field forces in France, Russia, Rumania and Italy. Remaining in the Army after the war, he underwent the normal training for General Staff officer and in 1930 was promoted captain, awarded General Staff Corps Status and assigned to the General Troops Office, which later became the Army General Staff.

Promoted lieutenant colonel in September 1939, KOEHLER was assigned to the General Army Office as Chief of Staff. A year later he was transferred as Chief of Staff to the Chief of Army Equipment and promoted colonel. In January 1942 he was promoted Generalmajor and at the end of the same year was removed from his post by orders of Hitler, who ordered that he was not to be employed in any General Staff position from then on.

From December 1942 on, the General served on the East Front as divisional commander and later as acting corps commander. Finally, in November 1944, he was promoted General der Kavallerie, having been promoted Generalleutnant in March 1943, and transferred to Norway in command of the XXXIII Corps, which assignment he held until transferred as commander of the XX Corps in Central Europe. On 8 May 1945, the General was captured by British forces at Tangermuende in North Germany.

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* Cavalry Units in the Imperial German Army

The Author

Hellmuth REINHARDT
Generalmajor
Date of Birth: 27 June 1900
Place of Birth: Stuttgart

After studying forestry at Tuebingen University, REINHARDT underwent training in the Munich and Muensdorf infantry schools from May to November 1920 and from January to July 1921 respectively. In addition he received training in the Berlin War College from October 1932 to April 1935.

In World War II REINHARDT served as Supply Officer and later as Operations Officer at Deputy Headquarters of V Infantry Corps, in Stuttgart, as Operations Officer of the 25th Infantry Division in the Westwall and in the French Campaign, and was then transferred to Army High Command Headquarters at Fontainebleau as Branch Chief in the Organization Division of the Army General Staff. In March 1941 he was appointed Chief of Staff in the Army General Office, Berlin. On 1 November 1943 he was relieved of his post and placed in the Army High Command Officer Reserve. In March 1944 he was assigned to the Eighth Army as Chief of Staff and in June of that year promoted Generalmajor. He was transferred from the Eighth Army to the Staff of the Wehrmacht Commander in Chief in Denmark (Lindemann Army) as Chief of Staff on 28 December 1944 and remained in Silkeborg, Denmark, until 6 June 1945.

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Franz Halder

Generaloberst a.D.

Koenigstein, 29 March 1950

To: Historical Division

The supplement to the study on The Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army in the Army High Command, initiated but left unfinished by General der Kavallerie Koehler, is attached to this letter. In accordance with the wishes of the Historical Division the missing sections have been completed by Generalmajor Reinhardt. The preliminary work by General Koehler was also used for this. In addition, General Reinhardt had the opportunity of learning how General Koehler essentially intended to complete the study. General Reinhardt himself was Chief of Staff of the General Army Office for several years and thus possesses extensive personal knowledge of conditions.

The two chapters, "Inspector of Education and Training," and "Chief of Training in the Replacement Army," have been written by Colonel Zerbel (general staff) as a home-worker. As Chief of the Training Branch of the Army General Staff during the war, Colonel Zerbel cooperated actively with these offices and thus became familiar with their structure and method of operation. His two contributions have been examined and corrected by General Reinhardt in a few minor points.

The attempt to recheck the draft of General Reinhardt's supplement

which was completed on 30 November 1949 came to naught because General Koehler is kept so busy by his new occupation that neither a written commentary on nor a verbal statement concerning the draft could be obtained from him. After General Reinhardt repeatedly attempted this for more than a quarter of a year without success, and since even today no possibility of success within a reasonable period of time presents itself, the study has been completed without General Koehler's check.

Chapters 15 to 17 of Section D, covering the last years of the war, were checked and approved by Generalmajor Laegeler, the last Chief of Staff of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Training Army.

In the field of armament, essential contributions to this study were made by Generalmajor Kennes, who had been Chief of the Section II (Armament) in the staff of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Training Army for several years during the war.

An index to the section of the study, submitted here, has not been inclosed since it can only be of value when part of the entire study on the Army High Command.

/s/ Franz Halder
Generaloberst

PREFACE

Three years after the end of World War II hostilities the author was released from British and American internment as a prisoner of war. He composed without constraint the following short study of the creation, course, mission and activity of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army in the Army High Command. The commission for this was given by the Historical Division, US Army, after the Hesse Sonderspruchkammer of the Neustadt internment camp, on the basis of the "Law for the Liberation from National-Socialism and Militarism," had classified him in Group V (affected but not incriminated). Thus any impediments standing in the way of an objective, historical presentation were removed. The author gives no consideration to any feelings, wishes or opinions, no matter from which side they are advanced.

The author had only a small amount of data at his disposal for the study. The records of the Chief of Army Equipment and his subordinate offices had been destroyed, before they could fall into the hands of the victorious powers.

The study has been essentially written from memory. Doubts could be rectified with former co-workers and proceedings could be reconstructed. Mistakes and errors are not impossible.

The principles and methods, which, beginning in 1934, were employed in the development of the peacetime army and the growth of the armament industry, proved their worth. They were maintained at the outbreak of

the war and the tempo of the work increased.

The offices and agencies of the Army High Command, which were assigned to the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Training Army at the beginning of the war, remained untouched in their organization and structure; their work procedure initially continued without friction.

The mission of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Training Army during the war can best be shown by referring to events which occurred within the Wehrmacht and Army High Commands in the time between Hitler's rise to power and World War II. Such events distinctly show the reasons and causes which contributed to Germany's inevitable collapse.

A.

I. The Peacetime Development of the Wehrmacht Top-Level Organization for War

Generaloberst von Blomberg, as Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht, originally intended to unite, in his own hands, the command power over all branches of the Wehrmacht und the war ministerial authority for all matters concerning the defense of the Reich.

This clear and simple solution was not achieved. It failed because the Fuehrer, as dictator, could not tolerate so much power in a hand other than his own. But the Party, claiming total authority in all matters concerning government, also followed the development of the Wehrmacht with distrust. Goering is also to blame, for, in his capacity as Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, he was not willing to share his extraordinary authority with an energetic "Reich War Minister." Neither Goering, as the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, nor Grossadmiral Raeder as Commander in Chief of the Navy, wanted to subordinate themselves to a rigidly run "Wehrmacht High Command." They recognized correctly, that, with a uniform, rigid command, they would be in no position to press forward the special interests of their Wehrmacht branches.

Finally, the resistance of the Army was decisive. The leading men of the Army High Command, with few exceptions, rejected the Fuehrer and his national socialistic philosophy, or at least had strong inner doubts about

them. As participants in World War I they had had bitter experiences. They wanted peace and were not at all ready to push the population into new military adventures.

Thus they considered the development of the Army less from the viewpoint of foreign politics than from that of internal politics. For the controversy with the regime of the dictator, which was their goal and which could be expected with certainty, they wanted a dependable, non-political, modernly equipped, not-too-large peacetime Army.

By Blomberg's plan the Wehrmacht High Command would have been headed by a revolutionary man, deeply devoted to Hitler, who, under certain circumstances, might not even come from the ranks of the Army. In this case grave encroachments in the traditional organization of the Army, its conservative structure and in the non-Nazi older members of the officers corps were to be expected. The Commander in Chief of the Army and his Chief of Staff felt it their duty to insure a decisive influence for the Army in the new top-level organization.

Proceeding from the continental location of Germany, this claim was based on the decisive role which would fall to the Army in a defensive war. The development of the Wehrmacht, the extent and tempo of rearmament, the adaptation of the entire governmental apparatus and the economy to the necessities of a total war were, in their opinion, just as much a mission of the Army as the command of operations on the ground and in the air. In such straight-forward language, it was made clear that the Luftwaffe had to subordinate itself to the interests of the Army.

It goes without saying that men like Goering and Raeder were not at all inclined to content themselves with a second class role in this Wehrmacht which was being formed. The Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe and his young General Staff represented new revolutionary ideas on the possibilities of modern operational air warfare with the commitment of compact independent air forces. The Reichsmarschall did not want to be shackled in any way in this free development he was striving for, neither by the Army nor by a streng Reich Defense Minister, who was at the same time Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht.

With such resistance facing them it was impossible for either Generaloberst von Blomberg or the Commander in Chief of the Army to realize their objective. In its stead a compromise solution was chosen which substantially corresponded to the desires of the Fuehrer. It avoided bestowing too much power on any one person or on the decisive influence of one branch of the Wehrmacht. The Army, Luftwaffe and Navy remained independent and were given a free hand in development and construction, with their own armament and their own administration. The unrestricted competition between the individual branches of the Wehrmacht, which arose from this, the resultant friction and overlapping in all fields of legislature, armament and administrative matters as to personnel, material and finance were included in the bargain with much hesitation. The repeated opinion of the Fuehrer that the able person will prevail over the less able person in the long run played a great role in settling the matter so quickly.

Such a procedure would have been bearable in a country with an

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Such a procedure would have been bearable in a country with an

unlimited war potential, but in a country of Germany's backwardness in all fields of personnel, materiel, and particularly industrial armament, and her notorious lack of the raw materials needed for a war, this free competition necessarily led to intolerable conditions. Instead of establishing a uniform direction toward an established and clearly defined goal, in which each branch of the Wehrmacht had been assigned a certain mission, a calamitous dispersion, an unproductive duplication of effort and disharmony set in. This development reached its peak during the first years of the war.

Friction increased when the Waffen-SS under Himmler made ever increasing demands; Hitler furthered these efforts. As dictator he was filled with distrust toward the Army High Command, but particularly toward the General Staff. It was a political necessity for him to create an absolutely secure bodyguard, blindly devoted to him, which could paralyze * any possible separatist movements, from wherever they might come.

In spite of all difficulties, Generaloberst von Blomberg and the Wehrmacht High Command, then still capable of action, succeeded in creating the prerequisites necessary for the construction of a uniform defense of the Reich. There was no legal foundation for the conversion of the nation in the case of war. These prerequisites were achieved by painstaking work and by overcoming considerable friction and resistance. In cooperation with the highest Reich agencies, as well as with the Party and its

* Original contains the word parallelisieren, (to make parallel) but this is obviously a typographical error.

organizations, the necessary laws were established between 1935 and 1938 and put into effect.

1. The National Defense Law (Wehrgesetz).
2. Law concerning Services and Works in the Interest of National Defense * (Wehrleistungsgesetz) (later Reichs-Leistungsgesetz - Law Concerning General Requisition).
3. Emergency Service Decree (Notdienstgesetz).
4. Wartime Civil Service Salaries Act (Kriegsbesoldungsgesetz).

It must be pointed out that the initiative and the preliminary work for these laws came from the Army High Command. The influence of the Army was insured to a high extent in the proceedings.

Through the simultaneous establishment of the "Cabinet Council for National Defense" (Reichsverteidigungsrat) and the "Committee for National Defense" (Reichsverteidigungsausschuss) it became theoretically possible for the responsible offices of the Wehrmacht High Command to prepare the nation in peacetime for the requirements of a total war. If this was not done in practice, it was only because of the personalities of the successors of Generaloberst von Blomberg who did not understand how to play on this instrument. The attempt to mobilize Germany's war potential in advance came to a halt before it ever began.

For an understanding of further developments a brief description of the internal political picture of that time seems indicated. The friction

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* Setting up conscription of business and labor.

prevailing in Germany between 1935 and 1938 was a consequence of the fight as to who was to achieve decisive power in the Hitler's Third Reich. Was it to be the Party, the Wehrmacht, the SS or the SA? The Party represented the revolutionary in this struggle, the Wehrmacht the conservative principle. Hitler himself was initially only determined not to grant decisive influence to any one grouping of power. He kept the rival forces in balance. The position of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police formed the balance on the scale of power groupings. Use had not yet been made of this.

Excluding the actions of some of the leading personalities of the Army, this fight was not directed against the person or the philosophy of the dictator. The broad mass of the people and especially the entire younger officers corps of the Army was solidly behind Hitler. A strong opposition, capable of action, did not exist if one is speaking of something more than the divergent streams of national-socialism itself, disunited as to the final goal. Small, unimportant, malcontent groups constituted a quantite negligeable for the continued existence of the regime.

On the other hand, the rivalry within the Wehrmacht and the conflict concerning the wartime top-level organisation drew the attention of the Fuehrer, Goering, Himmler, Goebbels and above all the Party. They recognized that any danger for the Third Reich would threaten from this direction. This judgement of the situation, on the whole, correct, led to the downfall of von Blomberg, von Fritsch and von Beck in 1938. In one blow the Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht, the Reich War Minister, the Commander in Chief of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army, were

simultaneously removed. The methods employed were base, but the removal of these leading men was not attempted until the system had already become so firm owing to external and internal successes that it could disregard feelings and opinions, without having to fear the danger of internal political reverses.

A.

II. Status of the Wehrmacht Top-Level Organization for War at the Outbreak of the War and its Effect on the Army High Command

On the departure of Generaloberst von Blomberg, Hitler declared himself Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht. He placed the Commanders in Chief of the three independent Wehrmacht branches directly under himself and gave them as before, a free hand in the development of their branches. The personal union which had existed up till then between the Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht, with command authority, and the Reich War Minister, who was responsible for all matters of Reich defense, was thus dropped. In the place of the latter came the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command, who was no longer the nominal war minister but had been placed on the same level as the other ministers. He had no — and this was the decisive point — command authority whatever.

In the place of the strong and creative men who had been removed by the system, a man who could offer the least resistance, Feldmarschall Keitel, was subsequently chosen successor by the Fuehrer. His appointment as Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command constituted a positive guarantee for a frictionless and weak-willed cooperation with the dictator. Goering, Himmler, Goebbels and Bormann very soon recognized how small was the danger for their positions which threatened from this direction. In the course of the war they emphatically supported the continuation in office

of this sad representative of the Wehrmacht. When Generalfeldmarschall von Brauchitsch left in the fall of 1941, Keitel was unfortunately charged to represent the interests of the Army.

Hitler and the men of his immediate surroundings did not want to believe in the possibility of a directly imminent war. He continued to trust, with complete misunderstanding of the foreign political situation, in his lucky star, With new, but in any case peaceful means, he had achieved hitherto unthought of successes for Germany. Contrary to this, the majority of the responsible commanders of the Army and the Navy realized after 1938 that the path which was being trod had irresistably to lead to military actions. They raised their voices in warning, but without success.

When Hitler tumbled unwillingly into World War II, as a result of his exaggerated foreign policy, the development of the Wehrmacht had not been completed. Germany was not at all prepared for war with the whole world. The development of the Army, Luftwaffe and Navy was still under way. There were only a few personnel and materiel reserves. Industry had not been converted to armament production. Stock-piling in supplies and ammunition, in essential raw materials, in fuel and food stuffs was only in the initial stage. These facts were known to Hitler. Even the structure of the wartime top-level organization had not come closer to a solution at the beginning of the war, considering the position taken by the Fuehrer toward these problems and the rivalry within the Wehrmacht.

Details on the legal position of the Wehrmacht High Command and on its

development during the war have been exhaustively represented in the study "Wehrmacht High Command." If the essential facts are briefly summarized in the following, it is only because knowledge of these matters is a prerequisite to the understanding of the position of the Chief of the General Army Office in peacetime and that of the Chief of the Army Equipment in war.

The position of the Wehrmacht High Command was pronouncedly weak at the outbreak of the war. The interference of the Fuehrer caused its development to exhibit a retrograding tendency. Instead of a strong concentration of forces, a harmful dispersion set in; the command conditions and the spheres of authority were absolutely unclear. The Wehrmacht High Command was not in a position at the outbreak of the war to fulfill the mission originally intended for it.

1. The Wehrmacht High Command with its Group for National Defense was not a command staff, merely a work staff for the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht. It was not responsible for the operations of the Wehrmacht, but merely transmitted Fuehrer Orders and Directives concerning the interests of the war as a whole to the Commanders in Chief of the independent Wehrmacht branches.

2. The Army High Command planned the joint operations of the Wehrmacht branches on the basis of the directives of the Fuehrer. The Commander in Chief of the Army was responsible for their execution. He secured the necessary cooperation between the individual Wehrmacht branches. There was no subordination of one to the other.

3. The Commanders in Chief of the Luftwaffe and the Navy were responsible for the independent air and sea operations.

4. All Commanders in Chief were responsible in wartime too for the armament and administration of their Wehrmacht branches.

5. Under these circumstances the influence of the Wehrmacht High Command could only be applied to sections of the war direction.

a. War ministerial tasks for which it had been responsible in peacetime remained unchanged. It had to represent Wehrmacht requests before the Reich agencies, the plenipotentiaries, the Party and its appendages, the SS and the police, the Reich Labor Service and the other organizations.

Even here a substantial weakening of its position was effected. The Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command was at Hitler's Field Headquarters at the front when the war broke out. Under such circumstances, the interests of the entire Wehrmacht were unsufficiently represented in Berlin, the seat of the other organizations. As a result, the parts of the Luftwaffe, Army and Navy High Commands, which had likewise been left behind in Berlin, assumed more and more ministerial authority. In part they negotiated independently in the interest of their respective Wehrmacht branches and, bypassing the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command, had the result directly sanctioned by the Fuehrer.

b. The following was treated jointly for all the Wehrmacht branches:

Wehrmacht Signal Communications (the Army, Luftwaffe and Navy had their own networks in addition to this.)
Wehrmacht transportation.

Foreign Affairs and Counterintelligence.
General Wehrmacht Affairs (internal politics, national-socialistic training, press and propaganda, casualties, prisoner of war affairs, welfare and rations, technical training).
Wehrmacht Judge Advocate General and Justice.
Wehrmacht Budget.

The vain attempt was made in the Group for Military Economy to coordinate the free competition of the Wehrmacht branches in the field of armament, to distribute raw materials and to prepare economic mobilization.

6. The Wehrmacht High Command left certain tasks, necessary for the direction of overall war operations, with a single Wehrmacht branch. Thus, for example, the Army was responsible for the entire Wehrmacht in the following areas:

Wehrmacht conscription and recruiting (General Army Office, Group for Replacement and General Troop Matters).
The distribution, control and tabulation of motor vehicles and fuel (General Army Office, Inspectorate 6 — Armored Force Branch).
The tabulation and procurement of rations for men and animals (Army Administration Office, Group VIII — Rations and Procurement).
Medical Service (General Army Office, Medical Inspectorate).
Army Postal Service.

In all these areas the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command reserved the right of decision in fundamental matters concerning all the Wehrmacht branches.

B.

I. The Chief of the General Army Office, his Office and Mission in the Peacetime Army High Command

The position of Chief of Army Equipment did not exist in peacetime. At the outbreak of the war, the Chief of the General Army Office was appointed Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Training Army as provided for by the Mobilization Plan. His job becomes understandable only after the tasks of the General Army Office in peacetime are described.

Hitler legally came into power in 1933. At that time the Army consisted of the 100,000-man Reichsheer. The enlargement of this army by 50,000 men, begun under the governments of Bruening and Schleicher, had not yet had any effects. The development of the Army had been impeded by the shackles of the Treaty of Versailles. Immediately after Hitler came into power, the development of a new Wehrmacht was begun and pushed on with all means. The prerequisites for the development of the Army were not at all favorable under the prevailing conditions.

There were no legal regulations for the preparation of defense of the Reich in any sectors.

With regard to personnel one could fall back on the 4,000 officers, the noncommisioned officers and the enlisted personnel, who had enlisted for twelve years. They constituted the cadres for the Army which was being activated and also for the Luftwaffe, which had not existed before and

now had to be created from nothing as the third independent Wehrmacht branch.

Trained personnel reserves, with the exception of overage groups from World War I, did not exist. There was no organization for the tabulation of those liable for military service. A Wehrmacht conscription and recruiting administration was in the stage of disguised organization, but it had not yet been able to accomplish its mission properly. There was only about enough equipment available to increase the Reichsheer threefold. This equipment was exclusively composed of old World War I stocks of arms and ammunition which were completely obsolete. Modern arms, such as tanks, antitank and antiaircraft guns were lacking or had not advanced essentially beyond the stage of the initial testing. All units were horse-drawn; motorization was in its very beginnings.

There was no effective armament industry in Germany. The entire economy, particularly manufacturing, suffered from the effects of the world economic crisis. It was almost exclusively adapted to the production of consumer and export goods. An immeasurable army of unemployed burdened the economy with their small buying power and became a load on the public welfare. With the uncertainty of the internal political as well as the economic situation, the independent plant owner shrank from a conversion of his plant for armament purposes and from making the expenditures necessary for this. Industry itself was not in a position to finance such a thorough production revolution. The banks could not advance sufficient private capital. In spite of an extremely high rate of taxation,

the state, owing to the general depression, was not in a financial position to make available the necessary means for a large-scale development of the Wehrmacht.

In such a situation, the Wehrmacht branches initiated general competition in matters concerning their development. The development of the Army took place under the responsibility of the Commander in Chief, General der Artillerie von Fritsch. The following were assigned to him:

1. The Army High Command, consisting of the following:
   a. Army General Staff
   b. Army Personnel Office
   c. General Army Office
   d. Army Ordnance Office
   e. Army Administration Office
   f. The Arms Inspectors

2. The peacetime Army with all command agencies, units, administrative agencies and territorial installations (see Appendix 1).

The following persons within the Army High Command were responsible for the development:

1. The Chief of the General Staff of the Army. He established, by order of the Commander in Chief of the Army, the requirements for the organization of the wartime Army, which included all resultant matters of import as to the type, extent, procurement and supply of the peacetime Army.

2. The Chief of the General Army Office (later Chief of Army Equipment). By order of the Commander in Chief of the Army he was responsible for the carrying out of the following:

a. Reconstruction of the new peacetime Army

b. Mobilization work

c. All measures for the armament preparation in peacetime and wartime armies in the fields of personnel, material and finance.

B.

II. The Mission of the Chief of the Army General Staff and the Chief of the General Army Office in Army Development and Armament

As was to be expected, the reconstruction of the Army produced an abundance of new problems. Before Hitler came into power theoretical deliberations had been carried out in the General Staff but there had been no final result. In practice, especially as a result of the speed at which the new regime worked and wanted to see positive results, premature decisions could not be avoided.

Here, too, the wartime top-level organization in the Army High Command played an essential role. From the very beginning of the developmental work until the end of the war, it could not decide on a really applicable solution.

The contrast between the Chief of the General Staff on the one hand and the War Minister on the other, traditional in the Prusso-German Army, immediately appeared in the reconstruction.

The duties of war minister were taken over for the Army by the Chief of the General Army Office. A clear division of the spheres of work and responsibility between the Army General Staff and the General Army Office in matters of reconstruction was extremely difficult.

In the long run it was a matter of indifference which agency was competent to carry out various details in developing the Army. Directives,

no matter how carefully they are formulated, receive value and significance through the personality who must administer them and fills them with life and on whose shoulders lies the responsibility.

1. General der Artillerie Beck (Chief of the Army General Staff). General-major Fromm (Chief of the General Army Office, later Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Training Army)

As he, General der Artillerie Beck, saw it, the mission of the Chief of the General Staff was firmly tied to the traditions of the General Staff. His model was the elder Moltke, under whose excellent command the Army General Staff had fully proved itself in the wars of 1866 and 1870-71. All educated in the same vein by Schlieffen, the General Staff had been able to maintain its reputation and esteem in spite of the lost world war. Beck was fully aware of the great responsibility he had assumed. Educated in abstract thinking, he was a master in the theoretical planning of ground operations, an experienced tactician, an excellent educator and instructor. Tenaciously clinging to tradition, he looked at the technical possibilities of modern warfare with distrust.

He was scrupulously exact in his procedure of work, carefully deliberative and hesitating in making a decision, but clear and definite after having made it. His thinking and acting was one-sidedly military. He secluded himself, insofar as his position permitted, from important state and economic problems and avoided, because of inner modesty, taking an active stand on such matters.

His conservative, intellectual attitude brought him by necessity into a sharp, inner conflict with the dictator and his revolutionary ideas.

The Chief of the General Army Office was very much younger than Beck and was his absolute opposite. Coming from the Army General Staff, he developed into an organizer, politician and economist. He was an expert in financial, budget and administrative affairs. As a student of General von Schleicher he had matured into a soberly-calculating, realistic politician who was at home in both the German internal political picture and the international spread of the League of Nations. Through his manifold connections with the German economy, he understood its inner structure and never became lost in details.

As a soldier he had retained his common sense and his clear judgement. He kept himself free of exaggerated artificialities and accepted only simple and primitive solutions. He was open for all innovations, providing that they kept within the realm of the possible. He did not shrink from breaking with tradition and was determined to search out new methods of warfare. He was an excellent orator who formulated his opinions clearly and convincingly. Never at loss with auxiliary measures, he could be unscrupulous in the choice of his means if it were necessary. He was one of the few men who understand how to let others work for him and to have confidence in them, and who thus always find time to occupy themselves with really decisive problems. A robust man of forceful nature who did not shrink from risking everything in a critical situation, his was a personality which was not ready to make compromise in fundamental matters.

He viewed national socialism with expectant reserve, but was ready to grant it the chance of proving itself.

Beck and Fromm should have been well able to complement each other in disposition and ability. Unfortunately they did not find the common level necessary for productive and trusting cooperation. The chasm which seperated both men was hardly apparant in public. Both wanted the best. Discord set in in 1934 and grew worse during the years. Even after Beck's dismissal in 1938 the fight continued underground. It found its tragic conclusion on 20 July 1944. In the presence of his rival, Fromm, Beck committed suicide, since he could no longer escape arrest by the Gestapo.

2. The struggle of the Chief of the General Army Office for Equality with the Chief of the General Staff in Matters of Army Development and Armament

The Chief of the General Staff had gained dominant and decisive influence in the 100,000-man Army as the senior advisor of the then Chief of the Army Command in all matters concerning the Army. He had been silently recognized as the highest authority.

The Chief of the General Army Office was ready to fully recognize this superiority in the field of operations, tactics and training. But he was just as determined to make his influence felt in matters of army development, organization and armament. He was not willing to let himself be controlled by the General Staff in his job and responsibility.

Every attempt of the Chief of the General Staff to gain predominant influence for his position in the Army High Command, to make decisions himself or to interfere authoritatively in the activities of the various

independent offices, had to be met by strong resistance from the Chief of the General Army Office and later from the Chief of Army Equipment. The former protested against the method employed now and again by the General Staff of negotiating behind closed doors and then confronting the Chief of the General Army Office with an accomplished fact, thus demoting him to a mere executive agent of the General Staff.

In his opinion the hitherto valid hypothesis had undergone a fundamental change. The organization and armament of the 100,000-man Army had been determined by the victorious powers in the Treaty of Versailles. The development of the Army became stagnated under such political bars. With the exception of the General Staff, the entire Army High Command had more or less become a purely administrative office, and even the General Staff had to confine itself to theoretical deliberations on war and warfare. Only in the field of training and education could it exert practical influence. Under these circumstances the activity of the General Army Office had been of secondary importance, but with the beginning of rearmament the General Army Office was assigned tasks which were decisive with regard to the future development of the Army.

The Chief of the General Army Office took the initiative. He demanded equality with the Chief of the General Staff in organizational and armament matters and also succeeded in achieving it. Thus it was accomplished that the requesting agency and the executive agency became equal in rank and had the same rights and that both had the same responsibility toward the Commander in Chief of the Army within their individual spheres of authority.

Such dualism could lead to differences in opinion and friction. As

long as it remained within bounds of reason, however, one could put up with it, but it could only work positively as long as the Commander in Chief of the Army directed the two agencies uniformly and made clear decisions in cases of doubt. With the shelving of the position of Commander in Chief of the Army in the fall of 1941 and the assignment of the Chief of the General Staff directly to the Fuehrer, of the Chief of Army Equipment to the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command, grave consequences set in which will be treated in detail later.

3. Positions of the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the General Army Office on Fundamental Matters of Army Development and Armament

After the position of the Chief of the General Army Office in the Army High Command had been clarified, technical discussions with the Army General Staff on fundamental matters of development and armament soon took place. Opinion was not unanimous within the General Staff relative to the operational and tactical principles under which the new Army was to be organized.

The old school under Beck wanted to continue where the development had broken off for Germany after World War I. Proven operational and tactical experiences were adhered to. The number of units was to be increased according to plan and their organization essentially maintained as was. Forbidden or obsolete arms were to be replaced by new ones. Medium and heavy artillery, tanks, antitank and antiaircraft arms were to be incorporated in the normal infantry divisions, or combined as corps or GHQ units. The French Army, which had rested on its laurels since 1918, served as a model. The organization of the new Army was to be adjusted to the French

in its basic lines and strength.

The new school, under the intellectual direction of the later General-oberst Guderian, proposed a basically different way. It wanted to discard the methods which had led to the loss of World War I, especially to prevent the reformation of stationary fronts and thus the futile exhaustion of one's forces. An independent armored branch, which had to be started from scratch, would enable the command to realize the old, established principles with new means on the battle field. This new school, therefore, proposed to combine the armored branch into compact divisions, armored corps and armored armies by assigning it motorized infantry and artillery.

At first, the Chief of the General Staff did not feel that he could agree with this viewpoint. At this time the development of the armored branch was still in its initial stages. The operational, tactical and command possibilities were completely new territory. He wanted "security" and under no circumstances to let himself get involved in untested experiments. The development was to take place systematically, step by step and was to be planned with a long-range viewpoint. He based his position on the weakening of the core of the army, which would be the logical consequence of the reorganization and on the lack of suitable officers and non-commissioned officers, the absence of arms, equipment and ammunition, clothing and personal equipment for each soldier, the quartering and training possibilities. Under all circumstances he wanted to avoid a decline in the Army's readiness for action.

To what degree internal political deliberations played a part in this at that time is now hard to establish. The Chief of the General Staff was

also against precipitate rearmament, since this would arouse the distrust of the neighbor nations who were armed to an extent to which Germany would not be able to equal for many years.

The Chief of the General Army Office, who was responsible for the organizational construction of the Army and for armament production, required a clear conception of the demands which were to be made of him and what long-range planning had to be carried out. He pressed the Commander in Chief of the Army for a quick decision. He emphasized the importance of coordinating the program with the demands of internal and foreign politics and the economic setup.

a. Hitler had given the Wehrmacht branches a free hand in their own development. The Army had to utilize this unique opportunity without loss of time. Every delay led without fail to intervention by the dictator, which had to be avoided for the sake of the reputation of the Army.

b. In the international negotiations, which were expected and had as their goal the equality of Germany in all respects, the presence of a strong Army had to be simulated at least for the outside world. Possible deficiencies resulting from too rapid development of a precipitate construction could and had to be taken into the bargain. The Fuehrer had guaranteed that in this period of weakness he would stop any conflict short of war.

c. If free competition between the three Wehrmacht branches were to exist one could reckon with certainty that the Army would fall behind in armament if it hesitated longer. The Luftwaffe and Navy had begun unrestricted construction. German industry's limited armament capacity already threatened to become largely absorbed. The lack of proper

manufacturing plants made itself felt by the Army, with its mass requirements of material. Goering was not only Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, but also simultaneously Plenipotentiary General for the Four Year Plan. Plants which he had reserved for his Luftwaffe were no longer released for the Army. The position of the Wehrmacht High Command (the Economic and Armament Office) was much too weak to correct any such fait accompli.

d. Without taking a stand in the difference of opinion within the General Staff, Fromm warned the members not to overestimate operations and tactics in an era of mass armies and air forces. Underestimation of matters connected with organization, armament and war potential was considered by him as a grave error. He was of the opinion that the decision in a modern war would not only be determined on battle fields and at the front. Final victory would be with that group of powers whose war potential would be able to meet the greatest burden for the longest time. Working from this standpoint, he demanded, with the approval of the Army General Staff, that uniform economic mobilization for all three Wehrmacht branches be vigorously prepared by the Wehrmacht High Command in peacetime. The decisive prerequisite for an early utilization of Germany's war potential consisted of getting the war production into high gear as rapidly as possible. It could be anticipated with certainty that the conversion of the entire nation to the requirements of a total war had to become necessary as a result of the economic mobilization.

Fromm referred to the memorandum, compiled on his request by Colonel Winzer (General Staff) in 1933, which contained his attitude on all questions concerning armament. In this memorandum Germany's war potential had been

examined on the basis of detailed studies, in which the Organization Branch of the General Staff, the Ordnance Office and the Administration Office had collaborated.

The prerequisite for a rearmament of the Army was the enlargement of already-existing armament plants, the conversion of parts of the peacetime industry to Army requirements and the establishment of skeletonized factories which could start working at once in case of mobilization. The financing of these measures had to be made by the Army with an eye to the future. Without knowing the requirements, the Ordnance Office could not plan and the General Army Office could not finance. Under the given conditions, years would be necessary to gear the new plants to the mass production of arms, equipment and ammunition. Trained personnel reserves did not exist in Germany. They constituted the prerequisite for the activation of reserve units in the case of mobilization.

In sharp contrast to the Chief of the General Staff, Fromm demanded that the new peacetime army, in spite of a lack of arms and equipment, be constructed on a broad personnel basis from the very beginning. The aim was to stretch the frame of the Army as far as possible as early as possible. Only in this way could the prerequisites for the training of a great number of soldiers be created, who could be transferred to the reserve after as short a service time as possible. As he saw it, the risk had to be taken that the necessary extent of armament would be lacking at first and could not be recovered for a number of years.

In spite of all objections and hesitation on the part of the Chief of the General Staff, Generalmajor Fromm suggested to the Commander in Chief

of the Army that he push the development in a twofold direction.

a. Development of a first-rate operational army consisting of independent armored and motorized units, equipped with all modern technical advantages, completely mobile with superior fire power.

b. Development of a mass army of normal organization and armament, which rendered the utilization of the nation's entire war potential immediately possible in case of mobilization.

The Commander in Chief of the Army ordered the development and the planning of the armament carried out on the basis of this suggestion.

The Chief of the General Army Office was fully aware of the immense responsibility which he had thus accepted. He wanted war just as little as did the Chief of the General Staff, the General Staff or the entire officers corps. It could not yet be seen then where Hitler's policy would finally lead. At that time Fromm was of the same opinion as has so strikingly been formulated by President Truman in his message to Congress on 18 March 1948 in the following words:

> I believe that we have recognized the importance of maintaining military power as a means of preventing war. We have found that a sound defense system is necessary in time of peace, if we want to maintain the peace.

4. Peacetime cooperation between the General Staff and the General Army Office. The Result of Joint Activities.

Until the plan of reconstruction was realized considerable difficulties had to be overcome. After the Commander in Chief of the Army had made his decision, it was to be expected that all sections of the officers corps,

considering its traditional attitude, would utilize their entire knowledge and ability in the direction ordered. Every attempt from one side or the other to deviate because of selfish interests was ruthlessly stamped down.

In this connection the fact must be referred to that the Chief of the Organization Branch of the General Staff, the later General von Sodenstern, in close cooperation with the Chief of the General Army Office, supported the latter's arguments and contributed with all his might to their realization. He tried again and again to bring about an agreement between his immediate superiors, the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the General Army Office.

The cooperation between the Organization Branch and the General Army Office in peacetime and at the beginning of the war was frictionless. Later, under pressure of the situation at the front and the senseless widespread interorganizational conflict which arose therefrom, sand was put into the complicated gears. The result is not a matter for discussion here.

It is to the imperishable credit of Generaloberst Guderian that he sacrificed himself completely to advancing the organization, development and training of the armored forces. Even if this sometimes resulted in professional arguments with the Chief of the General Army Office, one could trace it to the fact that he made demands at times which could not be immediately fulfilled if the interests of armament as a whole were to be considered. Convinced of the correctness of his idea, Guderian pushed forward with such speed that the development of the mass army was sometimes

seriously endangered.

The small peacetime army, already weakened by heavy detachment of particularly talented officers, noncommissioned officers and complete units to the Luftwaffe, now gave its best forces for the development of the armored branch. The rest hardly sufficed as cadre for training in quick succession the reserves so necessary for a mobilization army. This task was even more aggravated when, as a result of General Staff pressure, the one-year service period had to be replaced by two-year service. Thus the annual amount of new recruits was decreased by nearly fifty per cent.

When the war broke out unexpectedly the Army's rearmament was not at all complete. The ammunition program for the necessary outfitting of the mobilization army was, for example, not supposed to be fulfilled before 1945. The absence of sufficient supply stocks in arms, ammunition and equipment, from which the requirements of the fighting army could be covered until war production got into full gear constituted a serious danger. It was merely owing to the fact that there were only small personnel and materiel losses during the Polish, Norwegian and French campaigns, followed by lengthy periods of inaction, that serious crises did not come about in the supply situation.

Reconstruction did succeed in the end, after all, by overcoming immense friction, the causes of which could be found partly within, partly without the Army. The following figures, therefore, are of particular interest.

About forty infantry and sixteen armored, motorized and light divisions, including corps and GHQ troops, were activated in the peacetime

years 1934-1939 from the seven infantry and three cavalry divisions permitted by the Treaty of Versailles. With the beginning of mobilization, seventy-five additional divisions were added. Looking at it purely from the viewpoint of number, this meant an increase from 100,000 men to 2,500,000.

This development was rendered particularly difficult by the fact that the scheduled course had to be constantly interrupted as a result of the tense political situation (Rhineland, Austria, Sudetenland, Bohemia-Moravia) and new stop-gaps had to be sought again and again.

The above development has been described in detail, since it is a model example showing how an objective clash of opinions is a prerequisite for peak performances. The reconstruction of the Army could only be so astonishingly successful because it was not dictatorially and hence intolerantly directed by one authority. The Commander in Chief of the Army understood how to awaken the talent which existed in the Army High Command, and to direct it in positive, creative work toward a joint goal.

The free play of forces within the Army High Command did not lead to a duplication of effort or mutual opposition of rival personalities or offices. They never crippled the activities of one another. In the clash of opinions the stronger will, the stronger personality, the clearer setting of the goal, the better technical knowledge prevailed for the best of the whole. Only thus can it be explained that a case occurred which happened but once in the history of the Prusso-German army. The Chief of the General Army Office (who was considered war minister within the Army) offered more forces to the Chief of the General Staff than the latter had

requested or even wanted, an incident which constantly repeated itself in peacetime and in the periods of inaction between campaigns until the outbreak of war with Russia. The fact must be acknowledged that an army was formed out of nothing through the joint work within the Army High Command, and that it was far superior to its enemies at the outbreak of the war in spite of considerable deficiencies.

5. Experiences From the Development of the Peacetime Army

The development of the Army and the beginning of rearmament, in addition to his regular duties, consumed the energy of the Commander in Chief of the Army to an exceptional degree. It also developed that he more and more had to accept the role of mediator between the agencies of the Army High Command which participated in the development. The offices involved, including the Chief of the General Staff, persisted in their own technical viewpoint in individual matters for the most part so that the Commander in Chief of the Army was constantly bothered by petty decisions.

All of the following had equal parts in the development:

The Organization Branch of the General Staff

The Army Personnel Office

The General Army Office

The Ordnance Office

The Army Administration Office

The Chief of the General Army Office was responsible for executing the reconstruction. He had to cooperate with the other offices and was

thus dependent on their intelligence and good will. He could not give them any orders, since they were all assigned directly to the Commander in Chief of the Army. In practice, however, he had means available to correct any lack of good will among those who should have cooperated. The Chief of the General Army Office had at his disposal:

a. The funds allotted to the Army, which he allocated to the participating offices with strict orders as to utilization.

b. The raw materials allotted to the Army, which he likewise allocated with strict orders as to utilization.

c. The noncommissioned officers and enlisted personnel who composed the manpower allotted to the Army, which was released to the requesting agencies only if the latter held to the framework of the overall plan.

One further inconvenience came into the open. All agencies of the Army participating in a particular field of the reconstruction were forced to negotiate, in some way or other, with the Chief of the General Staff, the Wehrmacht High Command, the Plenipotentiary General for the Four Year Plan, the Party and its organizations, the SS or other organizations. When objectively representing the overall interests of the Army, nothing could be said against such a procedure. But it could not be avoided that some agencies tried to push through special interests or to frustrate decisions already made by the Commander in Chief of the Army.

About 1936 the Chief of the General Army Office proposed that, for the relief of the Commander in Chief of the Army, all agencies participating in the reconstruction and rearmament be assigned to a special commissioner,

their independence not being effected by this. He wanted to achieve the following by doing this:

a. Only one office within the Army would be responsible to the Commander in Chief of the Army for matters of reconstruction and rearmament.

b. One office would coordinate in these matters the cooperation of all Army High Command agencies participating in this work.

c. Only one office would negotiate with the General Staff in basic problems and requests.

d. The interests of the Army would be represented by only one office in negotiations with Wehrmacht High Command and other organizations.

The fact must be expressly noted here that Generalmajor Fromm, the youngest in service among the office chiefs involved, did not claim this new position for himself but suggested an intimate co-worker of the Chief of the General Staff. At the same time he had requested that the General Army Office, which played such a decisive role, be filled with more General Staff Officers to insure closer cooperation with the General Staff.

The Commander in Chief of the Army declined both suggestions. The Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Army Ordnance Office protested for very fundamental reasons. Without doubt, such a "Commissioner for Army Development and Armament" in peacetime would have combined too much power in one hand with his extensive authority. On the other hand, the suggestion was accepted in the preliminary work for the Mobilization Plan of 1937. It provided that the Commander of the Replacement Army was,

at the same time, to take over the command over those elements of the Army High Command remaining in Berlin. In the execution of this job the title of "Chief of Army Equipment" was introduced later.

C.

The Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army

I. The Army High Command in Wartime

With the beginning of World War II the Mobilization Plan of the Army became effective.

The Army High Command, hitherto stationed in Berlin, was divided into the following parts:

1. The mobile parts, which, as Field Command Agencies, went into the field in connection with Hitler's Field Headquarters.

2. The elements remaining in Berlin, which were combined under the Chief of Army Equipment.

Corresponding to the division of the peacetime Army into mobile field army and replacement army, there was a clear differentiation between area of operations and zone of the interior.

The authority of the Army was established in the Army High Command as follows:

1. The Commander in Chief of the Army exercised command authority over the entire Army (field and replacement armies). He was responsible to the Fuehrer for the command of operations and for the maintenance of the combat power of the field army.

2. The following men were at his disposal to carry out these tasks:

a. The Chief of the General Staff, who, on the former's order

and as his advisor, planned the operations and supply of the field army and supervised their execution.

b. The Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, who, supported by the resources of the zone of the interior, was responsible for the armament of the Army in the fields of personnel, materiel and finance.

c. The Chief of the Army Personnel Office, who was responsible for all matters which concerned officers.

The field army was directly assigned to the Commander in Chief of the Army, the replacement army to the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army. (See Appendix 1b).

C.

II. The Mission of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Training Army

Shortly after the outbreak of the war, General der Infanterie von Stuelpnagel who, according to the mobilization plan, was to have filled the position of Commander of the Replacement Training Army, was relieved by order of the Fuehrer.

The Chief of the General Army Office, General der Artillerie Fromm, who at first still retained his former position, took Stuelpnagel's place. Only after the completion of the Polish Campaign was a successor as Chief of the General Army Office appointed, Generalleutnant Olbricht.

Because of the reasons mentioned in Section B II, 5, "Experiences from the Development of the Peacetime Army," the activation of a Chief of Army Equipment in case of mobilization was now carried out. All agencies and offices of the Army High Command which participated in the planning and organization of armament or in the training, supply and administration of the Army, were united under the Chief of Army Equipment.

1. Arms and Services Inspectors, Fortifications Inspector, Medical and Veterinary Inspectors.
2. The Chief of Education and Training Affairs.
3. The General Army Office.
4. The Ordnance Office.
5. The Army Administration Office.

6. The Remnants of the General Staff which more or less merged with the General Army Office.

Only the Army Personnel Office remained assigned directly to the Commander in Chief of the Army.

The Chief of Army Equipment was at the same time Commander of the Replacement Training Army to whom all command agencies, offices, units and stationary installations of the Army in the zone of the interior were assigned, both as to troop service as well as territorially. Legislative and executive were combined in one hand as a result of this personal union. The execution of the orders and instructions, issued in his capacity as Chief of Army Equipment, were supervised by himself as Commander of the Replacement Army in the zone of the interior.

The Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army was, on the basis of his service instructions, provided with extensive powers and authority. He was thus placed in the position of taking the responsibility for the armament of the Army and the command of the Replacement Training Army, to a large extent, away from the Commander in Chief of the Army, who was fully occupied with the command of field army operations.

The service instruction for the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army was brief and laconic:

> He directs, in accordance with instructions by the Commander in Chief of the Army, the training, replacement and armament of the Army with regard to personnel (except officer replacements, which will be handled by the Army Personnel Office), materiel and finance, the development, procurement and receipt of arms, ammunition and materiel, and all fields of Army Administration.

It is hard to realize from these few sentences the responsibility with which the Chief of Army Equipment had been burdened. Here only a few examples are mentioned as follows:

1. Representation of the interests and requests of the Army to the Wehrmacht High Command in all armament matters concerning personnel, materiel or finances. By order of the Commander in Chief of the Army, he had to maintain close contact with the responsible leaders of the various Reich agencies, ministries, plenipotentiaries for economy, administration, Four Year Plan and food, the Party and its organizations, the SS and other organizations.

2. At the outbreak of the war he was responsible for all Replacement Affairs (Army, Luftwaffe, Navy, SS, Police, Reich Labor Service). The directives for the distribution to the Wehrmacht Branches were issued by the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command. The Chief of Army Equipment was responsible for their execution.

Compromise between the personnel requirements of the Wehrmacht and the constantly increasing demands of other civil area and armament user agencies became a problem hardly capable of solution. He had to carry out the tabulation, mustering, conscription, distribution, training and making available of replacements for the Army. At the same time he had to list the wounded and sick, coming from the field army, to take care of them until they had recuperated and then to make them again available as replacements, or to discharge them in case of unfitness for service.

3. His activity in the field of materiel for armament and supply covered arms, ammunition, equipment, tanks, motor vehicles, horses, outfits,

clothing and food supply. Within the framework of this task he was responsible for development, testing, procurement, receipt, repair, storing, administration and preparation.

In this connection he had the thankless task of procuring, through the weak Wehrmacht High Command, the seemingly endless Army requirements of raw and synthetic materials from the Plenipotentiary General of the Four Year Plan, and of distributing them to the appropriate user agencies of the Army according to overall planning.

4. Organizationally he had to carry out the new activations and reorganization of divisions and units of all service arms and special services, a task which grew constantly during the course of the war. Furthermore he had to insure the rehabilitation of battle-weary units insofar as this was not done in the field army.

5. In the field of training a distinction was made between his tasks as Chief of Army Equipment and those as Commander of the Replacement Army.

a. As Chief of Army Equipment he directed the compilation of the training directives of all service branches and special services. The General Staff issued the necessary instructions and directives based on the war experiences. Their compilation was handled by the Arms Branch of the General Army Office under the responsibility of the Arms Inspector.

b. As Commander of the Replacement Army he was responsible for the training of replacements in enlisted personnel, officers and special personnel of any type. The training took place in the replacement units, in

numerous courses in the zone of the interior as well as at the Arms Schools with their training and testing units. The deputy Commanding Generals were responsible for directing the training, the Arms Inspectors supervised its uniformity.

c. The tabulation of the officer and noncommissioned officer replacements, their training and education as well as the direction of the Officers, Noncommissioned Officers and Noncommissioned Officers Pre-training Schools was the task of the Inspector for Education and Training Affairs. He was assigned directly to the Chief of Army Equipment.

d. In all matters of pre-military training he was in close contact with the competent offices of the Reich Youth Leader, the SA and the Reich Labor Service.

The Reichsfuehrer SS was responsible for the training of the Waffen SS and the Police. However, the training followed the regulations prescribed for the Army.

6. The Chief of Army Equipment exercised no influence over the measures taken by the Army Personnel Office. On the other hand, he was responsible for all matters concerning Army officials in the field of Army justice, Army administration, and, as well, all civilian employee matters.

7. The entire Army Medical and Veterinary Service with all its installations was assigned to him.

8. His agencies handled all matters of home defense legislation, insofar as the Army was concerned, fundamental legal matters which arose as a result of the state of war, Army justice, the maintenance of discipline,

leave regulations, the Military Police, the rights and obligations of the individual soldier and the religious affairs of all faiths.

9. The financing of the Army, the making available of funds for the use of the troops, took place according to the regulations established for the entire Wehrmacht. A special burden was effected by the financing of private armament factories and entire fields of armament, which had to be executed and supervised by the Army Budget Branch.

Aside from his activity as Chief of Army Equipment came the special burden of his tasks as Commander of the Replacement Army with the subordinate Deputy Corps Headquarters (Wehrkreis Headquarters)* with their territorial missions and the Replacement Army, which sometimes increased to over 2,000,000 men (including wounded and those recuperated).

The Chief of Army Equipment received his directives and orders from the Commander in Chief of the Army. The Chief of the General Staff made his requests through the Organization Branch, the Chief of Army Supply and Administration and the Training Branch. The physical distance between the Office of the Chief of Army Equipment and the Field Command Agencies disturbed the smooth utilization of these channels. The Chief of Army Equipment had to be informed in time on operational intentions. This was the case as long as the Commander in Chief of the Army had had the responsibility for armament. The possibility of bringing about the necessary measures in time still existed then on the whole. With the removal of the Commander in Chief of the Army and the increased secrecy ordered by the Fuehrer, orientation, after 1941,

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* Basic military area of Germany, resembling somewhat the pre-war U.S. Corps area.

often took place so late that wild improvisations, mostly unsatisfactory, became necessary.

The Chief of Army Equipment issued directives to the subordinate offices and independent branches. He insured the mutual cooperation of the offices with one another, with the Army General Staff, the other Wehrmacht Branches, the Waffen SS, the Reich Labor Service and the Organization Todt.* He directed basic planning in the fields of development of armament and the organization of activation and replacement affairs in exclusive cooperation with the Office Chiefs. He made his decisions on the basis of oral reports.

The staff of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army was kept consciously small, it was never larger than fifteen officers. Its activities will be treated in detail in Section C III. It was decisive that the staff did not handle special work of any kind but was chiefly responsible for the coordination of all agencies of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army.

All armament work in the fields of personnel and material was directed by the subordinate offices of the Army High Command. They had become thoroughly acquainted with the work in peacetime and had vast experience as a result of the rushed development of the peacetime Army. At the beginning of the war turnover in personnel was at first prevented; changes in organization were avoided. The Offices and their branches simply increased their personnel.

The Chief of Army Equipment reserved for himself the distribution to

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* Paramilitary construction organization of the Nazi Party, auxiliary to the Wehrmacht and named after its founder, Dr. Todt.

Army user agencies of funds and raw materials allotted by the Wehrmacht High Command. Thus he was placed in a position to concentrate his influence at any time upon certain points in directions he considered necessary or to ruthlessly throttle measures undesirable for the successful conduct of the war. For this reason the Army Budget and Central Branch, insofar as it handled matters of expenditure, was withdrawn from the General Army Office at the beginning of the war and assigned directly to the Chief of Army Equipment. At the same time a Raw Materials Branch was taken away from the Ordnance Office and likewise directly attached to the Chief of Army Equipment. It had to balance the requests for raw and synthetic materials among the various user agencies of the Army.

The evolution of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army and the course of events up to the end of the war will be specially reviewed in Section D. In a chronological sense the following phases were of particular significance:

1. The Polish Campaign 1939-1940.

2. Creation of Wehrmacht High Command Theater of War in the spring of 1940.

3. Establishment of the Ministry of Armaments and Munitions in the spring of 1940.

4. Operation SEELOEWE.

5. Beginning of the Eastern Campaign in 1941.

6. Winter campaign 1941-1942.

7. Dismissal of the Army Commander in Chief and assignment of the Chief of Army Equipment to the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command in Winter

1941-1942.

8. The Caucasus crisis in the summer of 1942.

9. The memorandum entitled "At the Height of Power and Glory" written in the fall of 1942, which caused the Chief of Army Equipment to fall from Hitler's grace.

10. The catastrophes of North Africa and Stalingrad in the fall of 1942 and the spring of 1943.

11. Discord with Minister for Armaments and War Production (Speer) in 1943.

12. Discord between the Reich Propaganda Minister and Reichs Director Bormann in and after the summer of 1943.

13. Discord with the Reichsfuehrer SS as a result of the expansion of the Waffen SS as of Summer 1943.

14. The attempt on Hitler's life on 20 July 1944.

15. Assumption of the post of Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army by the Reichsfuehrer SS.

16. The role played by the Army Staff within the Wehrmacht High Command.

17. The Collapse.

The Chief of Army Equipment had the following agencies of the Army High Command (Appendices 2 and 3) assigned to him:

A. General (Army High Command)

1. Army Budget Branch, Central Branch.

2. Army Raw Materials Branch.

3. General for Special Employment with the Chief of Army Equipment in and subsequent to 1942.

4. Army Judge Advocate General.

B. Arms Inspectors.

1. Inspector of Infantry.

2. Inspector for Riding and Driving.

3. Inspector of Artillery.

a. Senior Officer of Artillery Observation Troops.

b. Senior Artillery Officer for Land Fortifications.

4. Inspector of Engineers and Railway Engineers.

5. Inspector of Mobile Troops.

6. Inspector of Signal Troops.

7. Inspector of Motor Transport Troops.

8. Inspector of Chemical Troops.

C. Inspector of Fortresses.

D. Army Medical Inspector.

E. Army Veterinary Inspector.

F. Chief of Education and Training Affairs.

G. Chief of Training (beginning in 1942)

H. The General Army Office.

I. The Army Ordnance Office.

J. The Army Administration Office.

The Commander of the Replacement Army, as a command authority in the zone of the interior, was assigned the following:

1. The deputy corps headquarters (Wehrkreis headquarters).

I-XIII

XVII

XVIII

XX

XXI

Bohemia-Moravia.

Government General in and after 1940.

2. All agencies and units of the replacement army or units detached from the field army to the zone of the interior, the Wehrmacht replacement organizations (competent for the Wehrmacht), and all territorial agencies of the Army.

C.

III. The Staff of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army.

1. The Staff was kept as small as possible. The following sections were formed under the chief of this staff.

Section I (Commander, Replacement Army). This section was concerned with all tasks connected with the functions of the Commander of the Replacement Army.

Section II (Armament). This section was oriented toward the responsibilities of the Chief of Army Equipment.

Personnel Section. This section served as personal adjutant's office for the Commander of the Replacement Army and handled all officer matters within the jurisdiction of the Chief of Army Equipment.

Officer matters of the Wehrkreis headquarters and the replacement army were not handled by this section. Only the efficiency ratings of deputy corps commanders, chiefs of staff of Wehrkreis headquarters, division commanders of the replacement army, recruiting area inspectors, and commanders of service schools were responsibilities of the Commander of the Replacement Army.

The Personnel Section also handled matters concerning complaints of officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men of the Replacement Army and matters concerning courts of honor, doing so on behalf of the Commander of the Replacement Army, who was the highest authority in such matters.

2. Responsibilities were distributed to the sections as follows:

In Section I the following matters were handled for the Replacement Army:

a. General organizational matters, service regulations and powers of authority; the situation on the front, written reports and notes for oral reports to the Fuehrer.

A General Staff officer coming originally from the Organization Branch of the General Staff was in charge.

b. General matters concerning internal politics, general counterintelligence matters, matters of the press, the air situation and air damage reports from the zone of the interior, and daily reports to the Army Commander in Chief.

An officer of the Counterintelligence Branch of the Wehrmacht High Command was in charge here. The liaison officers to the Party and its organizations, to the Waffen-SS, the Reich Youth Leader's Office, the Labor Front, and the Reich Labor Service were combined in his office.

c. Originally the basic questions and directives concerning training in the replacement army were handled here on the basis of instructions from the Chief of the General Staff. For details see Section C IX (Chief of Training).

A General Staff officer who came from the Training Branch of the General Staff was in charge here.

In Section II (Armament) the following matters were handled for the Army High Command:

a. General ministerial tasks, general matters concerning troop organization, general planning on the personnel sector.

An officer of the General Army Office was in charge.

b. General armament questions on the materiel sector, general economic, technical and production planning, general matters concerning procurement and rationing of raw materials and substitutes.

An officer of the Army Ordnance Office was in charge.

c. Evaluation of statistics prepared by the Offices, covering all sectors of armament as to personnel, materiel and finance. The Hollerith system was used.

A statistician of the Ordnance Office was in charge.

The Section Chiefs were experienced regular officers, on the whole General Staff officers. Attached to them were technical officers who were experienced in the fields of economy, politics, or press and were assigned regardless of their seniority.

3. Responsibility of the Staff.

The entire work and function of all agencies of the Chief of Army Equipment was pointed toward one fixed goal, that of the strengthening and maintenance of the fighting power of the Field Army.

a. The staff was not responsible for handling any one area of responsibility. It was rather charged with insuring cooperation among all offices and agencies. Its duties included the following:

(1) To remain in continuous close contact with the field echelon of the Army High Command, particularly with the agencies of the

General Staff, and with the High Commands of the Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe and Navy.

(2) To accept from these agencies wishes and requests which, on the basis of the general situation at the front or in view of political developments, were subject to constant changes.

(3) To point out expedients and possibilities to the General Staff by means of positive suggestions, with the aid of which the Chief of Army Equipment, if the armament situation were taken into account, could be enabled to help the embattled field army.

The necessary contact with the Reich authorities and Party agencies that had remained in Berlin proved exceedingly cumbersome for the Staff.

Close and confident cooperation with the chiefs of staff of the offices and the heads of the independent agencies of the Chief of Army Equipment was an absolute prerequisite under the prevailing conditions for the accomplishment of any creative work.* There was no problem concerning armament in the fields of personnel or materiel on whose solution the four offices and their agencies did not work jointly in some form or other. It did not matter whether organization, training, supply of the field forces, or legislation, legal matters, military jurisdiction, administration were concerned. The same holds for long-range planning, for development and procurement of weapons, ammunition and equipment.

It was easily possible and undoubtedly constituted a certain danger that, as a result of the abundance of work and the attendant overlappings and obligations, duplications or unintended counteractions

*Until the end of 1942 approximately 180 groups and responsible branches with roughly 4,500 officers and 1,500 officials were combined under the four Offices.

occurred. To recognize and remedy these mistakes in time was not always easy.

b. The following factors made the functions of the Staff difficult:

(1) The secrecy demanded by the Fuehrer, which precluded general briefing from the very start.

(2) The necessity, because of the increasing bombing attacks, of dispersing agencies over the entire area of greater Berlin, which on account of the shortage of motor vehicles hampered personal exchanges of opinion.

(3) The principal impediment was the different working hours. The field headquarters worked through the nights and during the day were tied to scheduled oral reports or had their activities suspended, whereas the agencies of the Chief of Army Equipment worked without intermission from 0800 to 2100 for technical reasons or because of the constant nightly air raids.

A transfer of the numerous agencies outside Berlin was impracticable for political and moral reasons in view of the fact that the population, which was actively involved in the total war, had to remain in the city. Moreover, the entire military communication network, upon which the Chief of Army Equipment depended for the performance of his duties in the zone of the interior converged upon Berlin. Casualties had to be taken in the bargain.*

4. Modus Operandi of the Staff

a. The time-consuming procedure of co-checking, so rewarding in peacetime, was a luxury which could not be entertained under wartime conditions.

* From 1942 to the end of the war 1,650 officers, officials, noncommissioned officers, enlisted men, civilian employees, laborers, staff and signal communication women auxiliaries, who were under the jurisdiction of the Chief of Army Equipment, were killed in Berlin.

It was necessary to prepare all directives and orders - all edicts, ordinances, and laws - in the shortest possible time.

As soon as the situation at the front or in the zone of the interior necessitated new measures of a fundamental nature or grave decisions, that procedure was adopted which had already proven its effectiveness in the staff of the General Army Office.

b. The Chief of Army Equipment personally briefed the Office Chiefs, outlined the mission and gave basic instructions as to its accomplishment.

Whichever Office had the most important part of the assignment was vested with the responsibility. The assignment was then handled centrally in the staff of this Office (in exceptional cases special staffs were improvised). The other Offices detached authorized officers or officials to the working staff. They had to represent the standpoint of their respective Office Chiefs in basic matters. They furnished contributions to the orders. Whenever differences of opinion arose among the Offices which could not be straightened out, the Chief of Army Equipment, as the supreme agency, decided the issue immediately. This procedure took the place of all co-checking. As a result an extraordinary speed-up resulted.

c. Example I. The following practical example will demonstrate how closely interrelated the activities of the various Offices were. It will show both the chain of command and the lateral structure of the agencies of the Chief of Army Equipment (Appendices 3 and 4), the descending chain of command of the independent Offices which received their directives from the Chief of Army Equipment.

Cooperation on subordinate levels with agencies of equal rank were arranged as follows:

General for Special Employment	—	Chief, Army Raw Materials	—	Chief, Army Budget
Chief of Training	—	Chief, General Army Office	—	Chief, Ordnance Office
Arms Inspectors	—	Ordnance Branch	—	Ordnance Development & Testing Group
	—	Ordnance Inspectors	—	Ordnance Acceptance Group

The Chief of Army Equipment directly controlled the General for Special Employment, who represented the military requests of the Army concerning development of weapons, equipment and ammunition to the Ordnance Office and the Ministry for Armament and War Production. He was also the direct superior of the Army Raw Materials Branch which handled the distribution of raw and synthetic materials to the Army user agencies, particularly the Army Ordnance Office, and also was the superior of the Army Budget Branch which was responsible for all matters of finance. Thus the Chief of Army Equipment held the strings with which he could thwart any attempt of an Office to break away from his authority. This example also shows the prominent position of the General Army Office, whose ordnance branches handled training, organization and procurement. Within the organization controlled by the Chief of Army Equipment the General Army Office was at the same time the requesting and the handling agency.

The General Army Office was closely coupled:

a. In the sector of training with the Chief of Training, the Arms Inspectors, and the Training Branch in the Army General Staff.

b. In the sectors of development and procurement with the Ordnance Office, with the General for Special Employment, the Army Raw Materials Branch, and the Army Budget Branch.

c. In the sector of organization with the Chief of Training and the Organization Branch of the General Staff.

The General Army Office held the key positions necessary to fulfill to the best interests of the Army its extensive responsibilities within the sphere of authority of the Chief of Army Equipment. This position was further strengthened by the fact that all weapons, equipment and ammunition turned out by industry were taken over and prepared for shipment by its General Army Office ordnance offices. This meant that neither the Chief of Army Supply and Administration nor the Organization Branch could have weapons at their disposal unless the General Army Office ordered their issuance in accordance with the armament situation.

The chaos which resulted in the field of requisitions will be illustrated by a further example:

d. Example 2 (Appendix 5):

The Army (Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army) was responsible for the development, procurement and distribution of small arms (rifles, pistols, submachine guns, machine guns) for all Wehrmacht branches and other user agencies. As a result the following situation existed:

(1) Army Sector

(a) For the Field Army the Chief of General Staff represented by:

Organisations Branch for activation of new units.
Chief of Army Supply and Administration for supply.

Arms Chiefs for experimentation purposes.
Chief of Army Signal Communications for the civil forces of the Reich Postal Service, who were employed in the operational area.

The agencies represented the requisitions of the Field Army excluding armored troops regardless of whether the former was employed in Army or Wehrmacht High Command Theaters of War.

(b) For the armored troops:

The Inspector General of Armored Troops both for the Field Army and the Replacement Army.

(c) For the Replacement Army:

The Wehrkreis headquarters for newly activated units or for the training of the Replacement Army, for schools, training courses, and experimental troops.

(2) Wehrmacht Sector

(a) The Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command represented by:

Wehrmacht Operations Staff for special requests for Wehrmacht High Command Theaters of War which could not be attained through the Chief of Army Supply and Administration.

Wehrmacht Military Economics Branch for exchanges with foreign armament firms.
Wehrmacht Counterintelligence Branch for the equipment of special formations.
Wehrmacht Foreign Armies Branch for official arms shipments to allied nations.
Chief of Wehrmacht Signal Communications for his special units.
Chief of Wehrmacht Transportation for the equipment of transport units of the Reichsbahn.

(b) The Luftwaffe High Command.

(1) For Luftwaffe field divisions until they had been taken over by the Army.

(2) For the activation of parachute units and the Panzer Division Hermann Goering.

(3) For ground antiaircraft units.

(4) For the ground personnel of the Luftwaffe.

(c) The Navy High Command for coastal batteries and other small special enterprises.

(3) Sector of the SS and the Party with its Organizations

(a) The Reichsfuehrer SS

(1) For the Waffen-SS to the extent that it was employed in the front or in the zone of the interior. Whether and to what extent units of the SS, of the Security Service, and so forth, were also equipped with these weapons, was beyond the authority of the Chief of Army Equipment.

(2) SS volunteer units (foreigners of Aryan descent).

(3) The Police with its auxiliary organizations.

(b) Reich Defense Commissioners and Gauleiters for the Volkssturm.

(c) Reich Propaganda Minister Goebbels

(1) As Gauleiter of Berlin for special purposes.

(2) On behalf of the Party and for the representatives of the German Labor Front.

(d) Agencies of the SA

(1) For the Division Feldherrnhalle and its replacement units.

(2) For the SA defense teams.

(3) For the National Socialist Motor Corps and also for the National Socialist Flying Corps.

(e) Reich Labor Service

(1) For the paramilitary training.

(2) For units employed outside the zone of the interior.

(f) Reich Youth Leader's Office

(1) General paramilitary training.

(2) Special training in National-Political Education Institutes.

(g) Organization Todt and Transportation Fleet Speer

For the construction and working units employed for the construction of the Atlantic Wall, in Norway, and in the East.

(h) The Reich Minister for Armament and War Production

The plants furnishing him were in part subjected to pressure by political user agencies not connected with the Wehrmacht with the result that they gave weapons away surreptitiously upon payment.

(4) Remaining Agencies in the Reich

For the sake of completeness I wish to mention briefly that Reich Minister Sauckel and the State Secretary for Food and Agriculture Backe, both of whom had to carry out special tasks in the Eastern areas, addressed requisitions for weapons to the Chief of Army Equipment. Goering as Reich Hunting Master also raised demands which were not so minor.

This example is of basic significance because in many other sectors similar untenable conditions existed. All efforts on the part of the Chief of Army Equipment to put an end to this nonsense based on wrong organization failed solely because of the weak position of the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command.

It went without saying that the Field Army, the other branches of the Wehrmacht, insofar as they were employed in ground combat, and the Waffen-SS had priority in the allocations. But here also requisitions

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proceeded from nine agencies rather than one and, in addition, were kept separate for Army and Wehrmacht High Command Theaters of War. Another arrangement could have been worked out in time. Only after 1944 did a certain improvement appear with the activation of the Army Staff.

Generaloberst Fromm, to whom Keitel frequently passed the final decision, usually rejected the unreasonable demands of the Party and its organizations and the other user agencies. Although these requisitions were numerically small they constituted, in principle, an encumberance at a time when the armament situation was as strained as it was.

Much more decisive were the political effects on the position of the Chief of Army Equipment. The Party, accustomed to having its way everywhere, was deaf to all objective reasoning. Whenever its wishes were thwarted it took advantage of each opportunity which arose to complain, by utilizing the usual methods, to the Fuehrer against the power of Generaloberst Fromm and thus to undermine his position. Unfortunately it found willing support from certain circles in the Wehrmacht High Command. The weakening of the position of the Chief of Army Equipment fitted into the general program for the development of a uniform Wehrmacht High Command.

5. Work of the Staff with the Party, Its Organization, and Other Authorities of the Reich

As long as there was an Army Commander in Chief, the Chief of Army Equipment had, on his behalf, to maintain contact with the Party and its organizations in the zone of the interior. After the dismissal of Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, Generaloberst Fromm declined to continue this mission. In

his opinion it was the duty of the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command in his double capacity to take over this task personally for the Wehrmacht High Command and for the Army. In fact, however, the opposite came to be true. As soon as a prominent member of the Party approached Feldmarschall Keitel in matters concerning the zone of the interior he referred him to the Commander of the Replacement Army without giving the latter any instructions as to the line to follow. As far as possible Generaloberst Fromm kept in the background and directed his Chief of Staff or the Office Chiefs concerned to carry on noncommittal negotiations with subordinate representatives of these agencies.

a. The Reichsfuehrer SS

Negotiations with the commissioners of the Reichsfuehrer SS in all matters concerning the expansion of the Waffen-SS were carried on according to completely objective points of view. The agencies concerned presented their requisitions with reference to a Fuehrer Order. They generally understood and accepted reductions necessary on the basis of the overall armament situation and did not persist in their demands. In a few cases the Obergruppenfuehrer (SS lieutenant generals) who were conducting the negotiations disagreed clearly and objectively with the Reichsfuehrer SS. Thus, Himmler in 1941, demanded that the entire military recruitment and replacement system be turned over to the SS. The fact that he was unable to realize his intentions at that time was not due to Feldmarschall Keitel but to the opposition of objectively thinking men from the ranks of the SS itself. Yet there can be no doubt that in the question of personnel replacements for the SS serious friction with the General Army Office (Army Replacements Group) had to be

overcome.

Any negotiations on furnishing equipment to the General SS, the Security Service and SS guard units were refused on principle.

There was a constant subsurface struggle between the Waffen-SS and the Army with regard to armament. The SS, by exerting a certain pressure, tried to utilize production plants working for and financed by the Army for their own purposes. The Chief of Army Equipment received no assistance in counteracting this except for the hesitant support of the Ministry for Armament and War Production. Throughout the war there was no personal exchange of views between the Reichsfuehrer SS and the Chief of Army Equipment. They were correct and objectively cool toward each other but their attitudes showed mutual disapproval.

b. Reich Propaganda Minister, Gauleiters and Reich Defense Commissioners

Goebbels, in his double position as Propaganda Minister and Gauleiter of Berlin, as well as his arrogant agencies, were the heaviest burden of all for the State. This was doubly felt because these agencies simultaneously represented the interests of the Party and the German Labor Front. Likewise unpleasant were negotiations with the representatives of the Reich defense commissioners and the other Gauleiters. They tried to interfere with the responsibilities of deputy commanding generals (Wehrkreis), thus shaking the fundamental sphere of authority of the Wehrmacht in the zone of the interior. Each one of these negotiations constituted a heavy political encumbrance.

A certain significance for the civilian employees of the Army and for

the free workers came from the representatives of the German Labor Front. It must be emphasized that within the limitations of the possible they did everything to furnish the former material support.

c. Negotiations with the Reich Labor Service proceeded smoothly on the whole, both sides remaining objective. The paramilitary training undertaken by the Reich Labor Service facilitated further training of the recruits in the replacement army. On the other hand the Labor Service, with its leader corps of 45,000 men, deprived the Army of valuable potential officers.

d. The SA and the National Socialist Motor Corps (NSKK) had been defeated in the battle with the SS for position in the State. There is no doubt that their leaders sought connection with the Army. As a result there were scarcely any difficulties. The senior leadership of the SA willingly released their leader corps for employment at the front. The achievements of the NSKK in action were exemplary.

e. There was serious tension with the Reich Youth Leader's Office at the beginning of the war, which primarily concerned the preliminary non-commissioned officer pre-training schools. The Army attempted to convert these, contrary to orders from the Fuehrer, into disguised cadet institutions. After the Reich Youth Leader had emerged absolute victor from this conflict relations with the Army became good.

f. Relations with the Reich Minister for Armament and War Production and the State Secretary for Food and Agriculture were especially close and occasionally rather unpleasant. They will be specially dealt with in Section D.

6. Oral Reports to the Fuehrer

On behalf of the Commander of the Replacement Army, the Staff had to handle the preparation for reports to the Fuehrer. The Offices submitted their contributions and, when necessary, special statistical reference material.

7. Summary

As a matter of basic policy no staff was inserted between the Chief of General Staff and the agencies of the Army High Command assigned directly to him. The idea was to insure direct contact and to prevent any intermediate staff, which would not have the right to make decisions anyway, from retarding the progress of the work.

In contrast to this, it proved particularly useful that the Chief of Army Equipment and the subordinate Offices each had their own independent staffs. Nonetheless it is true that the chiefs of these staffs had no authority whatever for making decisions. Practically speaking they were more or less responsible heads of secretariats, who supervised the cooperation and coordination of all subordinate agencies and thus prevented work duplication. As trusted assistants of the Chief of Army Equipment and their direct Office Chiefs the chiefs of staff were usually accurately oriented on their intentions and goals. Hence they could at any time be at the disposal of the editorial agencies in an advisory capacity or could furnish suggestions to these agencies. The Commander and the Office Chiefs did not have to be constantly burdened with inquiries and decisions of a secondary nature.

The chiefs of staff were present as often as possible when military reports were given. They always attended conferences with authorities and Party agencies. When decisions had been arrived at, the agencies concerned were automatically notified and at the same time instructed what they had to do. The Commander and the Office Chiefs, whose schedules were already overcrowded, did not need to concern themselves with details of technical implementation. Thus they were relieved of all functional matters and had their minds free for essential and decisive tasks.

C.

IV. Army Budget Branch and Central Branch

1. Originally the Army Budget Branch and Central Branch belonged to the General Army Office. With the dissolution in 1940 of the personal union between the Chief, General Army Office, and the Chief of Army Equipment and the appointment of Generalleutnant Olbricht as Chief, General Army Office, the Budget Branch was taken away from this office and assigned to the Chief of Army Equipment. Looked at objectively, this change was correct. The functions of the Army Budget Branch affected all offices and agencies of the Chief of Army Equipment and all were dependent upon it in one form or another. As long as it was attached to the Chief of the General Army Office the latter would have had to decide budget and financial matters on his own responsibility. In addition he would theoretically have had the possibility of thwarting the intentions of the other offices in favor of his own interests. Hence it was practical to place the Budget Branch on a higher plane. Its decisions or protests, now that they emanated from a neutral source, were of more consequence. Its influence was further strengthened by the fact that it could act immediately on behalf of the Chief of Army Equipment.

2. On the whole the Budget Branch lost importance with the beginning of the war. "Money does not matter" was the usual slogan. Actually allocation of any requisitioned amount for armament purposes was approved by the Wehrmacht High Command.

The Chief of Army Equipment, however, had concluded a tacit agreement with Schacht and Funk in their capacity as Reich Finance Ministers that

the Army would make every effort to avoid waste, squandering, and faulty investments. Judging the situation incorrectly, many headquarters, offices, and so forth, thought that they could still initiate and carry out measures at the beginning of the war, which had been desirable for military reasons in peacetime but were not necessary in wartime and hence irresponsible. Such situations had to be prevented in favor of genuine armament interests.

The old, strictly prescribed budget procedure was adhered to insofar as technical armament needs were not concerned. In contrast with the Luftwaffe and especially with the Party, all peacetime planning for barracks or representative structures was discontinued. With the aid of the Budget and Central Branch the Chief of Army Equipment could allocate money, stipulating its use, to his subordinate offices and to agencies outside his immediate jurisdiction. Thus application of surplus funds for uses other than originally stipulated was prevented. The offices were forced to work objectively in keeping with wartime interests.

The Chief of Army Equipment was also in a position to keep the Budget Branch's one hundred per cent perfection mania within tolerable limits. He knew that always wanting to do something better is the enemy of doing something well. Nothing was considered good enough by the field forces and the higher headquarters. The most petty suggestions for improvement were pushed with as much emphasis as the really justified desires for decisive improvement of weapon effectiveness. Regardless of the raw material situation and of technical production possibilities, changes were to be made continually as opinions altered or as tropic, arctic, or Central European viewpoints predominated. The fact was ignored that any change, however

desirable in itself, causes a break in the conveyor-belt process. It was overlooked that a drop in production or at least a delay for weeks and months could result.

Field units and higher headquarters in part interpreted these justified measures of the Chief of Army Equipment as a narrow-minded nuisance and as lack of good will and understanding toward their wishes.

C.

V. Army Raw Materials Branch

The Army Raw Materials Branch was formed in 1940. It evolved from Section II of the Staff of the Chief of Army Equipment and from detachments of the General Army Office and the Ordnance Office with the addition of an official from the Administration Office.

Prior to the beginning of the war, raw materials had become exceedingly short as a result of the rapid rearmament in conjunction with the forced gearing of the economy, general building activity and construction of autobahns. There is no doubt that the output of weapons after 1937 could have been substantially greater on the basis of production capacity than it actually was owing to the raw material situation. In peacetime, raw materials were applied for to the Plenipotentiary General for the Four Year Plan (Goering) through the Wehrmacht High Command (Wehrmacht Economic Branch) on the basis of requisitions of the Ordnance Office in cooperation with the General Army Office. Goering never allocated sufficient quantities to the Army.

As was the case with funds, allotted raw materials (steel, iron, synthetic materials, scarce metals, rubber, wood) for industrial production were distributed after 1939 to the user agencies by the Chief of Army Equipment. The requirements of the offices were never fully satisfied as shortage progressively increased. On the other hand it was shown that the Ordnance Office overdrew on several occasions, so that for lack of production capacity considerable quantities lay unused in the plants, were hoarded by the armament industry for more normal times in the future, or were unauthorizedly used in

the manufacture of civilian goods, while other used agencies which had made reasonable requisitions did not receive sufficient raw materials despite urgent needs and could not make full use of their production capacity. To eliminate these inadequacies in distribution and guarantee a better control of the actions of the Office the Raw Materials Branch was established and assigned directly to the Chief of Army Equipment.

Its mission was to ascertain the requirements of the offices involved and to address the necessary requisition requests at first to the Wehrmacht High Command, later (1940-1941) to the Plenipotentiary General for the Four Year Plan and finally after 1943 to the Ministry for Armament and War Production. The distribution of granted allocations to the user agencies according to a priority scale was a responsibility of the Raw Materials Branch. The degree of priority depended upon the general military situation at the front.

From 1943 on considerable friction arose because the Speer Ministry did not adhere to the allocation system but placed orders for production without heeding the military requisitions. The situation was aggravated through personal interference by Hitler, who ordered special programs carried out which usually could only be realized at the expense of other urgent projects because new allocations were not forthcoming.

The most important user agency naturally was the Ordnance Office, but the Administration Office and the General Army Office also required considerable quantities.

Special allocations were made to the following:

Ordnance Office for Development	General Army Office for Ordnance Inspectorates	Administration Office for Individual equipment for each soldier
Preparation for mass production	Field Army for use in the theater of operations	Billeting equipment
Weapons		Wrapping material
Ammunition		Cans for canned goods
Equipment of all kinds		Construction steel for billets
Motor vehicles		
Tanks		
V weapons		
Spare parts		

In general allocations were made available to the offices for stipulated uses with the understanding that the offices report back unused quantities in time to allow the Army Raw Material Branch to redispose of them.

There was a constant fight particularly with the Speer Ministry over the production of tanks. The Ministry put too much worth in reporting a high output of new tanks to the Fuehrer every month. But these high production figures could only be reached if the production of spare parts was neglected. As a result the Army suffered grave drawbacks. After the reverses at the Eastern front and in Africa more tanks were lost owing to lack of spare parts than as a result of direct enemy action. Even when the Speer Ministry boosted the production of new tanks tremendously, only two-thirds of the tank losses sustained at the front as a result of the

shortage of spare parts could be offset. Spare parts for tanks no longer in current production were not manufactured at all. There was no longer any positive increase in tanks at the front after 1943. The vulnerability of the tanks was further increased by the excessive weight of all types. Tanks originally designed for sixteen tons later attained a weight of twenty-four tons as a result of improvements by the Speer Ministry. The overstrained motors, which could not be strengthened at the same rate, were not equal to such a load, and the manufacture of spare parts gained significance accordingly. Hence the Army Raw Materials Branch, on behalf of Generaloberst Fromm, endeavored to cut raw material allocations for finished tanks in favor of the production of spare parts, especially spare motors. This proved futile, however. The Speer Ministry did as it pleased and never refrained from using allocations destined for other purposes.

Serious crises occurred when, without notifying the Chief of Army Equipment, allocations for allegedly non-priority Army requisitions were appropriated for uses other than those stipulated. The result was, to cite only a small example, that the production of urgently needed field kitchens suffered a sudden drop without any warning with the result that for months neither the Chief of Army Supply and Administration could be furnished with field kitchens nor could the numerous newly activated units be equipped with them.

With the removal of Generaloberst Fromm after the attempt on Hitler's life in 1944, the Army completely lost its influence on the distribution of raw materials and thus the possibility of controlling production in view of urgent military requirements. Collapse became inevitable.

C.

VI. The General for Special Employment with the Chief of Army Equipment

Creation of this post became necessary in 1942. The Ministry for Armament and War Production tried to eliminate the Ordnance Office from the development of new weapons. On the other hand the Ordnance Office had developed new and serviceable weapons and types of ammunition which it wished to introduce regardless of the strained armament situation. In view of the chaos in weapons of the most varied types, which prevailed at the front (in addition to the regular German weapons the entire stock of captured Czech, French, Russian, Belgian, Dutch, Norwegian, and Yugoslav weapons had been introduced into the Army), a further increase in types of weapon was for the most part extremely impractical. Any new weapon on the whole did not produce revolutionary innovations either but was certain to demand a new type of ammunition.

An additional fact was that the wishes of the field forces represented by the Chiefs of branches of the General Army Office often ran in directions other than that which the Ordnance Office desired. Complaints accumulated with the Fuehrer. His disapproving attitude toward the Ordnance Office was further strengthened because he was constantly flooded with suggestions for new weapons from certain circles of industry, the SS, the Party and from civilian sources. On closer scrutiny many of the suggestions turned out to be of no use in the field. On the other hand industry made very useful suggestions based on experience for improvement and simplification of mass production and for the use of synthetic and scarce materials. A certain

decline in quality had to be accepted if, as a result, the monthly output could be raised. Besides, the Ordnance Office designed many of its weapons with too many safety attachments, thus making them too heavy or else over-developed the weapons, which diminished their usefulness in the field.

It was the responsibility of the General for Special Employment to straighten out conflicting interests and opinions and to determine how many useful new weapons were to be required. It was especially essential that these requirements be presented to the Speer Ministry in a coordinated fashion.

The Staff was composed of the following:

1. Representatives of all arms who had been on the front and were familiar with the wishes of the field forces. On the whole, they came from the Ordnance Branch of the General Army Office.

2. Representatives of the Ordnance Office, Experimental Branch, who knew the current technical status in the development of weapons and who contributed new suggestions.

3. Representatives of the armament industry who voiced their opinions on questions of production. Labor, time-saving methods, questions of tool machines, of the conveyer-belt process, and of steel and synthetic material requirements with a view to later mass production were all considered.

The result of these continuous discussions was consolidated in development and construction plans submitted to the Fuehrer for detailed comment. But in practice the Speer Ministry could not always be prevented from disregarding these demands and going its own way.

C.

VII. Arms Inspectors-Fortress Inspector-Medical and Veterinary Inspector-Army Judge Advocate General

1. Arms Inspectors

a. Upon the outbreak of the war, the Arms Inspectors, who until then had been assigned directly to the Army Commander in Chief, came under the command of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army.

b. There were inspectors for the following arms and branches of service:

Infantry
Riding and Driving
Artillery
Engineers
Mobile Troops
Signal Troops
Motor Transport Troops
Chemical Troops.

c. Their responsibility was to supervise the uniform training of the respective arms in the replacement army and in newly activated units. They were authorized to inspect the troops and, with the concurrence of the competent Wehrkreis commanders, to order exercises for their respective arms. At the same time they were special advisers to the Wehrkreis headquarters in matters of training for their arms.

The Inspector for Riding and Driving was responsible for the uniform training of all arms in riding and driving.

The Artillery Inspector was responsible for the Troop Surveying

and Weather Service, the Inspector of Chemical Troops for the Gas Defense Service with all arms.

They had opportunities to visit units at the front with the concurrence of the Chief of the General Staff and make use of their experience in the training, equipment, and organization of the replacement army.

d. The Arms Inspectors did not have their own staffs. They depended upon the Arms Branches of the General Army Office. They were authorized to present their demands regarding the training of the replacement army to the Chief of the General Army Office.

e. The Arms Inspectors never had any very substantial influence. Too old or too ill to find employment at the front, they were compelled to be constantly on the road under the very difficult and ungratifying conditions of the Replacement Army. In spite of a most faithful discharge of duties, they never had the chance to bring their influence to bear in full measure owing to the size and the scattered location of the Replacement Army. Attempts on their part to personally gather experience at the front displeased the General Staff. Upon the creation of the Chief of Training in 1942 (see C. IX) the Arms Inspectors were assigned to him. Thereby their independence was still further reduced.

f. Their relations with the very much younger, combat-experienced Branch Chiefs attached to the Chief of the General Staff were not overpleasant. The latter sought to gain increased influence on the Arms Branches of the General Army Office at the expense of the Arms Inspectors. Each of them had his pet scheme and constantly broached it, thinking himself thus

capable of decisively affecting the outcome of the war. On the whole, as one-sided representatives of their arms, they were not in a position to recognize the delicate interconnections of the armament and training situation. (For details see C. IX.) Stubbornly confining their view to their own respective spheres, they raised unrealizable demands. Their field of activity lay at the front. They could not judge the seriousness of the situation prevailing in the Replacement Army. When, in spite of this, they persisted in submitting, on behalf of the Chief of General Staff, demands which were impossible to fill, one cannot in retrospect resist the impression that they were endeavoring to have their direct superiors cover them. If they were to fail, their own incompetence then had a good chance of being overlooked.

They had actually little influence until the arrest of General-oberst Fromm. Thereafter, their activities did more to paralyze the work of the General Army Office than enemy action and other influences put together. When in September 1944 they were charged with the responsibility for the training of the Replacement Army, Field and Replacement Armies had been more or less united under the pressure of the current situation. Time for training was lacking. The service regulations issued at that time for the Branch Chiefs of the Army High Command were only on paper and had not been realized in practice.

2. <u>The Inspector of Fortresses</u>

The Inspector of Fortresses was assigned to the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army. In practice, however, he

was charged by the Army Commander in Chief and later by the Chief of General Staff with the execution of special tasks in the field of land fortifications. The Chief of Army Equipment refused to intervene in any form in strategic and tactical matters. In principle, he did not wish to interfere with the sphere of authority of the Chief of the General Staff.

For the execution of the mission assigned him he had the Inspectorate of Fortresses in the General Army Office at his disposal, the functions of which are dealt with in detail in the section by Generalleutnant Reinhardt entitled, The General Army Office.

3. The Army Medical Inspector

a. The Army Medical Inspector was assigned to the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army. He originally directed the medical service for all Wehrmacht branches on behalf of the Wehrmacht High Command and in this capacity was assigned directly to the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command. In this position he was responsible for the entire medical service in the Wehrmacht. He issued the directives for the organization of wartime medical service.

In the personnel sphere he was responsible for replacement and employment of medical personnel; in the materiel sphere for development, procurement and administration of medical equipment and for its use in the theaters of operations and the zone of the interior. He directed the general medical service (fight against epidemics) and the special medical service for military recruitment, supply and prisoners of war. He controlled hospital and ambulance facilities. He directed the employment

of the voluntary nursing service and issued basic directives to welfare institutions of this organization. He had to maintain contact with civil authorities in medical matters and to represent the interests of the Wehrmacht in the event of any basic measures taken in the zone of the interior.

b. He issued directives to the Army Surgeon with the Chief of Supply and Administration for the management of medical services in the Field Army, for the evacuation of the wounded and sick and for the supply of medical equipment.

c. He was responsible for the training of medical personnel and at the same time was their senior specialist superior. He made suggestions to the Army Personnel Office as to appointments and promotions of Army medical officers. He was authorized to supervise the entire medical service both in the theaters of operations and in the zone of the interior with permission of the Army Commander in Chief and the Chief of Army Equipment. He directly controlled the Academy for Military Medicine and the Main Medical Supply Depot.

4. The Army Veterinary Inspector

The Army Veterinary Inspector was assigned directly to the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army. He directed the veterinary services of the Wehrmacht on behalf of the Wehrmacht High Command and was their representative in contacts with the civil authorities. He issued the directives required for the organization of the wartime veterinary services. In the personnel sector he was responsible for the replacement and employment of veterinary and blacksmith personnel. In the

materiel sphere he was responsible for development, procurement and administration of veterinary equipment and for its use in the area of operations and in the zone of the interior.

He was the specialist superior of the entire veterinary and blacksmith personnel, for whose special training he was responsible. He made suggestions to the Army Personnel Office as to appointments and promotions of veterinary officers in the Army.

He issued directives to the chief Army Veterinary Officer with the Chief of Army Supply and Administration for the management of the veterinary service in the Field Army and for the evacuation of sick or disabled Army animals and then distributed them to the animal hospitals in the zone of the interior.

He determined the employment of the organizations for the prevention of cruelty to animals serving with the Army. He was the disciplinary and specialist superior of the veterinary services in the Replacement Army. In addition he directly controlled the following:

The Army Veterinary Academy.

The Army Veterinary Examination Office.

The Main Veterinary Supply Depots.

The Army Blacksmith Schools.

He headed the Veterinary Inspectorate of the General Army Office, which was at his disposal as working staff.

5. The Army Judge Advocate General

The Army Judge Advocate General was assigned directly to the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army. He was the senior

specialist over all military justice officers in the Field and Replacement Armies and was their disciplinary superior. He issued the administrative directives pertaining to Army justice, directed the training of military justice officers and supervised their activities in this field.

He was the confidential adviser of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army in the confirmation and annulment of sentences pronounced by courts-martial of the Field Army (if the offenders had been transferred to the replacement army) and of the Replacement Army.

Because of his legal knowledge he was consulted, without having authority on the basis of his service regulations, in all matters of law and justice, in the preparation of drafts of laws, in general administrative matters and in expenditures. He was -- and this must be particularly emphasized -- of incorruptable integrity. He allowed himself to be influenced neither by Himmler nor by pressure from Party agencies.

Death sentences pronounced by courts-martial of the Replacement Army were always referred by the Commander to a court-martial of higher level for examination. In almost all cases appeals for clemency were then submitted and subjected to a scrupulous personal examination by the Commander. Death penalties were frequently converted by an act of clemency into penal servitude.

C.

VIII. Inspector of Education and Training Affairs

By Colonel Zerbel (General Staff)

1. Development

Special value was attached in the German Army at all times to the education and training of young officers. This was based on the knowledge born of long experience that in the final analysis the value of its officer corps determines the value of an army. Accordingly the direction of the education and training of future officers had always been entrusted to a special agency which was composed of officers particularly suited and experienced for education and training matters.

Before the war this function had been entrusted to the Inspectorate of Officer Candidate Schools, which was directly controlled by the Army Commander in Chief. It was responsible for the administration of the education and training of future officers from officer aspirant to second lieutenant.

At the beginning of the war the Inspectorate of Officer Candidate Schools was disbanded. The officer aspirants receiving their training at the officer candidate schools entered their mobilization assignment with the Field Army according to their training status, as did the highly-qualified training personnel of the officer candidate schools. The reason for these measures was the tendency, prevailing at that time, to believe that the war would be of short duration and that therefore peacetime training periods for future officers (training at officer candidate schools alone required two years) could no longer be entertained. Instead, wartime officer aspirant training courses were established in the Wehrkreises, in which fully trained

enlisted men were trained to be officers (platoon leaders) in short courses of eight weeks duration in order to cover anticipated losses.

These training courses were controlled by the subordinate corps headquarters. The former chief of staff of the Inspectorate of Officer Candidate Schools was to supervise this training as "Commander of Officer Aspirant Training Courses." He was assigned to the Chief of the General Staff and received his directives through the Training Branch of the General Staff, to which he reported on his experience and his observations. This organization was unhappily-chosen and clumsy. It lay completely outside the scope of tasks of the Army General Staff. The observations made by the Commander of Officer Aspirant Training Courses were to be evaluated by the Training Branch of the Army General Staff and transmitted, as a request, by the Chief of the General Staff to the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army. The latter had then to issue instructions, directives, and orders to the subordinate corps headquarters which controlled the officer aspirant training courses.

This organization never put in a practical appearance. The recognition that the duration of the war could not be foreseen led, by the fall of 1939, to the demand for its reorganization and for more strictly controlled and more systematic training of future officers as part of a long-range program. In early 1940 the officer candidate schools were reopened. Control of the training was turned over to the newly-created agency, "Inspectorate of Education and Training Affairs," which was assigned directly to the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army. Development of this over the subsequent war years involved a constant

expansion of responsibilities and duties of the Inspectorate of Education and Training Affairs. Assumption of control of the noncommissioned officer and preliminary noncommissioned officer schools brought additional responsibility for the education and training of the future noncommissioned officers. With this step the education and training of all future commanders in the overall Army training program was combined under the direction of the Inspectorate of Education and Training Affairs. Eventually the influence of the Inspectorate of Education and Training Affairs was also extended to the preliminary preparation, enlistment and registration of potential officers, as will later be described in detail.

When in the fall of 1942 the Chief of Training (see Section C. IX.) was created in the Replacement Army, the Inspectorate of Education and Training Affairs was assigned to him, but it always remained a separate sector within the field of overall training, responsibly directed by the Inspector of Education and Training Affairs. In October 1943 the Inspectorate of Education and Training Affairs was reorganized as Office of the Inspector General for Future Officers, which continued in operation until the end of the war. The reasons which led to this reorganization in addition to the aforementioned extension of responsibilities will be dealt with in a subsequent section.

2. Responsibilities

(Set down in the service regulations governing the Inspector of Education and Training Affairs of the Army, General Army Communications 1943, page 419.)

The mission of the Inspector of Education and Training Affairs was

to direct the education and training of future officers:

a. In the case of officer applicants (reserve officer applicants) from the original assignment to a unit until promotion to second lieutenant.

b. In the case of professional noncommissioned officer aspirants from the original assignment to a unit until completion of training in the Army noncommissioned officer schools.

On behalf of the Chief of Training he had to issue the necessary orders and directives to the troops (Replacement and Field Armies), to the subordinate schools and training courses, and to the officer candidate and advanced officer candidate courses at the service schools.

In the field of technical and tactical training of the various arms he was bound to comply with the directives and contributions given on behalf of the Chief of Training by the authorized Arms Branches; in the case of armored troops, with the orders and directives issued by the Inspector General of Panzer Troops.

In the education and training of future officers he had to consider the demands of the Army Personnel Office.

He had to supervise the training and was authorized to determine the standing of education and training and of the attainment of training goals of potential officers with field units, officer candidate and advanced officer candidate courses at the service schools.

His responsibilities additionally included:

a. Direction of general education in the Army including all measures taken to select and train Army instructors and potential Army instructors needed to give general courses in education.

b. Direction of sports in the Army including measures required for the carrying out of official and voluntary sports by members of the Army; selection of potential Army sports instructors and regulation of their training, decisions as to the employment of Army sports instructors.

c. Suggestions

As to recruitment of potential officers (to Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, Potential Army Members Branch).

As to acceptance of officer applicants (to Army Personnel Office, Branch P-4).

As to acceptance of noncommissioned officer applicants (to General Army Office, Branch for General Troop Matters).

Requisitions for replacements for the Army noncommissioned officer schools.

d. Handling of personnel affairs for Army airmen and ground tactics instructors of the Army employed at Luftwaffe schools, continued tactical education of ground tactics instructors, institution and supervision of training courses conducted by the Army within the scope of the training of Luftwaffe personnel as Army reconnaissance flyers.

3. Organization and Chain of Command

a. The Inspector of Education and Training Affairs was a member of the Army High Command. He was responsible to the Chief of Training in the Replacement Army.

He had the status of a chief of a group, and he had the disciplinary authority of a divisional commander toward the schools he controlled.

b. The Inspector of Education and Training Affairs controlled directly:

(1) The infantry officer candidate schools including the advanced officer candidate courses attached to them.*

(2) The artillery officer candidate schools including the advanced officer candidate courses attached to them.*

(3) The Army noncommissioned officer schools and preliminary noncommissioned officer schools (the latter until their disbandment) including the officer applicant courses attached to the noncommissioned officer schools.

(4) The institutions in the Army designed to train future Army instructors in general education.

(5) The Army airmen cadre battalions.

(6) Remnant staffs of officer candidate schools and of the Army School of Sports.

c. The Inspector of Education and Training Affairs had a working staff -- the Inspectorate of Education and Training Affairs -- headed by an elder General Staff officer who was placed at his disposal. The staff was composed of the following:

(1) Officer Candidate Schools Branch.

(2) Noncommissioned Officer Schools and Preliminary Noncommissioned Officer Schools Branch.

(3) Army Specialist Schools Branch.

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* Only infantry and artillery had their own officer candidate schools. In the other arms officer candidates were trained in courses attached to the service schools, which were under the direct control of the Chief of Training.

(4) Regulations and Means of Instruction Branch.

(5) Registry.

d. The Inspector of Education and Training Affairs issued instructions and directives on behalf of the Army High Command concerning the training and education of all future officers and noncommissioned officers. These were binding for all agencies of the Army, hence for both the Field and Replacement Armies.

e. The Inspector of Education and Training Affairs represented the Army in negotiations with the Reich Youth Leader. In this capacity he particularly represented the interests of the Army regarding paramilitary training in the Hitler Youth.

f. The Inspector of Education and Training Affairs represented the Army in negotiations with the Minister for Science, Education and Popular Instruction. Here he primarily represented the interests of the Army regarding the military orientation of school and college students.

g. As representative of the Army in contacts with the Reich Sport Leader he represented the interests of the Army regarding the participation of Army personnel in civilian sports and the training of athletic instructors.

h. The Inspector of Education and Training Affairs depended upon direct cooperation with the Reich Air Minister and Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, relative to whom he represented the interests of Army personnel assigned to the Luftwaffe as Army flyers and ground tactics instructors.

The organization, command, and cooperation conditions described in the paragraphs above were the result of a development during the years between 1940 and 1943. The trend of this development was to extend the influence

of the Inspector of Education and Training Affairs to all sectors involved in the education and training of future officers. The high losses of officers and noncommissioned officers, especially during the Eastern campaign, and the constantly increasing number of newly activated units resulted in needs which could not be met by existing schools and training courses. Again and again new courses had to be improvised in the Field and Replacement Armies. In addition the different educational background of the applicants (young officer aspirants and reserve officer aspirants, seasoned noncommissioned officers, older age classes), each of which required a different objective and training period, had to be taken into account. Only a strict organization could intelligently bring this diversified training into a uniform system. The rising requirements of technical and tactical training (new weapons, war experience) made Army influence upon paramilitary training a pressing matter so that the simplest phases of basic military training would be already taught prior to military training proper with a resultant saving of valuable time. This development was climaxed by the conversion of the Inspectorate of Education and Training Affairs in March 1943 and the establishment of the Inspector General for Potential Officers. His sphere of authority was even more strictly defined and it emphasized primarily the influence of the paramilitary training of the Hitler Youth and the uniform education of the future officers of the Army. Details on the execution of these responsibilities and especially on the various careers, organizations and training stages at schools and in training courses have been dealt with in a special study, ("Personnel and Administration," Part IV, by Generalmajor Reinhardt).

4. Modus Operandi

a. In the Inspectorate of Education and Training Affairs, (the staff of the Inspector of Education and Training Affairs,) the training regulations governing all training of potential officers with the field forces, at schools and in training courses, were prepared. In cooperation with the Training Branch of the Army General Staff war experience was exploited, and in cooperation with the representatives of the various arms of service (Chiefs of Branches, Arms Inspectors, Arms Branches) the interests of the various arms were taken into account. In orders, directives and memoranda, schools and training courses received uniform regulations on the basis of which training schedules were determined in detail. Model and testing problems prepared by the Inspectorate of Education and Training were a further means of guaranteeing uniformity of training.

b. Supervision of the training of future officers and noncommissioned officers was the special mission of the Inspector. Through personal visits to schools and training courses, presence at their duties and inspections, he became acquainted with the caliber of their training and its execution. He was aided by authorized officers of his staff and by the Arms Inspectors and Arms Branches. Through inspection comments and discussions with commanders and instructors of schools and training courses he brought his personal influence to bear.

c. Special value was attached to the education of potential commanders. This principle followed the tradition of the German Army, according to which character, moral stamina and professional ethics had always been

the prerequisites for an officer career. These educational principles in the training of future officers very soon roused the antagonism of the Party which regarded their continuance as an adherence to outmoded standards and strove with all its means to gain influence upon the education of the future officer along the line of revolutionary national-socialist ideology. The problem of national-socialist education regarding future officers was a constant point of friction. Hitler and the Party were fully conscious of the fact that the opening wedge for national-socialist penetration of the Wehrmacht lay in the education of future officers. Hitler regarded the education of future officers with strong distrust and irritably demanded conversion of the program repeatedly. But in spite of all the means at its disposal, the Party remained unsuccessful in the long run. Even those officers who favored the Third Reich and expected victory for Germany under National-Socialist leadership for the most part soon ran counter to the tendencies of the Party in educational affairs. In the final analysis it was the insurmountable contrast between the tradition of German military profession and the revolutionary ideology of the Party that can be credited with this. The goal of officer education was the implantation of high professional standards and deep-rooted moral responsibility: the goal of the Party was an army of unquestioning mercenaries.

The objective of injecting revolutionary ideas into the education of officers was primarily pursued through selection of the corps of instructors. Even if the military expert — the officer — could not be dispensed with for instructional purposes, at least only those officers were to be admitted as instructors whose attitude toward the Third Reich was thoroughly positive.

Although demands from Party and top-level circles could not be simply ignored, technical qualifications still remained the prerequisite for the selection of officers for this important mission -- they had to remain so unless the military value of the officer corps was to suffer a decisive decline. The education and grave experience in the field of the officers finally selected always gained the ascendancy to such an extent that they imparted to the future officers in their care an earnest conception of the officer profession and its moral responsibility, emphasizing these as the most important prerequisites for every military commander.

The expectation that Hitler Youth training would have its automatic effects on the future officers materialized only in part. Even the contrary was often true. Satiated with slogans and propaganda in the Hitler Youth, the young men themselves, for the most part, felt that there existed a benefit in the difference between the past propaganda and the sober and objective tone of officer education and willingly subjected themselves to the education and training principles of the Army, which demonstrated that the traditions deeply rooted in the German soul could not be eradicated by external means.

d. <u>The question of selection</u> of potential officers and noncommissioned officers became more and more difficult as the need increased during the war. The basic standards set in peacetime -- such as a high school diploma as prerequisite for officer applicants -- could not be upheld. Instead, competent performance in the field became a new and outstanding basis for choice. Although thereby the circle from which potential officers

and noncommissioned officers were recruited was necessarily extended, one principle was rigidly adhered to: the decisive factor in the selection of potential officers continued to be an inherent quality of character and degree of personality.

Since he was in close cooperation with the agencies entrusted with the selection -- the Army Personnel Office for Future Officers and the General Army Office for Future Noncommissioned Officers -- the Inspector of Education and Training Affairs insisted on careful selection according to the principles cited. Even in the face of demands by the Party to accord preferential consideration and more rapid advancements to the leaders of various Party organizations and formations, these principles were adhered to. Character and performance remained decisive. Those who did not meet these requirements were not admitted to the commander curriculum or were eliminated during training.

A special problem was the promotion of competent noncommissioned officers to commissioned officers. The possibility of becoming an officer existed for every noncommissioned officer. A prerequisite was that he met the requirements with respect to character, personality, and ability. Numerous noncommissioned officers, primarily those who served from Reichswehr times and who possessed excellent military backgrounds, were promoted to officers, proved themselves highly qualified and in part reached high command positions. In their selection, however, strict standards were applied as was only right, and the principle, "better a good noncommissioned officer than a bad officer" was followed. The Inspector of Education and Training Affairs, who responsibly handled both positions, exercised decisive influence upon the selection and issued directives for education and training.

e. Since application for an officer career in the various arms was on a voluntary basis, publicity for the various arms played an important role. The fact that enlistments predominated in all technical branches of service, especially in the armored forces, corresponded to the trend of the time. But the need for infantry was now, as before, the greatest. The Luftwaffe and the Waffen-SS offered the stimulus of special advantages. At times a battle of competition for the best potential officer manpower conducted by rather unpleasant means raged among these various agencies. In this matter too, it was the responsibility of the Inspector of Education and Training Affairs to represent the interests of the Army. In cooperation with the Reich Minister for Science, Education and Popular Instruction and the Reich Youth Leader he handled the dissemination of information as to requirements and the various careers one could follow. Officers who had returned from the front adorned with the highest decorations for special achievements, held lectures at schools and at units of the Hitler Youth. The solution of the problem of obtaining future infantrymen was primarily sought in this manner.

f. As Army representative in dealings with the Reich Sports Leader the Inspector of Education and Training Affairs represented the demands of the Army for general physical training as a preparation for the military training period. To guarantee uniformity of athletic training, intensive training of sports instructors was undertaken and the required number of sports instructors for the units of the Army, schools, training courses, and the like, were set aside. This responsibility of the Inspector of Education and Training Affairs also included representation of the interests

of the Army regarding participation of Army members in civilian sports events.

g. Numerous Army officers were employed within the Luftwaffe. At the beginning of the war the observers of reconnaissance squadrons were young Army officers detached to the Luftwaffe to receive their special training as observers. In addition, experienced Army officers were employed at the observer schools of the Luftwaffe as ground tactics instructors. Supervision of all these officers detached to the Luftwaffe was a responsibility of the Inspector of Education and Training Affairs who, in cooperation with the appropriate agencies of the Luftwaffe, regulated training and welfare and saw to their execution through inspections and presence at activities. In 1943 the Army observers were transferred to the Luftwaffe.

h. Like all other agencies entrusted with responsibility for training affairs, the Inspector of Education and Training Affairs also led a constant battle in his sector for adequate training periods. The unexpectedly high officer casualties, especially during the reverses in the East, caused requirements to rise by leaps and bounds. Demands by the Army Personnel Office for more rapid training of the necessary future officers were the natural result, but the Inspector of Education and Training Affairs repeatedly expounded the view that only well-trained officers could perform their tasks and that it was a crime, especially in so strained and critical a period, to entrust troops to incompletely trained commanders and subordinate commanders. Understanding on the part of the top military level for this attitude — which was self-evident from the military point of view — was slight. Hitler often

emphasized that spirit could replace training and that a fanatic National-Socialist was the best leader of troops in battle.

Nevertheless it must be stated that adequate training periods were maintained with regard to future officers. With individual exceptions the Inspector of Education and Training Affairs succeeded on the whole in preventing transfers to field assignments during the training period and in maintaining the necessary length of these periods. Details concerning training periods in the various officer curricula and courses are contained in a special study on officer training.

5. Conversion of the Post of "Inspector of Education and Training Affairs" into the Post of "Inspector General for Potential Officers"

In October 1943 the office of the Inspector of Education and Training Affairs was reorganized as the office of the Inspector General for Potential Officers. The reasons for this lay primarily in Hitler's distrust of the kind of education and training of future officers which was being offered. He felt that education and training still proceeded too much according to an obsolete system, that too much value was attached to special military training, and that education of fanatical fighters for National-Socialism got the worst of the bargain. The reorganization was also necessitated by the course of events, however, and was in accordance with the justified demand for a still stricter concentration of all affairs concerning future commanders as a result of the increasing strain developing in the course of the war.

The Inspector General for Potential Officers received extended authority

in all fields concerned with potential officers. His influence on the Hitler Youth was particularly strengthened and more preminence was accorded to National-Socialist education. In effect, however, there was no substantial change. Schools and training courses continued to be directed by competent line officers, and these, from their own experience, attached primary importance to military principles. These principles proved themselves fully in the recent war. From a pure military point of view it is due to them that the officer corps and the bulk of the noncommissioned officer corps, despite all difficulties and all weak elements in their ranks, maintained a level of education and training which permitted them to do their duty until the end and thereby made the troops they led a useful instrument in the hands of the high command in spite of all adversities.

C.

IX. The Chief of Training in The Replacement Army

By Colonel Zerbel (General Staff)

1. Evolution

The first war years showed that training in the Replacement Army was inadequately organized and not equal to its tasks. It was organized with the idea that the Replacement Army was merely to train recruits for the Field Army according to established principles and prepared training schedules. The responsible director of this training was the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army; it was handled by Section I in his staff under the direction of a General Staff officer.

This arrangement was satisfactory during the Polish and French campaigns, where losses were relatively small, though even during this period the fact made itself unfavorably felt as a result of the fact that the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army was so busy with his extensive sphere of responsibilities that he was quite unable to devote himself to the direction and supervision of training to the extent that this important field required.

The further course of the war, the heavy casualties in the Eastern campaign and the resultant increased need for replacements, and the numerous new activations of whole units in the area of the Replacement Army increased the training mission of the Replacement Army in unexpected measure. In addition came the introduction of numerous new weapons, the necessity for evaluating

war experience quickly and making it applicable for the training of the Replacement Army, the extension of existing schools and the organization of many new schools and training courses of all kinds.

Section I in the staff of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army was quite unable to perform these extended responsibilities from the sheer point of view of the work involved. A really strict direction and supervision of training by the responsible Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army became more and more illusory as his responsibilities in the sector of armament and organization were also constantly expanded in the course of the war. Still this steadily became ever more imperative to guarantee uniformity of training for all arms. During 1941 and 1942 training in the Replacement Army was based to a great extent on the cooperation of subordinate agencies, which naturally depended upon various individuals and thereby differed accordingly.

Demand for a central agency -- with sufficient personnel -- to direct responsibly the overall training in the Replacement Army became increasingly frequent. Therefore, in October 1942 the post of "Chief of Training in the Replacement Army" was created (hereafter briefly referred to as "Chief of Training").

2. Mission

a. The mission of the Chief of Training was to direct the training of the entire Replacement Army, including newly activated units under the control of the Replacement Army, according to directives which the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army issued in compliance with demands made by the Army General Staff.

b. Main points of this mission were the following:

(1) To guarantee uniformity of training.

(2) To exploit war experience.

(3) To make training realistic and modern.

3. Organization and Chain of Command

a. The Chief of Training was directly subordinate to the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army. He had the status of an office chief in the Army High Command and the disciplinary authority of the commanding general of a corps.

For the execution of his mission an especially selected staff was at his disposal, which, in addition to two General Staff officers, contained experienced and able line officers of all arms. Thus the interests of the various arms were maintained within the staff, and uniformity under General Staff direction was guaranteed.

Under the direction of the Chief of Staff (a senior General Staff officer) the Staff was organized as follows:

(1) Section Ia, Chief: A General Staff officer, who simultaneously was the deputy of the Chief of Staff and Chief, Section I.

Cooperation with the Army General Staff.

Compilation of training principles for replacement troops, newly activated units and allied armies.

Cooperation with other Wehrmacht branches, Waffen-SS, and Reich Labor Service.

(2) Section Ia (1), Chief: a field grade officer.

Experiences of the field army.

Inspection comments of the Chief of Training.

(3) Section Ia (2), Chief: a field grade officer.

Equipment, armament, clothing.

Training aids.

Training of convalescents.

Training directives, magazines, instruction books.

Native and foreign literature.

(4) Section Ia (3), Chief: a field grade officer.

Training schedules.

(5) Section Ia (Sp), Chief: an official (sports authority).

Sports for replacement troops, schools and training courses.

Sports for convalescents.

(6) Section Ib, Chief: a field grade officer, who simultaneously was the Chief of Section Ib.

Training at service schools.

Training of instruction units.

Troop experiments for instruction and test units.

(7) Section Ib (1), Chief: a field grade officer.

Training in courses and at schools.

Use of instruction units.

Training films.

(8) Section IIa, Chief: a field grade officer, who simultaneously was Chief of Section II.

Personnel affairs of officers of all directly subordinate agencies.

Efficiency ratings.

(9) Section IIa (1), Chief: a reserve officer.

Personnel affairs of noncommissioned officers and enlisted men of all directly subordinate agencies.

Awards and decorations.

Selection of most qualified personnel.

(10) Special-Missions Staff Officer to Chief of Training: a first lieutenant.

Personal matters of the Chief of Training.

Preparation of visits to troops.

(11) Registry under the direction of an official.

b. The Arms Branches

To handle affairs of the individual arms, the Arms Branches of the General Army Office were at the disposal of the Chief of Training. They were obliged to comply with his instructions in all matters concerning training and on his behalf prepared regulations, memoranda and notes for the individual arms and made additions concerning the individual arms to training directives and training schedules.

c. The Arms Inspectors.

The Arms Inspectors were assigned directly to the Chief of Training. Their main mission was to be present at the activities of replacement units on behalf of the Chief of Training, to conduct inspections and supervise training. They made reports to the Chief of Training which the latter utilized in his training directives and inspection comments.

d. The Replacement Units.

Toward the deputy corps commanders, who responsibly directed the training in the Wehrkreise, the Chief of Training acted on behalf of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army. He was authorized to visit all replacement units. The deputy corps commanders were bound to follow his directives in training matters. According to his own observations during unit inspections and on the basis of reports by the Arms Inspectors he continually issued inspection comments in the form of memoranda.

e. The Inspectorate of Education and Training Affairs.

The Inspectorate of Education and Training Affairs was assigned directly to the Chief of Training. Thus the Chief of Training was also vested with the responsibility for the training of all future officers. Since the Inspector of Education and Training Affairs and his staff were located near by, close cooperation with this important agency was insured. He exercised decisive influence on this training through visits and inspections at officer candidate schools, noncommissioned officer schools, and preliminary noncommissioned officer schools and by issuing training directives and training aids.

f. The Army Motion Picture Office.

The Army Motion Picture Office was assigned directly to the Chief of Training. It was occupied by officers of all arms who had had combat-experience and, in close cooperation with the Training Branch of the Army General Staff, the Arms Branches of the General Army Office, and the Arms Generals produced instruction films for training.

g. Cooperation with the Army General Staff.

Close contact with the Field Army was guaranteed by close cooperation with the Training Branch of the Army General Staff. The Training Branch transmitted the demands of the General Staff for the training of replacements. It furnished the evaluated experience reports from the field forces and the regulations, memoranda, and training aids issued for the Field Army, upon which the Chief of Training based his training directives. This cooperation especially involved continual assignments of combat-experienced training personnel from the Field Army to all training establishments of the Replacement Army and the organization and manning of training courses and schools. For the individual arms this cooperation was attained in conjunction with the Arms Generals in the Army High Command and the Arms Branches of the General Army Office.

h. Cooperation with Special Agencies.

In training matters the Chief of Training additionally depended upon cooperation with the Special Staff for Tropical Warfare, with the Senior Officer of Administrative Troops, the Army Medical Inspector, and the Army Veterinary Inspector, all of whom had to follow his directives insofar as general military training was concerned, while they were independent in matters concerning their own specialist training.

i. Cooperation with Agencies Outside of the Army.

Paramilitary training in the Reich Labor Service was influenced by direct cooperation with the latter -- training in the Hitler Youth through the Inspectorate of Education and Training Affairs. Cooperation with the Waffen-SS was limited to the transmittal of training material. The Waffen-SS

conducted the training of its replacements independently, but for the purely military phases of training it adhered to the training principles of the Army.

j. Training of Allied Units.

From 1943 on the training of Allied units was added to the responsibilities of the Chief of Training. Hungarian and Italian units were billeted as entire units or organizations within the area of the Replacement Army. They were armed with German weapons and were trained according to German principles under the guidance of German training detachments. A special interpreter branch translated the necessary manuals.

4. Modus Operandi

The training directives for the Replacement Army were prepared according to the demands of the Army General Staff. The reports of the Arms Inspectors were also taken into account. Training schedules were determined in conjunction with the Arms Branches of the General Army Office.

It was the main responsibility of the Chief of Training to guarantee the uniformity of training for all arms and to curtail unjustified special wishes of individual arms. A continuous fight over such special wishes and interests flared up in the later war years, conducted rather impetuously by the representatives of the individual arms (Arms Generals and Arms Branches) and not always according to purely objective points of view. Questions of prestige often played a large part in such strifes. It hampered the work of the Chief of Training, but the fact that the conflict went on at the central agency had the advantage of saving the units from conflicting demands and directives which could not be fulfilled.

Special attention and effort was again and again devoted to the question of how to make training in the Replacement Army modern and realistic. In addition to the aforementioned, rapid evaluation of battle experience of the field forces and its use in the training directives for the Replacement Army, plus a continual exchange of training personnel was arranged in cooperation with the Training Branch of the General Staff. This served the purpose of enabling senior and subordinate commanders of the Field Army who had distinguished themselves at the front to pass on directly as trainers in the Replacement Army the practical experience of recent battles.

Furthermore, a close contact was established between field and replacement units by coupling replacement units with certain field units in the form of a "sponsorship relation." Direct exchange and mutual visits between officers made this contact closer and rendered it of value in training. The attempt to actually dispatch replacements upon completion of training to their proper sponsor unit was only realizable during the first period of the war. Later this desirable measure failed for organizational reasons which were more and more supplanted by improvisation as a result of the constant crises in the East.

The hardest battle was waged by the Chief of Training in his sphere of responsibility -- as by all agencies entrusted with training matters -- for adequate training periods. At the beginning of the war a training period of twelve weeks was envisaged for recruits. According to experience gained in the Eastern campaign this period was extended in September 1943 to sixteen weeks but in 1944 shortened again to twelve weeks under force of circumstances. This was a battle for theoretical training periods, however. In practice, from

1943 on, replacement units with a training period of eight weeks and less were almost continually driven to the front in critical situations and immediately thrown into combat.

The most disastrous effects of this system of incipient disorganization date from 1944 and thereafter with newly activated units, which often were suddenly pulled out of their training and exceedingly hastily shipped to the front, large parts of their ordnance equipment being issued to them only during the movement.

The Chief of Training, just like the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, never ceased to protest against such measures. This opposition was only rarely successful. The blame for once, of course, lay in the adverse course of the war and the growing crises on all fronts, but also in the fatal disregard and depreciation of training in general on the part of the top command.

The principle of the German Army, tried and hardened through long tradition, that "training saves blood," was countered by Hitler with his revolutionary principle that "spirit replaces all training." This flippancy cost much valuable blood.

5. Disbandment of the Post of Chief of Training

When, after 20 July 1944, Himmler assumed command of the Replacement Army, the influence of the Chief of Training was further reduced. Even before this — in March 1944 — the Inspectorate of Education and Training Affairs ceased to be subordinate to the Chief of Training and was assigned directly to the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army as office

of the "Inspector General for Future Officers" with considerably extended authority.

On 1 February 1945, the post of Chief of Training was dissolved. His responsibilities devolved back upon the staff of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, where a special "Branch IV - Training" was formed. At the same time the influence of the Arms Generals was strengthened, who, in double subordination to the Chief of General Staff and the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, were to uniformly orient and influence the training of the various arms in the Field and Replacement Armies.

This reorganization no longer faced a practical test in the spring of 1945 since the war had already entered the zone of the interior and the progressive paralyzation and disorganization made impossible any systematic training.

C.

X. The General Army Office

A. Responsibilities

1. The General Army Office was assigned to the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army.

2. It handled Army personnel and materiel replacements and armaments according to basic directives governing the overall apportionment of national resources which could be utilized by the Wehrmacht.

3. The General Army Office directed replacement affairs for the entire Wehrmacht according to basic directives from the Wehrmacht High Command. It regulated the distribution of personnel replacements to the individual Wehrmacht branches, the Waffen-SS, the Police and the Reich Labor Service. It distributed the Army replacements to the replacement units for training. It regulated the assignment of trained Army replacements by way of rehabilitation or new activation.

4. To equip the Army with materiel the General Army Office prepared the requisitions with the concurrence of the Ordnance Office and, if necessary, requested the Wehrmacht High Command for a change in the Wehrmacht production schedule. The General Army Office placed requests and orders for the development of military equipment by the Ordnance Office. It stored and administered materiel after it was manufactured. It made available for shipment to the field forces the supplies (with the exception of food) requisitioned by the Chief of Army Supply and Administration. Supplies for deputy Wehrkreis headquarters were shipped by it upon requisition.

5. For the Army training program the General Army Office, on the basis of directives from the Army General Staff, prepared training regulations and changes governing schools and training courses of the Replacement Army. These were assigned to the Chief of the General Army Office in matters of organization and training, to the deputy corps headquarters in territorial respects.

6. The following agencies were vested with responsibility for the entire Wehrmacht in addition to their duties for the Army:

a. Group for Replacement Matters (concerned with replacement affairs and organization of replacements).

b. Riding and Driving Branch (concerned with procurement of horses).

c. Armored Force Branch (concerned with all transportation affairs, procurement of motor vehicles, fuel and rubber, and registration for mobilization (together with organization of replacements)).

d. Chemical Warfare and Air Raid Protection Branch (concerned with chemical warfare and smoke agents).

e. Medical and Veterinary Inspectorates (concerned with medical and veterinary affairs).

B. Organization (see Appendix # 2)

1. Replacement and Army Affairs Group

a. Replacement Affairs Branch

b. Army Affairs Branch (later Branch for General Troop Affairs)

c. Penal Affairs Section

d. Chaplain's Section

e. Branch for Billets and Maneuver Areas (barracks)

2. Army Judge Advocate General's Branch

3. Arms Branches

Inspectorate 2	Infantry
Inspectorate 3	Riding and Driving
Inspectorate 4	Artillery
Inspectorate 5	Engineers
Inspectorate 6	Armored Troops
Inspectorate 7	Signal Troops
Inspectorate 8	Motor Transport and Supply Troops
Inspectorate 9	Chemical Warfare Troops
Inspectorate 10	Railway Engineers
Inspectorate 11	Technical Troops
Inspectorate 12	Motor Maintenance Troops
Inspectorate 13	Army Antiaircraft Troops
Inspectorate 14	Rocket Weapons

Each Inspectorate had the following responsibilities regarding its individual arm of service:

a. Organization

b. Training (in cooperation with the Arms Inspector, later with the Chief of Training).

c. Development and testing of new weapons, equipment, and ammunition pertaining to each respective arm (in conjunction with the proper testing branches of the Ordnance Office).

d. Procurement of weapons and so forth pertaining to each respective arm (in cooperation with the Ordnance Office (Group for Weapons and Equipment Manufacture)).

e. Special tasks.

4. Ordnance Inspectorate

5. Army Clothing Branch.

Responsibilities and evolution of the General Army Office have thoroughly been dealt with in the study "The General Army Office in the Army High Command". There is no need to go into details. The reasons which caused replacement affairs to be disassociated from the General Army Office and placed under the control of the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command will be briefly discussed.

The Chief of Army Equipment had to distribute replacements to the individual Wehrmacht branches and other requesting agencies according to directives from the Chief of Wehrmacht High Command. The General Army Office handled the routine work involved.

The Army's need of replacements for newly activated units and to offset heavy casualties rose immeasurably. Luftwaffe and Navy made demands which could not be filled, while the SS and Police met their own requirements independently without heeding the interests of the Wehrmacht as a whole or of the economy. The Organization Todt and the Labor Service raised increasingly larger demands as more was expected of them. The armament industry under the protection of Ministers Todt and Speer refused the release of skilled workers, demanding on the contrary the discharge and assignment to indispensable status for many specialists in the Wehrmacht. The available reserves of men fit for military service ran short after the spring of 1942 and threatened to dry out completely toward the end of 1943.

The Reichsmarschall, the Reichsfuehrer SS, and Minister Speer did not comply with the decisions of the weak Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command and protested directly to the Fuehrer, who through personal interference mostly modified the plans at the expense of the Army. The activity of the Group for Replacement Matters was threatened with complete paralization.. So part of the development toward a handling by the Wehrmacht High Command of all Wehrmacht projects hitherto controlled by the Army, the Group for Replacement Matters was turned over to it. Thus a condition was finally brought about that correct organization could have achieved at the very beginning of the establishment of the Wehrmacht. The military replacement organization continued to be under the territorial control of the Commander of the Replacement Army. The furnishing of replacements to the Army continued to be handled by the General Army Office.

A parallel process occurred in the motor transport service. Inspectorate 6 (originally the Branch for Armored Troops, Cavalry, and Motorization of the Army) was the responsible agency for the entire Wehrmacht with regard to motor transportation, procurement of motor vehicles, fuel and rubber, and registration for mobilization. At the beginning of the war it was expanded into a Motor Transport Group with extraordinary nominal authority. In practice it was unable, under the pressure of the strained production situation, to meet all requisitions. The remaining user agencies of the Wehrmacht (Navy, Luftwaffe, SS, Police, Labor Service, and so forth) had requirements far exceeding the percentage due them.

It was self-evident that Goering and Himmler would not agree to let an Army agency decide whether the demands raised by the Luftwaffe and the

Waffen-SS for organizational reasons or to offset losses were justified or exaggerated. Nor were they content with what was allocated them but rather sought a modification of the distribution plan in their favor through the "man of least resistance," Feldmarschall Keitel.

Under these circumstances the decision was usually in favor of the Luftwaffe and the SS at the expense of the Army. Keitel, however, was not only Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command. Since the removal of the Army Commander in Chief he was also the top representative of the interests of the strongest Wehrmacht branch, the Army. If he remained adament and refused unjustified demands -- which occurred seldom enough -- Goering and Himmler brought about a decision by the Fuehrer. For reasons of principle this decision was always in favor of the Waffen-SS, the latter's personal bodyguard. Keitel was not the man to cover General von Schell (Motor Transport Group). The latter was removed because the other branches of the Wehrmacht began a campaign of complaining about him to the Fuehrer and thus more and more undermined his position. The motor vehicle industry also opposed him pointedly. It did not wish to comply with his demands for standardization of production and increase in the manufacture of spare parts.

When the Motor Transport Group was disbanded the post of "General of Motorization" was created. His authority extended over the entire Wehrmacht, the SS and the other organizations in the service of the Wehrmacht in the zone of the interior and the area of operations. Technically, the new post no longer had any business within the jurisdiction of the Chief of Army Equipment. Hence there were no objections to its direct assignment to the

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Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command. The Chief of Army Equipment could restrict himself to the role of requisitioner and, because of his strong personality, better assert himself toward Keitel. Previously he had always been compelled to fight against the demands of Goering and Himmler. The final decisions usually fell against him and existing tensions were aggravated even more. This solution at last transmitted the responsibility to that agency which it should properly have held from the very beginning of the war.

The General Army Office was the brain-child of Generaloberst Fromm. He had built the Army in peacetime with these agencies. In wartime, as Chief of Army Equipment, he relied on this competent, absolutely trustworthy office. Throughout its existence the General Army Office was subject only to insignificant organizational changes, which caused no alteration whatever in its fundamental structure. All outside attempts to weaken the position of the Office, whether from the military or the political point of view, to remove further parts, to limit its authority or to paralyze its activities were frustrated by the sound perseverance of Generaloberst Fromm and his successor, General der Infanterie Olbricht. Almost all other agencies of the Wehrmacht High Command, the Army and the Luftwaffe were fundamentally reorganized during the war. Only the General Army Office remained essentially untouched because it proved itself fully competent in war and peace.

The Chief of Army Equipment was arrested on 20 July 1944. At that time the position of the Office was not yet shaken at all. Even his successor, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Juettner, left it untouched for the best interests of

the Army. With the aid of the General Army Office, Juettner, acting from a purely objective point of view, waged his battle against the unjustified demands of the SS with more success than had been possible for his predecessor. The Office, which stayed in Berlin despite years of savage bombing, remained in full operation until the final collapse in May 1945.

The creator of this Office, Generaloberst Fromm, was sentenced to death, allegedly without Hitler's knowledge, by a special court presided over by general officers and was shot on 16 March 1945, at Brandenburg on the Havel.

C

XI. The Army Ordnance Office

A. Responsibilities at the Outbreak of the War

1. The Chief of the Army Ordnance Office was assigned to the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army.

2. He was responsible for development, procurement and acceptance of weapons, ammunition and equipment for the Army and — as far as assigned to him — for the Luftwaffe and the Navy, as well as for the production capacity of the armament industry assigned to him or its enlargement.

3. Basis for procurement was the production schedule approved by the Wehrmacht High Command. A change of this schedule could be ordered only by the Wehrmacht High Command.

4. The Chief of the Army Ordnance Office was authorized in all non-basic matters to deal directly with the Army Commander in Chief, the Chief of the General Staff and the appropriate agencies of Luftwaffe, Navy and SS.

5. In the following matters he depended upon direct cooperation with the Wehrmacht High Command.

a. Requisition of raw and synthetic materials.

b. Allocation or establishment of new manufacturing plants.

c. Equalization and limitation of authority and responsibilities with the Luftwaffe and Navy if no direct agreement were possible or permissible.

d. Insuring personnel requirements for industry (with the group for Replacement Matters).

e. Basic matters of price control.

6. If any of the matters cited above had to be regulated by orders, such orders were issued by the Wehrmacht High Command through the Chief of Army Equipment.

7. The Chief of Army Equipment distributed raw materials or substitutes, with their use stipulated to the user agencies of the Army.

8. New development projects were ordered by the Army Commander in Chief or occasionally by the Fuehrer himself.

New developmental projects and production schedules were continually drawn up. The Chief of the Army Ordnance Office provided for the evaluation of the most recent results of research and of combat experience in cooperation with the General Army Office.

B. Organization (see Appendix 2)

1. Development and Testing Group

Branch 1 Ballistic and Ammunition Branch

Branch 2 Infantry Branch

Branch 3 Chief Designer

Branch 4 Artillery Branch

Branch 5 Engineer and Fortress Branch

Branch 6 Tanks, Motor Vehicle, and Motorized Equipment Branch

Branch 7 Signal Branch

Branch 8 Branch for Optical, Meteorological, and Surveying Equipment

Branch 9 Gas Protection Branch

Branch 10 Antiaircraft Branch

Branch 11 Special Equipment Branch *

Branch 12 Branch for Proving Grounds

2. Group for Equipment, Weapons and Ammunition Manufacture

a. Army Equipment Procurement Branch

b. Army Weapons Procurement Branch

c. Army Ammunition Procurement Branch

d. Manufacture Branch

e. Organizations Branch for Procurement

f. Procurement Branch for Tanks, Motor Vehicles, and Motorized Equipment

g. Signal Equipment Procurement Branch

h. Branch for Powder and Dynamite

3. Acceptance Group

4. Regulations Branch

5. Chief Ordnance Engineer Office

6. Ordnance Research Branch

Responsibilities and development of the Army Ordnance Office have been dealt with thoroughly in the study "The Army Ordnance Office in the Army High Command" by General der Artillerie Leeb. There is no need to go into details.

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* No doubt responsible for the development of some of the V weapons (Ed.).

From the beginning the Army Ordnance Office proved the problem child of the Chief of Army Equipment. Owing to the establishment of the Ministry for Armaments and Munition Armaments and War Production, the Office was subject to continual organizational changes and never was able to achieve an orderly, regular development.

As a result of the close cooperation existing between the agencies of the Chief of the General Staff and those of the Chief of Army Equipment, no substantial friction existed at the beginning of the war. The official routine of the Ordnance Office, as practiced in peacetime, was initially equal to all requirements. The small materiel losses in the campaigns against Poland, Norway and France could be offset from current production, the reserve stocks of weapons and ammunition could be increased and, in addition, new units could be continually activated. It was through the Ordnance Office that the first interferences with the organization of the Chief of Army Equipment occurred.

C. Failure to Call for Economic Mobilization

Failing to recognize the seriousness of the military situation upon the outbreak of World War II, the economic mobilization prepared by the Wehrmacht High Command was not ordered in spite of the urgent demands of the Chief of Army Equipment. Under the influence of foolish propaganda to the effect that the war would not last long and its conclusion lay immediately ahead, peacetime economy was hesitant in adapting itself to all-out requirements. The Military Economy Group in the Wehrmacht High Command, controlled by soldiers, was not fully equal to the demands confronting it with the result that the Ministry for Armaments and Munitions under Reich Minister Todt was

created in the spring of 1940. With the establishment of this ministry the wartime economy was placed in the hands of competent specialists from industry and economy. Nevertheless, the readjustment from a peacetime to a wartime economy could not be substantially accelerated, primarily because only fifty-five per cent of the steel production was released for military purposes by the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, while the remaining forty-five per cent continued to be futilely wasted in senseless peacetime production and in Party construction projects as late as the spring of 1942.

Under these circumstances the output of weapons and ammunition rose only slowly. There was no change in the responsibilities of the Chief of Army Equipment. The Ordnance Office was not yet hindered in the development of new weapons. It had merely to adapt itself to slight changes in its collaboration with industry.

D. False Strategic Estimate of the Situation after the Beginning of the Russian Campaign

Upon the outbreak of the war against Russia in 1941 serious difficulties arose. Hitler judged the situation completely false. Dazzled by initial successes, he and the Wehrmacht High Command believed in Russia's immediately impending collapse. In spite of the strongest protests on the part of the Army Commander in Chief and the Chief of Army Equipment, he ordered the production of materiel for the Army to be suspended in September in favor of an increase for the Navy and Luftwaffe. The output of weapons and equipment for the Army dropped to a barely endurable degree as a result of the withdrawal of production capacities, raw materials and specialists.

In conjunction with the military reverses during the winter of 1941-1942 and their immense losses of material, considerable supply difficulties arose. The reserves which the Chief of Army Equipment had been quietly stocking at the ordnance depots allowed a temporary meeting of the most urgent requirements. These gaps could never be refilled in the further course of the war. It was months before the suspended production for the Army again came into full gear.

E. Establishment of the Speer Ministry

Recognizing his mistakes, Hitler now sought to make up for the neglect. The Ministry for Weapons and Ammunition was reorganized in the spring of 1942 as the Ministry for Armaments and War Production. Minister Speer was provided with extensive authority. Through a concentration of forces a substantial increase in production was to be achieved.

Principally affected by this organizational change, which smashed a setup that had proved its efficiency, was the Ordnance Office. It lost part of its influence on the development and procurement of weapons, ammunition and equipment. These responsibilities were placed into the hands of civilians, mostly representatives of industry. They lacked understanding of military interests and of the inter-relations between the military and industry.

Orders to industry were no longer placed according to requirements which the Chief of Army Equipment and his agencies deemed appropriate with regard to the overall interests of the Field Army, but were rather frequently concentrated by Hitler's personal interference upon certain points of gravity, a procedure which resulted in sharp drops in production in other areas.

Of decisive significance was the fact that the Chief of Army Equipment was deprived of any influence over the distribution of raw materials among the user agencies of the Army. Thus he was divested of the last means for controlling the procurement of weapons and ammunition on the basis of military priorities. An aggravating factor was industry's persistent refusal to increase the production of spare parts since new production of whole items brought greater profits.

Since control of the numerical production output of weapons and equipment was rendered difficult for the Chief of Army Equipment by the Speer Ministry, which was directed by civilians, the General Army Office temporarily lost its overall view. The Chief of Army Equipment could not prevent considerable portions of the new production output from disappearing mysteriously into those organizations which were either close to the circle of persons around Speer (Organization Todt, Reich Labor Service, Reich Youth Leader's Office) or were ruthlessly extorted by agencies of the Reichsfuehrer-SS or the Party (Waffen-SS, Police, SA, Volkssturm). Since all these agencies had their own budgets independent of the Wehrmacht budget they were also independent in financing their armament. The Chief of Army Equipment was officially the agency charged with placing orders. It made no substantial difference to the manufacturing industry who the recipient was if only the costs of the orders were paid. Similar conditions existed with regard to raw materials. The output figures reported directly to Hitler by the Speer Ministry still contained the weapons and equipment and especially the motor vehicles which disappeared sub rosa.

F. The General for Special Employment with the Chief of Army Equipment

In order that the influence of the Chief of Army Equipment might be maintained at least on development and testing, the post of General for Special Employment with the Chief of Army Equipment was formed. The incumbent's responsibility was to examine, according to military viewpoints, suggestions for the developments of new weapons and equipment made by industry, the SS, the field forces, the General Staff or other agencies of the Army High Command and to present them as military requisitions to the Speer Ministry. Under the altered circumstances there was no guarantee that these wishes would receive consideration.

G. Time Required for Development of New Weapons Until They Were Ready for Mass Production

The Army General Staff and the higher field headquarters in planning operations always took time and space into account. Full understanding for the period required until a new weapon could be employed en masse at the front with sufficient ammunition could only rarely be achieved. This period of time was created by the following lengthy route: desire on the part of the field forces; request by the General Staff; development and manufacture of experimental examples; tests with the necessary changes that went with this decision concerning introduction; calculation of requirements; order for mass productionp establishment of new or conversion of old plants by industry; development and procurement of new tooling

and semi-automatic machines; allocation of raw and synthetic materials; assignment of new skilled laborers; beginning of production, with inevitable reverses for technical reasons or material reasons, or as a result of the bombing raids; interruptions in the transport situation; beginning of mass production; acceptance; storage until called for by the Field Army, training of troops; and finally employment.

The impatience of the agencies responsible for the conduct of operations was understandable. Complaints to Hitler usually led to forcible intervention which ruptured any systematic progress which existed. Whenever acceleration was achieved -- mostly at the expense of some other equally important project -- it could nevertheless happen that a new weapon arrived at the front in large numbers while the special ammunition for this weapon was not yet available in sufficient quantities because of some flaw or other.

The field forces, whose judgment was clouded by the fact that they had no knowledge whatever of the true state of affairs and who often awaited for months the arrival of announced weapons, attributed the fault to the Chief of Army Equipment or the Ordnance Office.

H. Reciprocity of Operation and Armament

After the reverses of the winter of 1941-1942 the General Staff raised extraordinary demands for rehabilitation and activation of new units in the Field Army. The Chief of Army Equipment, using the last reserves of personnel and materiel in the zone of interior and overcoming considerable friction in the field of transportation, succeeded on the whole in meeting

these demands. In the spring of 1942 the Field Army in the East was again fully prepared for battle. Contrary to the intentions of the Chief of the General Staff, Hitler ordered the attack in the direction of the eastern Ukraine (meat, grain, oil-yielding plants), the Donets river basin (coal, iron, nickel, electric power), the Caucasus (oil) and Stalingrad (manufacturing).

The 1942 spring offensive did not have the annihilation of Russian forces as a goal but was aimed at gaining vast areas and territories. The war potential of encircled Europe was to be enlarged in view of the two-front war. For unknown reasons the Chief of Army Equipment had been informed of the operational intentions neither by the Chief of the General Staff nor by the Chief of Wehrmacht High Command, who was his immediate superior. He received word of the plans of the High Command in conversations with Reich Marshal Goering (Four Year Plan), State Secretary Backe (responsible for food), Todt (representing the interests of heavy industry) and deputies of the I. G. Farben Concern and the German Shell Association (oil). Finally he heard of them from the Reich Foreign Minister, who emphasized the necessity of gaining a land bridge through the Near East in the direction of the Suez Canal and India.

The Chief of Army Equipment warned against exaggerated hopes. In all conversations with these men, particularly with the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command with whom he had a sharp encounter, he pointed out that it would take years before the territories damaged by fighting, systematic evacuation or destruction could be of full use to the German economy. He especially warned against erecting new industries at the expense of plants in operation or under construction in the zone of interior.

Nevertheless plants producing ammunition for the Army, which were in full operation, were dismantled by persons acting on behalf of the Speer Ministry. They were shipped by railroad -- already overburdened with supply movements supporting the Stalingrad and Caucasus offensives — to the Donets basin and there lay inoperative for a full year. Upon their arrival there were neither factories nor coal, coke, electric power or fuel; iron and steel to start production was lacking.

When new, gigantic plants had been completed after considerable effort, it turned out that the crude steel necessary for manufacturing grenades, powder and the fuses all had still to be brought from Germany along a 2,000-kilometer railroad route. When production started with test pieces eighteen months later, the armies fighting in the Ukraine, armies which had been sacrificed on Hitler's order to protect the area, had suffered a crushing defeat. The model plants were destroyed by our own troops before mass production began.

In this connection it must be mentioned that coal for German locomotives operating in the Ukraine had to be brought in from Upper Silesia and in part from the Ruhr district because all pits had been destroyed and after they resumed operation the coal turned out to be of no use in German engines.

The Chief of Army Supply and Administration, Generalleutnant Wagner, is among those who share the blame for this bad investment. He urged Minister Speer to transfer armament plants to the Ukraine because he hoped, among other things, to be able to remove such plants and their production from the influence of the Chief of Army Equipment. General Wagner was prepared to let Minister Speer transfer the entire production of light field

howitzer ammunition to the Ukraine. Only the personal intervention of Generaloberst Fromm, who pointed out the possibility of a Western offensive, induced the Minister not to carry out this nonsense. Attempts by the Chief of Army Equipment to personally inform Hitler of the true situation were frustrated by Field Marshal Keitel.

A similar case occurred in the field of oil production (Ordnance Office had no part in the matter).

Oil drilling in the vicinity of Vienna in order to open up new fields was in full swing in 1942. Production was about to begin with the aid of specialists from the Luneburg Heath. On specific orders from Field Marshal Keitel 2,500 out of the 3,500 specialists employed there, highly qualified, irreplaceable personnel, were formed into an oil brigade. The result was that oil production in the Danube Basin died down and those 2,500 men bled to death as simple front-line soldiers in the Stalingrad sector and in the Caucasus. Oil production in Austria could not get going again until the fall of 1943.

I. Boost of Armaments Production in the Zone of Interior in the Summer of 1944

The Speer Ministry then energetically endeavored to make up for what had been mishandled in Germany's zone of interior. Despite increasing bombing attacks, and despite the bad conditions described above, he nevertheless succeeded in bringing the production of armaments back into full swing shortly before the enemy in West and East broke across the German frontiers. It was too late to avert collapse. In the place of provident

planning a system of makeshifts and improvisations became more and more effective. From the fall of 1943 on, the Chief of Army Equipment was practically excluded from all matters of material equipment. From this time on the Speer Ministry, the Wehrmacht High Command, and the Army Staff were responsible for such matters.

The reasons leading to such a failure in the equipment sector will once more be briefly summarized as follows:

1. Failure on the part of the Wehrmacht High Command to call for economic mobilization in 1939.

2. Use of only fifty-five per cent of the steel production for military armament purposes.

3. Bad investments for Operation SEELOEWE in 1940.

4. Throttling of the entire armaments production for the Army in favor of the Luftwaffe and Navy.

5. Transfer of a large part of the Army armaments production to the Ukraine by the Speer Ministry in 1942.

These bad investments, with their shattering results, can be traced for the most part to personal interferences on the part of Hitler. But one must not overlook the fact that the warnings of the Chief of Army Equipment were heeded either not at all or too late, were accepted frivolously by the Wehrmacht High Command, or were acknowledged under the dictator's pressure by the Chief of the General Staff.

Just before the end of the war the creation of a uniform Wehrmacht Ordnance Office was ordered. This was merely a futile gesture. If a common

ordnance office for all Wehrmacht branches had been established at the beginning of rearmament in 1934 and trained economists and experienced engineers had been placed in charge, better results would presumably have been achieved. Prerequisite was indeed that the military demands of the Wehrmacht branches would have been complied with. In such case there is the danger of the responsible civilians making changes at their pleasure because demands raised do not fit into their production program. There can be no doubt, however, about the necessity for the agencies in charge of production of armaments at least to be heard before operations are planned.

C.

XII. The Army Administration Office

A. Responsibilities

1. At the outbreak of the war the Army Administration Office was directly assigned to the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army.

2. Within the functions exercised by the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army the Army Administration Office handled the following:

a. Finance, accounting, pay.

b. Officials, employees and laborers.

c. Billeting in garrisons and on military training grounds.

d. Food for men and horses, and post exchange items.

e. Material for clothing and equipment (excluding weapons).

f. Construction material and structures.

3. On the basis of requisitions from the Chief of Army Supply and Administration it provided the following for the Field Army:

a. Officials (excluding judge advocates, chaplains, and pharmacists).

b. Means of subsistence (except clothing and equipment).

c. Regulations governing the supply of funds and the settlement of accounts.

4. For the Wehrmacht the Army Administration Office handled food, textiles and leather as the "responsible Wehrmacht agency."

5. In case of a mobilization it was envisaged that the Chief of the

Army Administration Office simultaneously was to become Chief of Wehrmacht Administration. This project failed to materialize because the Luftwaffe Commander in Chief and the Navy Commander in Chief raised protests against such a measure. They persisted in the position they had forcibly acquired in peacetime that "each Wehrmacht branch should be independant and should have its own armaments production and its own administration." They were afraid of receiving the short end from the Army because of its dominating position.

At the outbreak of the war in 1939 the Administration Office was in the midst of a complete reorganization. At first any further organizational change was halted. Then systematic enlargement was begun in view of increased demands exacted by the war.

B. Organization in 1939 (see Appendix 3)

1. Staff.
2. Group V-I., Group for Officials and Civilian Workers.
   a. Army Official and Accounts Branch V-1.
   b. Branch for Salaried Employees and Wage Earners.
   c. Branch for Technical Army Officials.
3. Group V-III, Rations and Procurement Group.
   a. Army Rations Branch V-3.
   b. Army Procurements Branch V-5.
4. Army Billets and Training Grounds Branch V-2.
5. Branch for Administration of Army Construction V-5.

C. Organization in 1944

By 1944 the Administration Office had organically developed into the following organization:

1. Staff
2. Group V-I:
   a. Branch for Army Administration Officials V-1.
   b. Branch for Salaried Employees and Wage Earners V-8.
   c. Branch for Financial and Accounting Affairs V-9.
   d. Organization Section.
   e. Section for Training of Army Officials.
3. Group V-II:
   a. Army Billeting Branch V-2.
   b. Branch for Training Grounds and Real Estate, V-6.
   c. Branch for Forest and Hunting, V-10.
   d. Special Services Branch.
4. Group V-III:
   a. Branch for Rations for Men and Horses, and Post Exchange Items, V-3a.
   b. Branch for Canning, Wrapping, Testing and Preparing, V-3b.
5. Group V-IV:
   a. Army Construction Administration, V-4.
   b. Army Construction Control, V-7.
6. Group V:
   a. Section I: General matters on the sector of textiles and leather.
   b. Section II: Raw materials, textiles and leather.
   c. Section III: Procurement of cloth, products manufactured from wool, cotton, artificial textiles and leather.

D. The responsibilities and development of the Army Administration Office are thoroughly dealt with in the study "The Responsibilities of the Army High Command in the Control of Home Resources for Army Supply (Demonstrated Through the Organization, Responsibilities, and Modus Operandi of the Army Administration Office)" by General der Artillerie Osterkamp. There is no need to go into details.

From this study it is clearly evident what a fundamental organizational mistake the independence of the three Wehrmacht branches on the administrative sector was. One also sees that only the pressure of greatest exigency forced the final step toward the establishment of a Wehrmacht administration, at a time when everything was too late.

D.

Evolution of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Training Army

The Course of Events up to the End of the War

By Generalmajor HELLMUTH REINHARDT

Preliminary Remarks:

It is not the purpose of the following account to give a complete chronological enumeration of the events and activities of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army but rather to convey, with the aid of useful segments of history, an impression of the responsibilities and the position of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, within the wartime top-level organization and to show the changes which this position underwent during the course of the war.

The account is primarily based on the personal recollections of the author of the preceding chapters, General der Kavallerie Koehler, who as a General Staff officer served for many years in peace and war on the staff of Generaloberst Fromm (Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army from 1939 to 1944) and was his chief of staff from 1941 to 1943. The author of this section was able to supplement and consolidate the information supplied by General Koehler through the study of existing records and through inquiries among other former staff members who served in the sphere of authority of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army. Since the author himself served for

several years under the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army he was aided in the preparation by his personal knowledge of conditions. He therefore hopes to be able to give a true and objective picture.

General Koehler's outline concerning the division of the Section into individual chapters has been retained.

1. The Polish Campaign 1939-1940

When mobilization was ordered in August 1939 the post of "Commander of the Replacement Army," provided for by the mobilization plans, was established accordingly and General der Infanterie von Stuelpnagel was named as Commander of the Replacement Army. According to the "Wartime Top-Level Organization of the Army" designed for use in the event of mobilization, the Commander of the Replacement Army exercised full command authority over the entire Replacement Army (all replacement units and the stationary agencies and institutions of the Army remaining in the zone of the interior). In addition, those offices of the Army High Command which remained in Berlin (except the Army Personnel Office) were assigned to him, that is, the General Army Office, the Army Ordnance Office, and the Army Administration Office. (Cf. Section C, p. 35 ff.) Thus an agency combining all responsibilities of organization, administration, and armament was created within the Army High Command. The Commander of the Replacement Army bore full responsibility to the Army Commander in Chief for all that had to be prepared and undertaken in the zone of interior to maintain and further the striking power of the Field Army, thus freeing the Army Commander in Chief for his new and principal task of commanding this force. To attain this end the latter, together with the Army General Staff, went to the headquarters of the Army High Command.

The point of gravity of the Commander of the Replacement Army's responsibilities at first lay upon the completion of mobilization and the start of the training activities of the replacement units under the new chain of command: Commander of the Replacement Army — deputy corps headquarters — replacement units. In addition, after the eighth day of mobilization organizational work began for the formation of more large units beyond the scope of the mobilization army. These activations had already been planned before the start of mobilization. They sprang from the initiative of the then Chief of the General Army Office, General der Artillerie Fromm. He reasoned that the responsibility of the home command must be to make available to the Field Army as many forces as possible and that it would be of the greatest significance in a war where surprises and new problems were always possible to have whole fresh units available for any such events. He therefore had successfully insisted, in spite of many objections, that the personnel and ordnance equipment of the former Czechoslovakian Army, which were not immediately assigned to the Field Army upon mobilization and were hence still available, be used to activate and train five new infantry divisions immediately and four more in a few weeks. The first of these divisions, after receiving their training, were actually committed in the fall of 1939 at the West Wall.

When, after having served only a few days, the recently appointed commander of the Replacement Army was dismissed from his post for personal reasons on August 31, 1939, it seemed proper in view of the predominance of organizational tasks that the Chief of the General Army Office be

entrusted with this post. He retained the position of Office Chief and combined the staff of the Commander of the Replacement Army with that of the General Army Office. (Cf. passages dealing with General Army Office, p. 63.)

General der Artillerie Fromm undoubtedly was the person with the greatest experience in all sectors of Army organization and armament and the one who could best understand their possibilities and limitations. (Cf. Section B, particularly p. 19ff.) He assumed his new duties with the conviction that the person in charge of organization and armament must gear himself to a long duration of the war and that hence a systematic control of all personnel and materiel resources exercised centrally by one agency -- the Commander of the Replacement Army -- was imperative. As a seasoned expert in these matters he knew that all measures of organization and armament required time unless they were to result in overhasty and expensive improvisations. He therefore always endeavored to look far ahead in taking his measures. Hence he had to demand that he be informed as early as possible of all plans of the Supreme Command.

According to the wartime top-level organization of the Army, the Commander of the Replacement Army was assigned to the Army Commander in Chief. From him he received the directives according to which he had to work. In addition he depended upon close cooperation with the Chief of the Army General Staff, to whose strategic and operational opinions and intentions he had to adapt his measures and from whom he hence had to expect proper briefings. In the practice of cooperation it was primarily the Organizations

Branch of the Army General Staff, on the organizational level and in matters of personnel peplacements, and the Chief of Army Supply and Administration, in all matters of supply, who transmitted to the Commander of the Replacement Army the demands raised by the High Command. All agencies of the Commander of the Replacement Army accordingly maintained particularly close relations with these two agencies of the Army General Staff. In addition, the Training Branch of the Army General Staff conveyed desires to the Commander of the Replacement Army concerning the training of replacements on the basis of experience gained in the field, and the "Arms Generals with the Army Commander in Chief" — established after the outbreak of the war — maintained close relations with the corresponding branches under the Commander of the Replacement Army in all matters of organization, equipment, and training of their arms.

As soon as the manner in which the Polish Campaign was to develop became apparent — about the middle of September 1939 — the Commander of the Replacement Army received a directive from the Army Commander in Chief prepared by the Army General Staff concerning the intended future conduct of the war after conclusion of the campaign and the tasks arising for him therefrom. This directive provided for a readjustment of the Army to a war of position and defensive combat in the West with an extensive demotorization of the Army and switch to the use of horses in view of the limited fuel supply.

At that time the situation facing the Commander of the Replacement Army was as follows:

With regard to personnel, the number of recruits in the Replacement Army far exceeded the amount required to cover the fortunately small losses of the Field Army. But after the completion of training the replacement units had to release their trained replacements in order to make room for new untrained recruits. The directive of the Army Commander in Chief hence provided that the trained men, insofar as they were not needed to fill the field units or to serve as the most readily handy replacements for anticipatable losses in the defense battles in the West, were to be discharged again to the civilian economy.

With regard to materiel, the situation, which had still been very grave at the beginning of the war, had improved owing to the rapid and successful conduct of the Polish Campaign. The normal output permitted the filling of gaps as well as the stocking of certain reserves.

A few days after receiving the directive of the Army Commander in Chief, the Commander of the Replacement Army was ordered to report to the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht. Hitler, in a complete surprise to the Commander of the Replacement Army, revealed his intention of waging offensive war in the West and demanded the greatest possible boost in the striking power of the Army with particular emphasis on motorized and armored units -- the exact opposite of the Army Commander in Chief's directive. The Commander of the Replacement Army correctly turned to his superior, the Army Commander in Chief for a clarification of this contradiction. The result was that the first directive of the Army Commander in Chief was withdrawn and some time later replaced by another one corresponding to Hitler's demand.

The Commander of the Replacement Army stopped the measures he had already initiated and established a schedule providing for the activation of fifteen more infantry divisions during the winter 1939-1940 in addition to a full rehabilitation of the old units of the Field Army, primarily the motorized and armored formations. This marked the beginning of the great organizational activities of the Commander of the Replacement Army which continued without interruption until the end of the war. The Field Army furnished the cadres for these new unit. Details of execution, which were handled by the General Army Office under the Commander of the Replacement Army, are dealt with at greater length in the study on the General Army Office (p. 85 ff).

When the beginning of the attack in the West had finally been postponed until the spring of 1940 and the Commander of the Replacement Army had gained an idea of the personnel and materiel accruing in the meantime, the activation schedule was extended even further. Altogether thirty-four divisions were activated and furnished to the Field Army by the Commander of the Replacement Army during the period from the end of mobilization to the beginning of the French Campaign (5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th waves).

The events connected with the conclusion of the Polish Campaign have been described here in greater detail because they demonstrate all the difficulties arising for the Commander of the Replacement Army as a result of conflicting opinions at the top-level concerning the conduct of the war. Repetition of such cases, which did not fail to occur, necessarily tended to make the Commander of the Replacement Army distrustful of demands and views coming presented to him by the Army General Staff. Conversely, it

understandably did not serve to improve matters when the Commander of the Replacement Army supported intentions by his organizational suggestions that ran counter to the opinions of the Chief of Army General Staff. Thus, no real confidential relationship ever developed between these two decisive personages who represented the Field and the Home Army, the conduct of operations and the production of armaments in the Army wartime top-level organization. The antagonisms which had already existed in peacetime and which, in part, had their basis in the personalities of the men themselves have already been dealt with in Section B, II.

In spite of the lack of mutual confidence, however, any objective observer must admit that the cooperation between the two agencies was good. Opinions frequently diverged, but this lay in the nature of things. To a still greater degree sand was thrown into the mechanism by another party. This point will be taken up again later. General Fromm, however, always adhered to the principle that he had to answer for his actions solely to the Army Commander in Chief as his direct superior and that all his work must be devoted to the task of providing for the Army Commander in Chief and the Army General Staff in the best possible manner the means with which, in conducting operations, they could properly meet the requirements of warfare. Accordingly, the Commander of the Replacement Army demanded of his subordinate agencies close and loyal cooperation with the appropriate agencies of the Army General Staff in addition to unequivocal support of his own views.

2. Creation of Wehrmacht High Command Theaters of War in the Spring of 1940.

If it had been difficult for the Commander of the Replacement Army to learn of final High Command plans in time to take actions accordingly during the first period of the war when the Army Commander in Chief and the Chief of Army General Staff still conducted operations alone, then these difficulties increased considerably when, beginning with the Norwegian Campaign, the Wehrmacht High Command assumed direct command over individual theaters of operations and thus appeared as requisitioning agency alongside the Chief of the Army General Staff.

The Commander of the Replacement Army knew that the Army Commander in Chief and the Chief of Army General Staff at first disapproved the plan of the Norwegian operation. The Wehrmacht Operations Staff in the Wehrmacht High Command, until then charged only with the issuance of basic directives concerning the overall conduct of the war in accordance with Hitler's intentions, had dispensed with the Army General Staff and had itself assumed the task of preparing for and conducting this operation. The Army Commander in Chief was not officially informed of intentions and plans at all. The notorious Fuehrer Order No. 1, which, for reasons of secrecy, prohibited giving information as to intentions and plans to anyone not directly concerned, may have played a fatal part.

The whole difficulty inherent in this new command scheme became apparent for the Commander of the Replacement Army when, during the preparations for the campaign in Norway, the Wehrmacht High Command addressed requests

regarding equipment of troops and storage of supply stocks directly to him without going through the Army Commander in Chief and the Chief of the General Staff. The Commander of the Replacement Army could not meet these demands without curtailing supplies requested by the Army General Staff for the Western campaign. Considering the character of the Commander of the Replacement Army, he naturally reported to his superior, the Army Commander in Chief, the demands made by the Wehrmacht High Command in order to bring about a decision. Rather than receiving clear-cut directives from one agency he was thus forced into the role of mediator with the only possible result that both requisitioning agencies began to bear resentment toward him. This condition continued throughout the war and assumed more and more unpleasant forms as the demands of war increased on the one hand while means available became scarcer and scarcer on the other.

The first Wehrmacht High Command Theater of Operations was followed by others as the war progressed: -- North Africa, the Balkans, Finland. When, in the spring of 1942, the West was also placed under the direct command of the Wehrmacht High Command, the Army General Staff was confined to the Russian theater in its conduct of operations. Before the war, the question as to whether the whole Wehrmacht should be commanded centrally or whether each Wehrmacht branch should be commanded separately had been answered in favor of the latter, and, as a result, the Wehrmacht High Command Operations Staff was definitely not prepared for these new tasks. Hence all matters of organization, training and supply -- in other

words, in precisely those fields which were the concern of the Commander of the Replacement Army — necessarily remained in the hands of the Army General Staff including those for the troops of the Field Army employed in Wehrmacht High Command Theaters. The Commander of the Replacement Army did, of course, receive the advantage from this that theoretically only one requisitioning agency confronted him. How things turned out in practice, however, has been demonstrated by the above example of the Norwegian Campaign.

As long as the Army still had its own Commander in Chief who controlled both the Chief of General Staff and the Commander of the Replacement Army and who himself was the direct subordinate of the Supreme Commander Hitler, such difficulties could be straightened out with relative ease. But when, after the dismissal of Generalfeldmarschall von Brauchitsch at the end of 1941, the Chief of the Army General Staff was assigned directly to Hitler and the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army was assigned to the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command (this phase will be treated at greater length in Chapter 7 of this section), the tangle in the wartime top-level organization became a scarcely bearable encumberance for the Commander of the Replacement Army. The Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command, primarily interested in the Wehrmacht High Command Theaters of Operations, went so far as to ask the Commander of the Replacement Army no longer openly to inform the Chief of the Army General Staff of the actual volume of available supplies and equipment. This occurred in spite of the fact that the Chief of the Army General Staff was still responsible

for the supply of all theaters of operations.

In view of the Commander of the Replacement Army's attitude as described above, it is hardly necessary to mention that he rejected this demand even though it came from his immediate superior. On the other hand the Army General Staff was now primarily interested in the Russian theater, even in matters of organization and supply. This became particularly apparent after the relief of Generaloberst Halder as Chief of the General Staff. It became necessary for the Commander of the Replacement Army to point out emphatically that the Army General Staff should consider all theaters equally in its requisitions to the former and must not accord unjustified preference to the Russian theater. This condition alone would enable the Commander of the Replacement Army to retain his loyal attitude toward the Army General Staff.

The course of events had been anticipated, but it seemed necessary to follow up the train of thought in order to show the whole significance of this development of the position and function of the Commander of the Replacement Army. Endless negotiations with several agencies which opposed one another was the result until a clear decision could be reached. Often the decision made was again overthrown by protest on the part of an agency which believed itself wronged, or else no clear decision resulted at all. Systematic organization and long-range control of means, which decreased progressively as time passed, became impossible. Improvisation with all its drawbacks and adverse consequences took the place of organization.

3. Establishment of the Ministry of Armaments and Munition in the Spring of 1940

Up to this point the organizational responsibilities of the

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Commander of the Replacement Army have been the primary subject of this study, but we must now turn back again to show the functions of the Commander of the Replacement Army in actual armament matters.

Regarding personnel matters, that is, the procurement of necessary personnel replacements, central control by the Wehrmacht High Command had been envisaged from the beginning. The General Army Office was the responsible agency for the entire Wehrmacht, and the influence of the Commander of the Replacement Army was therefore considerable at the beginning of the war. It decreased more and more, however, as the Wehrmacht High Command increasingly interfered directly. In 1942 the Chief of the General Army Office was assigned directly to the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command in his simultaneous capacity as Chief of the Conscription and Recruiting Office. In 1944 this Office was taken away from the General Army Office entirely and was attached to the Wehrmacht High Command. This development has been described in Section C-X. above and in the study on the General Army Office by Generalmajor Reinhardt. The Commander of the Replacement Army thus lost direct influence over the procurement of personnel replacements. Only requisition, distribution and training of replacements for the Army were left to him.

Different conditions existed with regard to materiel armament, primarily the development and procurement of weapons, equipment, and ammunition. This was left up to the individual Wehrmacht branches. The executive agency in the Army High Command was the Army Ordnance Office, which, upon mobilization, was assigned to the Commander of the Replacement Army. The responsibilities and functions of the Ordnance Office and its cooperation with the

Military Economics and Armaments Office of the Wehrmacht High Command and with the General Army Office in matters of development and procurement have been dealt with in Section C, Chapters X and XI, and in the two special studies on the Ordnance Office by General der Artillerie Leeb and the General Army Office by Generalmajor Reinhardt. Thus the Commander of the Replacement Army was the sole responsible agency for the materiel armament of the Army. Here too, the last months of the war brought a change (see Chapter 16 of this section, below). As used here and on the following pages, in dealing with the responsibilities of the Commander of the Replacement Army, the term "armament" refers specifically to the materiel armament of the Army.

Next, I should like to point out an error in the study on "The German High Command," which was prepared in the United States. It shows that, upon mobilization in August 1939, only the General Army Office and the Administration Office were assigned to the Commander of the Replacement Army, while the Ordnance Office was placed under his command only toward the end of 1939. This is not true as it stands. The mobilization regulation effective 1 March 1939, (Special Appendix # 3 to the Army Mobilization Plan) provided that the Ordnance Office would also be assigned to the Commander of the Replacement Army. This was in absolute conformity with the principle underlying the creation of the post of Commander of the Replacement Army as has been explained in Chapter 1 of this section, and it was carried out in just this fashion when mobilization began in August 1939. But when -- as already described in Chapter 1 -- the newly appointed Commander of the Replacement Army was again relieved of his post and the Chief of the General Army Office entrusted therewith, the then Chief of the Ordnance Office

battled against being assigned to a colleague whose seniority was substantially less. The battle in the chain of command continued for some time, the Chief of Ordnance Office gaining for himself the right to report directly to the Commander in Chief of the Army. Toward the end of 1939, however, an order from this office clearly stipulated once more the assignment of the Army Ordnance Office to the Commander of the Replacement Army. At the same time the latter's official designation was extended to "Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army," thus also outwardly manifesting the combination of all equipment affairs under his direction. The right of the Chief of the Ordnance Office to report directly to the Army Commander in Chief continued for some time to be a source of trouble, even after the incumbent Ordnance Office Chief had changed and after the seniority question had been resolved by the promotion of General der Artillerie Fromm to Generaloberst, an indication of how the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army had to struggle with many a difficulty even within his own sphere of authority. Although they were inconsiderable compared with external interferences, these aspirations toward independence on the part of the Ordnance Office (cf. Section C, VI, p. 72 ff) were nevertheless not quite without influence on developments in the final stages of the war as will be described later in Chapter 16.

After this digression let us return to the armament question. The armament situation of the German Army at the beginning of the war was characterized by two things. In the first place rearmament was far from being complete at the beginning of the war. There were large gaps in the materiel equipment of the German Army, and the reserve stocks of many kinds

of weapons and ammunition were absolutely inadequate. As a result, for example, it was not possible to equip with German weapons — mentioned in Chapter 7 — the units newly activated after mobilization; Czechoslovakian weapons had to be used. In the second place the mobilization measures for conversion from peacetime to wartime economy had not been started in spite of all warnings. Those who ran the nation did not wish to treat the military action against Poland as "war" but only as an "incident." It was decided in spite of all objections that total mobilization would be limited to the military sphere and the other measures prepared for mobilization started only to such an extent as was necessary for the execution of the envisaged military operations. In Chapter XI of Section C of this study and in the study on the Army Ordnance Office this point is treated further. Only the surprisingly easy and rapid success of the Polish Campaign prevented this measure, which retrospectively must be regarded as a mistake, from immediately leading to grave reverses.

The situation changed basically when Hitler made his decision to attack in the West. The armament question became acute, especially as it became increasingly plain that Hitler's intention of attacking in the West before the end of 1939 was impracticable and the attack had to be postponed to the spring of 1940. It was known that armament measures in France and particularly in England were running in full gear. A success as striking as that over Poland could not be expected in the West. Though initial successes were anticipated, a subsequent heavy struggle in France had to be taken into consideration. From this line of reasoning, for example, sprang the consideration of building a second West Wall approximately in

the Somme area, the basic plans for which had already been given to the builder of the West Wall, Todt. Under no circumstances could the German advantage in armament be allowed to be lost as a result of such an operation.

Therefore, to give the necessary emphasis to the armament measures of the Army, General der Artillerie Fromm, hitherto only entrusted with performing the duties, was finally appointed as Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army on 1 February 1940. A new chief was named for the General Army Office, thus fully freeing General Fromm for his new post. Undoubtedly the best and most experienced armament expert of the Army was thus brought to the critical post. He presently secured decisive influence over armaments control by directly reserving for himself the distribution of funds and raw materials allotted to the Army. This was accomplished by taking the Budget Branch and the Central Branch out of the General Army Office and assigning them directly under his control (cf. Section C, IV, p. 65 ff) and by establishing an Army Raw Materials Branch likewise attached directly to him. (Cf. Section C, V, p. 68 ff). By strictly controlling development and procurement through appropriate allocation of funds and raw materials, he was able otherwise to let offices assigned to him work with a great deal of freedom and independence in their respective spheres without losing himself in details. This scheme proved to be an excellent one.

It soon became apparent that the tremendously increasing requirements of the Army, particularly regarding ammunition, could not be met by the civilian economy, which had still not been converted to war. The propaganda

which harped on an early termination of the war did its part to make private industry reject the demands of the Ordnance Office rather than commit itself to military production. The demands of the other Wehrmacht branches rose similarly. Goering, as Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, resorted to continual seizure of plants in order to arm his Luftwaffe. The Army could not assert itself. Not even now was it possible to achieve full exploitation of all available capacities through a readjustment of the economy, that is, through execution of the prepared economic mobilization. Instead the Hitler Regime chose its typical way out by setting up new posts with new powers upon the appearance of difficulties. On 17 March 1940, a special Minister for Armaments and Munitions was created and Todt was appointed to this post.

The interposition of a new, civilian ministry in the armament industry was in itself no bad solution. Military interests were not curtailed. On the Army sector the Chief of Army Equipment and the Commander of the Replacement Army retained his responsibilities and his authority. He determined the orders to be placed with industry and made available the necessary raw materials from the allocation of the Army. The Minister for Armaments and Munitions merely had the task of insuring through strict supervision that industry filled these orders as promptly as it could. In addition he was to help with advice and action whenever the available capacity was not sufficient, was to find additional capacity, employ machines for military purposes from inactivated plants and make available the necessary labor force. Thus, the creation of the Ministry for Armaments and Munitions constituted a substantial support for the Chief of Army

Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army in his dealings with industry, as long as there was no interference on the part of this Ministry with purely military affairs. In the spring of 1940 the start of mass production, which had been prepared for the event of war, was finally ordered. The Chief of Army Equipment and the Commander of the Replacement Army now had centralized control of Army equipment within the military sphere firmly in his hand and, in the event of good and intelligent cooperation with the Minister for Armaments and Munitions, could make the importance of the Army requisitions clear to industry through the latter's channels without having himself to intervene in the civilian economy.

4. Operation SEELOEWE

The campaign in the West led to a striking success far more quickly than had been expected. The imminent collapse of France was apparent. About the middle of June 1940 Hitler issued his first directive concerning measures to be put into force after the conclusion of the campaign in France. Its train of thought indicated roughly that with the impending final collapse of the enemy on the continent, the task of the Army would be fulfilled. To continue the war against England would be the task of the Navy and Luftwaffe. Accordingly, the Army, as a basis for the future peacetime organization, should be reduced for the time being to 120 divisions (among them twenty armored and ten motorized divisions).

This directive entailed a complete about-face of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army's activities. He was in the midst of making further units for the Field Army available from the

forces of the Replacement Army. They were intended to serve as occupation troops for the Field Army in order to make the latter available for further operations rather than tieing it to the conquered territories. Now, however, the Field Army would no longer need these forces and was even to be reduced by about one-fourth of its present size, in other words, it faced disbandment rather than new activation. The activations under way or in part already completed were immediately stopped and voided. In addition, plans for the demobilization of about forty divisions had to be prepared. There was no demobilization schedule as yet. The General Army Office received orders from the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army to work out general regulations governing demobilization. Suggestions as to succession, speed and execution of demobilization and the future peacetime organization of the Army were drafted and discussed with the Army General Staff. A multitude of problems was raised, had to be considered and clarified.

The most difficult point was the fulfillment of the demand that the demobilized divisions, if necessary, had to be prepared for immediate combat-ready reactivation since the war was not yet over. Even in the case of the greatest possible acceleration of all measures, the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army could not, after an actual demobilization of the units, guarantee that a completely new mobilization and the attendant reactivation could be handled in the period set by the Supreme Command. Hence the plan was dropped. Instead of a partial

demobilization, the system of "divisions on leave" was implemented. These divisions sent the bulk of their personnel on leave. Only cadres and materiel remained in the home Wehrkreise. Thus the demand of making all dispensable soldiers available to the civilian economy was fulfilled. These divisions could be again ready to march within six to twelve days. A limited number of divisions with a particularly unfavorable combination of personnel (older age classes) and deficient ordnance equipment were also disbanded. Reactivation in these cases was definitely not intended.

Notwithstanding, the general demobilization schedule — the counterpart to the mobilization schedule — was completed as a finished draft. A limited number of copies was issued to the Wehrkreis headquarters, and from this time on its rules served as the basis for personnel discharges from active military service during the war.

While the agencies of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army thus handled the organization of the reduction of the Field Army as ordered, preparations had started in the Field Army itself for an amphibious operation against England — code word SEELOEWE. The organization and training of the troops for these special tasks were accomplished in the Field Army; the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army took only a small part in them. He was all the more engaged in preparations in the sphere of armament. The supplies necessary for maintenance of troops across the sea had to be made available. Special equipment had to be developed and procured. The number of vessels requisitioned for crossing and landing was so large in particular that the amounts of steel necessary for them could not be allotted by the Commander of the

Replacement Army without curtailment of other Army production.

And now the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army experienced another surprise. Hitler, to whom these estimates were submitted, flatly rejected any curtailment of Army production in favor of preparations for SEELOEWE and explained to the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army that SEELOEWE was only an instrument of propaganda. It would probably be difficult today to prove whether Hitler at any time seriously considered an amphibious operation against England. That he disliked and distrusted it is, I think, rather certain. His orders for it were put in such a manner, however, as to induce the Army High Command very earnestly and emphatically to push the preparations for this operation -- which was completely novel for the German Army -- even at a time when Hitler no longer called it anything but propaganda. This is a good illustration of the lack of orientation within the Supreme Command and the lack of confidence in cooperation. The Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army was again brought into the unpleasant position by this event of having to tell the Army Commander in Chief and the Army General Staff that their requisitions were not in conformance with the intentions of the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht.

5. Beginning of the Eastern Campaign in 1941

Operation SEELOEWE was definitely called off in the middle of October 1940. A long operational pause was granted the German Army until the start of the campaign against Russia again required its full force in June 1941.

When England did not yield as the men at the head of the Reich had hoped and Hitler issued his first directives to the effect that the Wehrmacht was to gear itself for a martial conflict with Russia, the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army was again compelled to throw the helm around. The task no longer aimed at demobilization and peacetime organization but an intensive enlargement and improvement of the wartime Army. For that an armed encounter with Russia would strain the German forces to the utmost could not be subject to doubt.

An immense program was established. For the last time during the war the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army was given an opportunity for long-range planning. The organizational problem was to increase the number of available units. According to the established procedure thirty-seven new divisions were activated (11th to 14th waves), trained and equipped by the spring of 1941 with the use of cadres from the Field Army. In addition was the conversion of the best infantry divisions into armored and motorized divisions in order to reach the required number of twenty armored and ten motorized divisions.

For the first time personnel difficulties arose. While the new activations which the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army had to achieve signified a considerable augmentation of the personnel of the Army, the armament industry, which had to run in full gear to produce the necessary ordnance equipment, cried for laborers. By granting leaves to 300,000 skilled workers among the Army personnel, so-called armament furloughs, this situation was remedied. They were replaced in the existing units by young recruits and were to be called up again by

the Replacement Army at the beginning of operations and used as replacements. When the Russian campaign began it was only partly possible to draw these soldiers away from industry again.

The greatest ordnance bottleneck was that of equipping units with motor vehicles. In addition to the increase of fully motorized divisions, the large number of army headquarters troops and GHQ troops (heavy artillery, signal units, engineers, service troops of all kinds and particularly numerous motor vehicle columns in view of the great distances in Russia), which were to be activated in addition to the divisions, added up to extensive requirements. Only by utilizing the French motor vehicle industry did the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army succeed in meeting requirements at least to a fair extent. The multiplicity of types, a heavy drawback in view of the supply of spare parts and maintenance, had to be accepted. Efforts to achieve uniformity of type at least within each division had only partial success. I only mention in passing the fact that, in addition to these large programs, there were still other tasks, such as procurement of special equipment for the troops committed in the new African theater.

In the spring of 1941 the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army increased the divisions of the Field Army by nineteen (15th and 16th waves) from the forces of the Replacement Army. They contained older personnel not fully adaptable to field duty and their mobility was limited. They were used as occupation and security divisions to free fully usable divisions in the occupied areas (in the West, in Norway, later also in the Balkans) and to occupy Russian territory behind the advancing Field Army.

All the agencies of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army had to make a last special effort before the Russian campaign began. The divisions that had participated in the unexpected Balkans campaign had to be rehabilitated once again for employment in the East. This task was also mastered. While all this organizational work within the Army could be performed in close cooperation with the Army General Staff without too much friction, considerable difficulties had to be overcome on the armament sector.

The burning question of a labor force has already been mentioned. So was the lack of motor vehicles. Both problems decisively affected the activities of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army from this period onward. Availability of motor vehicles was the basis on which the scope and time requirement of all activations and rehabilitations was judged. A violent battle over the manpower question ensued, however, between the Wehrmacht and the civilian economy. Whether the requirements of personnel replacements of the Army were met came more and more to depend on the extent to which it was possible to effect the release of laborers from civilian agencies, especially industry. These battles, in which the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army took only an indirect part, were waged by the Wehrmacht High Command or on its behalf by the General Army Office. They have been described elsewhere (cf. Section C-X of this study, the study on the General Army Office and particularly the study on the Wehrmacht High Command).

What rendered the function of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army especially difficult was the directive, issued in the summer of 1940 and not rescinded, to the effect that the mission of the

Army was fulfilled and that the point of gravity lay now with the Navy and Luftwaffe (see preceding chapter). The other Wehrmacht branches referring to it demanded priority over the Army with regard to equipment. This view was also supported by the Wehrmacht High Command so that the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army could not prevent, for instance, quite a few ammunition plants from passing from the Army to the Luftwaffe. How bitterly this was to be atoned for will be the subject of a subsequent portion of this study (cf. Chapter 6). One must also not forget that full economic mobilization had still not been carried out and no thorough restriction of civilian requirements in favor of production for military needs had been effected.

Another phenomenon must be mentioned here. In the long operational pauses between the Polish and French Campaigns and between the latter and the beginning of the Russian Campaign all agencies of the Army were naturally intensively engaged in evaluating the experience gained. There was ample time for such evaluation. In such cases everyone tends to evaluate his own experience particularly highly and to generalize. A flood of suggestions, wishes, and demands for the alteration of existing and the development of new weapons and equipment was the result. It is self-evident that experience had to be and ought to be evaluated and exploited. The problem of what was really of general validity and not due to particularly conditioned individual cases remained. Each agency, each arm of service naturally considered its wishes of primary importance. The new theaters in the tropical regions of Africa and in cold northern Scandinavia brought new special demands. In direct ratio to the assertiveness of the individuals advocating innovation and to the interest which they aroused at top level,

these demands came with more or less emphasis to the agencies of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army commissioned with their realization, to the Arms Branches of the General Army Office and to the Ordnance Office. The result was an almost limitless program of developments, tests, and experiments, which necessarily interfered with overall production. (Cf. Section C-IV, p. 39 ff).

The Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army had already been ordered by the Army Commander in Chief in the spring of 1940 to establish development programs for all arms of service which might lead to a reduction of the multitude of types. This work progressed very slowly, however. Again and again new wishes emerged. The agencies of the Army General Staff and the Arms Generals with the Army Commander in Chief had to be consulted. They were the ones who had direct war experience and had to use the items furnished by the Chief of Army Equipment. This led to endless negotiations. Thus it happened that this work, which occupied the agencies of the Chief of Army Equipment for over a year, practically came to naught since it was overtaken by the events of the Russian Campaign.

It was similar with the deliberations concerning the organization of the Army subsequent to the time when the Russian Campaign would be at an end. As early as the spring of 1941 the Army Commander in Chief had entrusted these deliberations to the Chief of Army Equipment and the Commander of the Replacement Army. Occupation troops, heavily motorized expeditionary corps for alpine warfare or for operations under tropical and arctic conditions, and manpower exchange on a large scale to furnish the civilian economy with laborers were among the problems discussed. They never exceeded the stage of theoretical consideration.

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It was very often not easy for the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army to make a clear distinction and discriminate between what had to be put into effect with speed and emphasis, what remained temporarily only theory though it deserved prompt consideration and testing and finally what were impossible fantasies and eccentric detours. The working method of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army proved effective in matters of this sort. He kept himself and his staff free of all details but retained his view of the whole and issued clear-cut directives according to which his subordinate agencies could work freely.

When the German Army began its attack against Russia in the summer of 1941, it had been brought up to a status which, as far as strength, quality of equipment and training was concerned, had never previously nor subsequently ever attained again. The main effort in achieving this goal had been borne by the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army and the agencies assigned to him. About 4,500,000 men were at that time under arms in the Army (including Replacement Army), the total strength of the Wehrmacht being 7,500,000. The divisions envisaged to carry out the attack were modernly and well equipped. All of them contained at least a cadre of war-experienced officers, noncommissioned officers and enlisted men, and the younger enlisted men had received adequate training. The resources of the Army were now exhausted. The personnel replacements and materiel supplies available would be sufficient to replace the losses of a rapid, victorious campaign and no more. Everything had been staked on one card.

6. The Winter Campaign 1941-1942.

In spite of the tremendous successes of the 22 June 1941 offensive

against Russia the expectations of a Soviet collapse did not come true. When winter set in the German armies stood far within Russia locked in hard fighting. Around the turn of the months of November and December they were at the end of their personnel and materiel resources. A large-scale rehabilitation of the entire Eastern Army now became necessary. But the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army was no longer in a position to make the forces and means available. How had this situation come about?

As for personnel, at the beginning of the Russian Campaign the Replacement Army had contained 300,000 to 400,000 men suited as replacements for the Field Army. They were believed to be sufficient to replace the losses sustained in the summer and fall. It had been hoped that final success would have been achieved by then and that the strength could be maintained during the winter with the aid of the wounded and sick returning to the front after their convalescence. This hope had failed. The beginning of winter brought hard battles with heavy losses for which there were no replacements.

At the beginning of the campaign each of the attacking divisions had a field replacement battalion -- all in all about 90,000 men. With this the divisions were supposed to get along for the time being, until a pause in operations permitted shipment of replacements from the Replacement Army to the front on the few railroads, which were then already overloaded with current supplies directly needed for combat. It soon became apparent that this demanded too long a wait. From the beginning of August battalions of replacements were assembled in the zone of the interior. The capacity of the railroads, however, did not allow the shipment of more than an entirely

insufficient number. Hence after August 31 the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army assembled the battalions in such manner as to enable them to undertake long marches on foot. He formed special divisional staffs, which led them from the Reich frontier or from the frontier of the Government General in long marches to the armies. In a similar way the replacement of horses was arranged through the cooperation of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army and the Chief of Army Supply and Administration. The time elapsed before the replacements actually arrived at the field units was considerable.

In spite of all these measures the Eastern Army, in December 1941, had more than 300,000 vacancies whereas at home there were only 30,000 replacements available in addition to convalescents. The plan of the Chief of the Army General Staff to save personnel be disbanding or combining decimated units, thus bringing the remaining units up to full strengths, was seconded by the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army. This measure was vetoed by Hitler with the result that a rehabilitation of units was no longer possible. The shortage of manpower at the Eastern front became chronic. The Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, however, could no longer get as many men released from the civilian economy as he needed to fully meet the justified requisitions of the Army General Staff.

Still worse was the development with regard to materiel. In the preceding chapter the battle of the Wehrmacht branches for allocations and sources of production has already been mentioned. Now, still other measures were ordered, which in retrospect must be termed serious mistakes.

In the summer of 1941 the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the

Replacement Army received a Fuehrer directive (dated 14 July 1941) which demanded a further general throttling of the production of Army equipment in favor of Luftwaffe and Navy on the one hand and an extension of the "specialized" programs of the Army (programs of the mobile troops -- including the tank program -- and the heavy antitank gun program) on the other. Significantly, this directive was accompanied by a letter from the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command, in which the latter personally asked the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army for his support against the foreseeable resistance of the Army Commander in Chief, a request which the Chief of Army Equipment rejected not only because of the principles he believed in but also in clear awareness of the grave consequences for the Army springing from the stipulated armament measures.

The Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army realized the danger of relying on a rapid termination of the Russian Campaign at this early date. Even within the share of armaments still granted to the Army, the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army could not use everything solely for the furtherance for the "specialized" programs. He had to keep up production in the other spheres at least to such a degree as would guarantee adequate provision of the troops with other equipment. Before the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army could take any action against this directive, however, the Minister for Armaments and Munitions had already readjusted the plants. Raw material allocations to the Army were so much curtailed anyway that even the reduced program was no longer insured.

The Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army described this situation in detail in a memorandum dated 26 October 1941. A few figures will serve as illustration.

A comparison of requisitions and allocation of steel in 1941 showed the following picture:

Quarter	Requisition	Allocation	Per cent of Requisition
First	459,000 tons	300,000 tons	65.4
Second	451,000 tons	270,000 tons	59.9
Third	358,000 tons	227,000 tons	63.4
Fourth	353,000 tons	150,000 tons	42.5

In other words, in spite of the fact that the requisition of the Army was already curtailed, even half the required amount was allocated in the last quarter of 1941.

The effect becomes particularly evident in the following figures on the planned development regarding the two principal types of artillery ammunition:

Type of Ammunition	Probable Requirement 1 Jul 41-31 Mar 42	Probable Supply 1 Jul 41-31 Mar 42
Light field howitzer	10,200,000 rounds	113,000 rounds
Heavy field howitzer	3,312,000 rounds	293,000 rounds

One must here also remember that at the time when the memorandum was prepared an intermission in the fighting was expected for the winter and hence winter consumption was calculated as being considerably less.

Actually, the stock of 22,000,000 rounds of light field howitzer ammunition existing on 22 June 1941, had already dropped to 10,000,000 by the end of 1941, and there was no end to heavy fighting!

In spite of these figures, which showed the downright disastrous situation of the Army in the event that land warfare would continue into 1942, the Wehrmacht High Command, in December 1941, once again ordered the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army to turn over considerable amounts of semi-finished light field howitzer ammunition to the Luftwaffe. This was at a time when the Eastern Army could only with great effort show any effect against Russian counterattacks and was in one of its greatest crises! The Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army had no choice but to ignore the orders of the Wehrmacht High Command concerning the further reductions and the transfer and simply overdraw the granted allocations. Owing to his superior knowledge of conditions he was successful and thus could at least prevent the worst catastrophe until finally, in the latter half of December, the Wehrmacht High Command apprehended the situation and swung armament production in favor of the Army. To tear down is easier than to rebuild, however, and it took considerable time and required exertion of all energies on the part of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army until Army production was again running to a satisfactory degree.

Particularly worth mentioning is the situation with regard to clothing. As early as in the spring of 1941, when preparations for a campaign in the East were under way, the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army had suggested the seizure or purchase of furs on a large scale in order to be able to make and store in advance winter clothing fit

for Russian conditions. The Army General Staff made the same request. This measure was rejected by top headquarters because it was regarded as jeopardizing the national morale. The propaganda machine did not wish to permit the idea of another winter of war filtering to the population at all.

When winter had set in and brought reverses the same Propaganda Minister who, in the final analysis, had frustrated the Army's fur drive in summer now called in resounding phrases for a fur collection officially directed and managed by himself. Instead of a well-prepared winter outfit, furs and other protective agents against cold were now collected at random with all the frictions which attend such an affair and, after elimination of completely unsuitable pieces, shipped to the East. All this did not occur without extensive support by the agencies of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, which was arranged in keeping with the desires of the Propaganda Ministry. Nevertheless, only portions of the collection of furs arrived at the front and that with delay, since the railroads could not manage the shipment. Newspapers and radio, however, announced that the Party and the Propaganda Ministry had again made up for the Army's failure to care for its soldiers. This is one of the reasons leading to the ill will between the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army and the Propaganda Minister, which will be dealt with later (cf. Chapter 12).

It was by no means true that the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army had done nothing at all to prepare for winter. The fur drive in summer had indeed been rejected but all other winter clothing had been prepared and stored in time. Since, however,

contrary to expectations, fighting did not cease, the capacity of the railroads was fully taken up by supplies necessary for combat so that the Chief of Army Supply and Administration did not succeed in shipping the available winter outfits to the field units in time. It is true, however, that the German agencies lacked experience with the Russian winter. The winter clothing which had been prepared was essentially the same as was customary in Germany although in comparison with the clothing normally issued, it was reinforced. The winter coveralls and felt boots modeled on the Russian and in part even improved, which later proved so satisfactory, could only be issued to the troops to a sufficient extent in the following winter. Nevertheless, the winter outfits made available by the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army in 1941 could have substantially mitigated conditions, which were catastrophic at places, had they only reached the troops in time.

By the middle of December the situation in Russia had developed into a very serious crisis. In this emergency a call for help by assigning troops from the Replacement Army, in whole units if possible, reached the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, emanating not from the Army General Staff but from the Wehrmacht Operations Staff. The Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army was not unprepared. As early as the summer of 1941 when the last systematically activated units had been delivered to the Field Army, the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army had given thought to the problem of finding a way of quickly placing new combat-ready formations at the disposal of the Field Army in case of an emergency — he believed that this must always be reckoned with in the vicissitudes of war. The

result of these deliberations were orders to the Replacement Army requiring preparation of a kind of mobilization. Upon certain code words ("Walkuere," "Rheingold") available units were to be assembled according to exact regulations by using all suitable forces of the Replacement Army, both personnel and materiel. These units would not immediately have the full value of field divisions but could at least free field divisions in less important areas. The drop in efficiency of the Replacement Army in its own sphere, which would result from calling up such divisions, had to be accepted.

Thus, when the Chief was ordered to report to the Fuehrer on 15 December 1941, he could, at that critical time, propose the immediate activation of nine and one half divisions. Of these, four and one half could be called up at once and would be ready for commitment by 27 December 1941 ("Walkuere"), five more in approximately four to five weeks ("Rheingold"). His suggestion was approved and the activation proceeded. The foresight of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army proved its worth. The strain upon the Replacement Army was heavy, but by working intensively on details it was possible to restore it to adequate efficiency relatively rapidly and even to prepare the "Walkuere" procedure. The High Command was helped several more times during the war by this plan when, in an emergency, it had no forces at its disposal anywhere which it could free for an urgent task.

The emergency measures taken by the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army were not exhausted with these divisions. Raiding detachments in battalion strength with selected personnel and special equipment for winter warfare were assembled, and regional defense and construction battalions were drawn from their assignment in the

zone of the interior and placed at the disposal of the Field Army. In a special drive, all motor vehicles that could be rounded up in any manner were combined into columns and dispatched by road to the Field Army; they were utilized as transportation for personnel replacements in the zone of interior and thus served to relieve the railroads. Replacements were also shipped to the front by airplance. All these measures, improvised in a few days, naturally did not proceed without friction and break-downs. But everything possible was done, and among other factors it was undoubtedly due to the exceedingly great effort of all the agencies of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army that the Eastern front did not collapse. When the strength of the Russians let down at the beginning of 1942 the crisis had been overcome for this winter.

In the meantime, the reversal in the control of armament production had finally been ordered (cf. above). After the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army received in December 1941 the first directives from Hitler concerning his intentions for 1942, he succeeded in making the resources of personnel and materiel available to the Army General Staff, which were needed to bring the Eastern Army, heavily bruised as it was by the winter campaign, considerably back to its fighting strength, even if not to any full degree.

7. The Dismissal of the Commander in Chief of the Army and the Assignment of the Chief of Army Equipment to the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command in the Winter of 1941/1942

In connection with the crisis of the winter campaign the Army Commander in Chief, Generalfeldmarschall von Brauchitsch, who was suffering

from a serious heart ailment, had requested and received his release. A successor was not appointed, but instead Hitler personally assumed command of the Army. Omitting all discussion of the reasons and the pros and cons of this solution, only its effects on the position of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army will be shown here.

The Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army had at first welcomed the turn of events. Now directly assigned to Hitler, he expected a greater influence on the latter's decisions, primarily in armament matters, in favor of the Army in its battle against the other Wehrmacht branches and the civilian economy. He additionally hoped that with the assumption of direct command Hitler's interest and understanding for the conditions and the situation of the Army would increase. These hopes were bitterly disappointed when Hitler named the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command as his permanent deputy as Army Commander in Chief, thus assigning the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army to Generalfeldmarschall Keitel.

This placed the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army in quite a peculiar position, particularly in view of the fact that the Chief of the Army General Staff remained assigned directly to Hitler. The Army General Staff, the agency whose intentions, plans, wishes, and demands ought to have been decisive with regard to the function of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, received all its orders and directives directly from Hitler and made its oral reports directly to him. Between the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, however, the person of Feldmarschall Keitel was interposed. This weakened the position of the Chief

of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army toward the Army General Staff since now they no longer held equal rights toward the Army Commander in Chief. Likewise the assignment of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army to the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command weakened the former's position toward the other Wehrmacht branches. The weakness of Feldmarschall Keitel's position, inherent in his personality, was conducive to the following situation:

As the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command, Keitel had no command authority but acted as a chief of staff for Hitler. Hence in all disputes between the Wehrmacht branches he had to have recourse to negotiation and had to obtain necessary decisions from the Fuehrer. There the Commanders in Chief of the Luftwaffe and the Navy had far stronger influence. Only toward the Army did Keitel, now that he was permanent deputy of the Army Commander in Chief, have command authority, at least toward the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army. As a result, whenever the demands of the three Wehrmacht branches could not be harmonized and the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command could make no headway against Luftwaffe and Navy, the easiest solution for him was to order where he could do so, namely with the Army. Similar were the effects of the new assignment of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army in the event of decisions between the Army and civilian or Party agencies. This point will be dealt with later (Chapters 11 and 12).

The Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army presently realized the danger of his new position. He attempted with all means to obviate it in that he skipped the Chief of the Wehrmacht High

Command and tried to gain direct influence with Hitler. Keitel, on the other hand, had steadily lost influence within the Wehrmacht High Command -- in operational matters the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff had the final word, authority in the armament sector went more and more to the Ministry for Armaments and Munitions (especially after Speer succeeded Todt, cf. Chapter 11). Actually nothing but the direction of the affairs of the General Wehrmacht Office remained for him. This was precisely the field in which he came into sharp conflict with Fromm (cf. Chapter 12). Keitel, therefore, attempted all the more to gain influence in the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army's sphere of authority. Vehement discord and a constant battle between the two personalities, Keitel and Fromm, resulted. In the following chapters this relation will repeatedly have to be dealt with. There the reasons which caused the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army to be defeated in the end will also become apparent.

First the influence of the new top-level organization upon relations between the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army and the Army General Staff must be briefly examined. In this connection I may refer to what has been said in Chapter 2 on the Wehrmacht High Command Theater of Operations. The Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command, whose office conducted the operations on the Wehrmacht High Command Theaters, was now the direct superior of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army. This was bound to lead to friction, especially since the Chief of the Army General Staff, who was responsible for overall Army organization and supply -- also on Wehrmacht High Command theaters --

received his directives directly from Hitler and accordingly addressed his requests to the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army. The whole confusion which now arose in the top-level organization has been treated with illustrations in the study on the General Army Office (p. 85 ff); I therefore need not go into detail again.

The Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army persisted in his loyal attitude toward the Army General Staff and also maintained this toward his new superior. In the honest exchange of differing opinions between the operational command and the man in charge of organization and equipment, an exchange desirable in the interests of a successful performance of functions, the latter had, however, lost considerable importance. The Chief of the Army General Staff and the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army could no longer present their opinions to their Commander in Chief as men of equal rank and obtain his decisions. The Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army was informed of matters through channels from the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command, who represented his interests badly or not at all but at the same time was increasingly successful in preventing direct reports by the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army to Hitler. The result was that the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army for his part sought an even closer tie with the Army General Staff, without, however, encountering any ready desire on the part of this body to meet him halfway -- perhaps because the difficulty of his position was not fully recognized there. A man of General Fromm's stature was really necessary under these difficult conditions to find ways again and again of carrying out what he always regarded as his

primary responsibility, that was, to give the Field Army all the assistance from the zone of the interior that could be obtained.

8. The Caucasus Crisis in the Summer of 1942

As already indicated in the preceding chapter the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, after the winter crisis had been overcome, succeeded in making the means available for an extensive, though not complete, rehabilitation of the Field Army. Because of his accurate knowledge of the armament situation he had considerable doubts, however, whether a large-scale operation in the East in 1942 could be carried through at all in view of the ammunition and manpower situation which had developed out of the events of the preceding fall.

Knowledge of the plans for the intended offensive in the southern part of the Eastern front and their objectives, which were essentially economic, reached the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army only by way of circuitous channels through civil ministries at a time when the decision had already been made. This offensive had been ordered by Hitler contrary to the opinion of the Army General Staff. It was primarily governed by the economic viewpoint of getting to the oil area and exploiting the industrial opportunities of the Ukraine. Generaloberst Fromm, who was not at all ignorant of economic matters, was convinced that it would take years before one could achieve actual economic success here, that hence no effect upon the course of the war could be expected and that the personnel and materiel expended on this project would be futilely drawn out of the zone of the interior. He had previously expressed his military

doubts (cf. above). Now it was too late to underscore them from the standpoint of armament production. Besides, it is doubtful in view of his already-declining influence whether a protest on his part would have had any success. Looking at the matter objectively also, it is obvious that it was a mistake not to consult the military armament expert in such decisions.

Events vindicated the opinion of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army. Much personnel and materiel was put into this project. Specialists and machines were drawn away from petroleum drilling beginning in the Vienna Basin. A special "Brigade" was assembled by the Wehrmacht High Command which the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army had to furnish with considerable equipment. The provision of motor vehicles interfered particularly with the measures of the Army. Practical results were never produced by this brigade; two years later commissioners of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army actually found a depot near Vienna in which equipment for these purposes (drilling devices, pipe lines, drive machinery) worth twenty million Reichsmarks was stocked up without use.

More closely than by the oil influence, the sphere of authority of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army was touched by the Armament Ministry's plan of establishing a large-scale ammunition manufacturing center in the Ukraine. The Armaments Ministry knew how to portray in the most beautiful colors the advantages of production close to the front. Even the Chief of Army Supply and Administration was convinced, and the order was issued for the erection in the Ukraine of an ammunition factory to produce several million rounds of the

most important calibers. The protest of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army that the necessary raw material was unavailable was rejected. Also cast aside was his contention that the supply of ammunition was a transportation problem and that, through separation of a large part of production from the zone of the interior, both the exchange of powder and explosives between the various calibers in accordance with changing requirements and their shipment to the various theaters in the event of an invasion in the West were rendered unduly difficult. On the contrary, without the knowledge of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, fuses, powder, explosives and many other items were dispatched to the East on a large scale before any production started at all, thus causing serious difficulties in production in the zone of the interior. (The Chief of Army Supply and Administration later returned portions of unused stocks to the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army in special shipments.) Personnel from ordnance agencies in the zone of the interior had also to be released for these purposes. In the end it turned out that even the coal for the generation of energy had to be shipped from the zone of the interior. Still all counterarguments were fruitless. A commissioner of the Ministry for Armaments and War Production began to set up ammunition production in the Ukraine. There was never any result from this. Before success was possible, the front had been pressed back to the Dnieper River and all stocks either had to be destroyed or left to the Russians.

In another respect the summer offensive in 1942 also had effects on the functions of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army. The vast territories in the East were a constant drain and

somehow had to be filled with troops. The Field Army needed its units for the increasingly heavy battles, however. In addition the danger of an Anglo-American landing in the West became more and more menacing. At first the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army once again eased matters by means of a "Walkuere" activation in July (cf. Chapter 6). With increasing urgency the demand for a transfer of parts of the Replacement Army to the occupied areas was raised. This measure was executed in September 1942. It is described in detail in the study on the General Army Office (p. 107 ff). The disadvantages arising from it for the Replacement Army and its command are also mentioned there. It became more and more evident that the limits of our capacity had been reached with respect to manpower alone, quite apart from the difficulties regarding materiel.

9. The Memorandum "At the Height of Power and Glory," Written in the Fall of 1942, Which Caused the Chief of Army Equipment to Fall from Hitler's Grace

The Campaign in the summer of 1942 had brought large territorial gains but again no decision. The Eastern front was overextended, the threat of a landing in the West impending. An increase in the amount of German troops was no longer possible; in fact, losses could scarcely be replaced. At this point the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army resolved for the first — and last — time to drop the reserve he had hitherto maintained in matters of overall warfare. He had strictly confined himself to his own responsibilities, always single-mindedly endeavoring to make available to the field army whatever it needed, and had

only put forth his opinion insofar as a reasonable and practical organizational application of the personnel and materiel resources procured and made available by him was concerned. He had never meddled with the operational and political conduct of the war. But now he saw as no one else the increasingly palpable deficiencies in personnel and materiel, the ever more evident exhaustion of the German people. He was greatly impressed by the data, given him by Reich Minister Speer, concerning American armament, with which Germany with its potentialities would never be able to cope. He was convinced that these factors had to have a decisive influence on the overall conduct of the war. Therefore he resolved to express his view point in a memorandum and transmit it to the Fuehrer.

The memorandum began with the words, "At the height of power and glory." It pursued approximately the following train of thought:

> At the height of power and glory it is proper to make an account. Tremendous successes have been achieved. Now the climax has been reached. Stretched further the bow must break. The utmost has been done regarding personnel and materiel. If the war continues Germany's inferiority, particularly to the American armament must make itself felt more and more. The exhaustion of the German nation becomes increasingly evident. In this situation military victory can no longer be expected. Instead, the two-front war must be ended if a military collapse is to be avoided. As a result of the situation, the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army arrives at a conclusion which shows that an immediate undertaking of political negotiations aimed at a conclusion of peace is now necessary as long as the German Wehrmacht still stands unvanquished in the field. The Wehrmacht's task in the future should only consist in preventing any serious reverses until the negotiations have produced satisfactory results. To this end a combination of all military and civilian forces and creation of a workable top-level organization is imperative. The point no longer is to gain a victory but only to prevent a catastrophe. The focal point of national government is clearly shifted in the process to the foreign and inner political spheres. Hence the proposal to entrust the conduct of military operations, which can no longer lead to victory, to a soldier and military expert while the Leader of the German

Nation devotes himself exclusively to the decisive political negotiations is valid. The Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, however, must receive authority for a last effort with regard to personnel replacements, procurement of ammunition and weapons, and organization.

This was approximately the vein followed by the memorandum, which, in November 1942, was personally read to Hitler by Generaloberst Fromm in the presence of Generalfeldmarschall Keitel. It was listened to in icy silence. The result was Generaloberst Fromm's fall from grace. He indeed remained at his post, probably because no successor for him could be found and he was indispensable as a result. But the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command knew how to prevent the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army from ever again gaining access to Hitler for a direct report, and thus his influence was practically eliminated. From now on he was persona non grata.

10. The Catastrophes of North Africa and Stalingrad, Fall 1942 to Spring 1943

How correctly the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army had judged the situation was demonstrated by the heavy reverses of the next six months in North Africa and at Stalingrad. The loss of whole armies was an unredeemable death blow relative to personnel matters. Neither the Propaganda Minister's announcement of "total war" nor General von Unruh's drive for the last men could effect a fundamental change. Industry needed men to achieve the required production; the Wehrmacht needed men to cover losses. There were not enough for either purpose. The result was disagreeable complications between military and civilian agencies.

Since the top representative of the Wehrmacht, the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command, was weak and did not dare assert himself against the civilian agencies (Armaments Ministry, Propaganda Ministry), the burden of these battles fell on the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army and his agencies, particularly the General Army Office. Since these were not supported by Hitler, unpleasant reverses repeatedly occurred. The Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army could, in advance, calculate when, judging solely from the manpower situation, the resistance of the German Army would be at an end. The prediction that this would occur in the spring of 1945 was exactly true.

But the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army found no more listeners. He received the order to reactivate the lost armies. With his old organizational mastery he solved this difficult task. From the Replacement Army was drawn whatever was fit for establishment of useful cadres for the new divisions. To fill them up replacement personnel had to be used who actually had been intended to replace the losses in formations in the East. Thus the Eastern Army retained its high number of vacancies.

The losses of materiel were also hard to replace. Yet the old truth proved itself that with respect to materiel much can be replaced within a reasonable space of time by the power of the human mind, inventiveness, expedients, substitutes and by increased work. The output of the armament industry continued to rise. In many areas (production of tanks, for example) it reached its maximum as late as the end of 1944. But men cannot be replaced by anything and cannot be produced artificially. And all materiel is of no value if there are no men to use it.

Here not only the number is important but also the training. The smaller the combat strengths of the forces became and the lower the training standards dropped, the higher the losses of materiel rose. Although the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army did not interfere much with matters of training and hence little space has been accorded training in this study, he always endeavored, often unfortunately without success, to counteract the depreciation of military training on the part of the top headquarters and to always allow an adequate period for training in his calculations of organizational directives.

Retrospectively, it can be said that the defeats in North Africa and at Stalingrad had the gravest repercussions in personnel matters. The results would not have been half as disastrous if at least the hundreds of thousands of battle-tested and experienced soldiers could have been saved, even without the materiel. A comparison with the conduct of the British at Dunkerque in 1940 forces itself upon the mind.

11. The Discord with Minister for Armaments and War Production Speer in 1943

While the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army had long had only an indirect influence on the procurement of personnel replacements, his influence on armament production had also been declining since 1942. After the crisis of the winter 1941-1942 and the sudden death of Todt, the Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions, Speer had been appointed to take his place on 8 February 1942, and had been provided with extensive authority. (He allegedly had an authorization in his pocket enabling him to completely eliminate the Chief of Army

Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army but he never made use of it.)

The Ministry for Armaments and Munitions became the Ministry for Armaments and War Production (hereafter referred to as the Armaments Ministry). Further responsibilities, hitherto incumbent upon the Military Economic and Armament Office in the Wehrmacht High Command, were switched, together with the appropriate agencies to the Armaments Ministry. Information hereon is contained in the study concerning the Army Ordnance Office and especially in the study concerning the Wehrmacht High Command.

The expanded Armaments Ministry at first attempted to gain the last word on the development of weapons. As a countermeasure the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army created the "General for Special Employment With the Chief of Army Equipment." He was supposed to clarify the wishes and opinions of the various agencies of the Army High Command (General Army Office, Ordnance Office, Army General Staff, Arms Generals) and then present a uniform representation of the interests of the Army toward the Armament Ministry (cf. Section C-VI). In the beginning cooperation was good, especially since Minister Speer maintained good working relations with General Fromm. The Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army.even received support from Speer in asserting Army interests over the other Wehrmacht branches, which often was impossible through Wehrmacht High Command channels.

The tendency grew in the Armaments Ministry, nevertheless, to take over exclusive control of the armament program without the participation of the Wehrmacht branches. This was supported by the fact that Speer and his men

always found Hitler more inclined to listen to them than did the Wehrmacht. As early as the summer of 1942 Hitler refused to discuss ammunition matters with the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army. "I tell the Munition Minister about the ammunition I need, for that I don't need Generaloberst Fromm," said he. The military expert was no longer heard at all. (Cf. the transfer of ammunition production to the Ukraine, Chapter 8.) The story in the other areas was similar.

Thus a condition developed in which the soldier no longer informed the civilian Armaments Ministry of his requirements but rather the latter determined the programs itself or received direct orders concerning them from top headquarters. By 1943 the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army had been completely eliminated from this process. The programs, however, concerned only tanks and large weapons. Figures were used without any consideration for military needs, in other words without consideration of other equipment necessary for the conduct of operations and the serviceability of the units. The tank and weapons program came through the Armaments Ministry to the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army and could then no longer be corrected.

The result was that the dispositions at top headquarters — and precisely in these things Hitler decided on even the most petty details — based organizational possibilities solely on this program. Thirty-six howitzers represented an infantry division, and one hundred tanks represented an armored division regardless of the fact that the howitzers also needed aiming circles, stereo-telescopes (for the battery commanders), limbers, harnesses, and that a division in addition to weapons also needed

field kitchens, entrenching tools, vehicles, and so forth. The production allocations for these items were insufficient because everything went into the tank and weapons programs in order that industry and the Armaments Ministry could present favorable production figures. The enlisted man had to see how he could get along.

At first the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army was still able to control the development through appropriate distribution of the raw material allocations which initially were assigned to him by the Wehrmacht High Command, later by the Four Year Plan (cf. Section C-V.). When the responsibility of allocating raw materials to the Wehrmacht branches devolved upon the Armament Minister in 1943 this last control also ceased; the Armaments Ministry simply ignored the distribution outline for the Army allocation prepared by the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army and took for its programs whatever it needed.

This situation necessarily resulted in increasingly deep-seated differences leading to permanent tension between the two agencies. Owing to his assignment to the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command and his incurrence of Hitler's disfavor, the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army was at a disadvantage from the beginning and lost one position after another.

12. The Discord Between the Reich Propaganda Minister and Reich Director Bormann in and After the Summer of 1943

Any deep concern with political matters did not belong to the responsibilities of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army. All political affairs in any way concerning the Wehrmacht were basically handled by the General Wehrmacht Office of the Wehrmacht High Command. In particular, the regulations and directives governing the relations of the Wehrmacht to the Party and other political agencies were issued there. Generaloberst Fromm practiced deliberate self-restraint in all such matters, but his position and his duties necessarily brought him into contact with political and Party agencies and frequently required action on his part (cf. Section C-III, p. 59 ff). This occurred in a dual respect.

For one thing, the functions of the Army High Command agencies assigned to the Chief of Army Equipment and the Commander of the Replacement Army had many points of contact with these agencies. The so-called ideologic education, for example, which was part of every soldier's training, was of particular significance for the Inspectorate of Education and Training Affairs. Another example was the basic regulations governing the station, the rights, and the duties of the soldier, which were prepared for the Army by the Branch for General Troop Matters of the General Army Office according to guides issued by the Wehrmacht High Command. Owing to the decisive influence of the Party in all civilian matters, however, many other matters requiring cooperation with the top civilian authorities of the Reich frequently assumed a political character. Such matters included questions of food supply

(Administration Office negotiations with the Food Ministry) and of clothing (General Army Office negotiations with the Ministry of Economics). The political and Party agencies particularly attempted to assert their influence in personnel replacement matters (Replacement Affairs Branch of the General Army Office).

In the second place the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army was, in the latter of his two capacities, the direct superior of the Commanders in the Wehrkreise. Their responsibilities included the representation of the interests of the Wehrmacht toward the civilian and Party authorities and cooperation with these in their respective Wehrkreise. They were therefore in constant contact with the Reich governors, provincial chief administrators, Gauleiter, and Reich defense commissioners. They had to receive their directives from the Commander of the Replacement Army. All disputed points and all incidents, which occurred amply in the process, came first to the Commander of the Replacement Army who had then either to make a decision himself or obtain one from higher headquarters (Wehrmacht High Command) and attach his own comment to it. This required the Chief of Army Equipment and the Commander of the Replacement Army to follow up carefully all inner political and Party political events and weigh their significance for the interests of the Army High Command and the Replacement Army. This was done by the staff of the Chief of Army Equipment and the Commander of the Replacement Army itself. In addition General Fromm maintained personal contact with important men among the other top Reich authorities.

While in general the relation between the Chief of Army Equipment and

Commander of the Replacement Army and the top Reich authorities was satisfactory, considerable differences of opinion and tension arose with two men in the course of the war. These were first, Reich Propaganda Minister Goebbels and second, the top representative of the Party, Reich Director Bormann.

The discord with the former had its basis in the manner in which the Reich Propaganda Ministry, in press and film, informed the people of the war events. On this point, as everywhere else, the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army confined himself strictly to his own responsibilities. He saw a great danger in the ostentatious propaganda regarding the status of German armament and the output of the German armament industry. He felt that the soldier at the front under the influence of this propaganda would no longer treat his weapons and his equipment with the necessary care. The impression that the German armament industry could easily replace what was lost or damaged engendered a tendency to waste materiel. As he saw it, it was the duty of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army to demand education of the soldier in careful maintenance of the precious materiel so difficult to replace.

Likewise, the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army protested against the representation of war as a succession of easily won victories. The young recruit, whose training had been entrusted to the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, especially received an entirely false conception of what awaited him at the front. The written and illustrated reports preferred to show the troops in moments when military forms had somewhat relaxed. This was

probably intended to lend them a "realistic" aura. The Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army felt, however, that such one-sided representation could only have unfavorable influence on the education and training of the young soldier and could only render the task of the trainers more difficult. The inexperienced recruit was not aware that strict military order and discipline would benefit him in the end and that what he had to learn in drills was based on a great deal of experience and helped not only to better chances of success but also saved blood. When he saw the weekly newsreel and read the newspapers he was inclined to regard everything as "barracks drill," which one does best to get rid of in the field as soon as possible. The Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army sought to counteract this tendency and to influence the propaganda in a good military fashion — but mostly in vain.

It was an eyesore for the Propaganda Ministry on the other hand that there was a film station with the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army which also took pictures at the front. There was an odor of competition. The Propaganda Ministry wished to direct everything concerning films, even if it primarily served military purposes (training, pictorial documents). (Cf. Section C-IX.)

The effect which the influence of the Propaganda Ministry had in the clothing question has already been demonstrated by the example of the winter of 1941-1942 in Chapter 6.

The tension reached its climax in the beginning of 1943 when, in the line of actions aimed at drafting hitherto irreplaceable persons for the

Wehrmacht, there was a violent collision between officers under the jurisdiction of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army and the Propaganda Minister himself. The point at issue was the induction into the Army of a number of persons from among the sizable category declared irreplaceable at the demand of the Propaganda Minister. On the ground of saving "divinely-inspired artists" and offering relaxation and diversion to the people by means of theaters, variety shows and so forth in times of war, not only actually practicing artists but in addition, in a loose interpretation of the term, also such assisting personnel as make-up men, scenery workers, and so forth, in ages subject to military service had been declared irreplaceable. A controversy over the demand of drafting these now in view of the Army's need of replacements developed which Goebbels presently reported to Hitler with the result that the latter personally rebuked high officers. It almost seemed a mockery that a little over a year later the same minister was commissioned by Hitler with the mobilization of all personnel for total war. This was exactly as in the winter of 1941-1942 when Goebbels arranged the great fur collection six months after he had thwarted a systematic appropriation and evaluation of furs for the Wehrmacht (cf. Chapter 6.).

All this in the final analysis demonstrates the great mistrust which prevailed in even the highest Party circles. The officer corps, primarily the officer corps of the Army, had remained the sole national institution which the power of the Party had not fully penetrated. In addition, this officer corps, founded on tradition and firmly rooted in high conceptions of duty and honor, enjoyed great popular esteem. This was a stumbling

block for the totalitarian claim of the Party, and it is easily understandable that the Party used every opportunity to undermine the esteemed position of the soldier, especially in the zone of the interior.

In the same direction lies the tension between the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army and Reich Director Bormann, although it was more subtle in its manifestation, more dangerous in its effects. It is impossible in a few brief strokes to draw the development of these unpleasant conditions with their complex interrelations, in which imponderables played a great role, and with the many minor causes and occasions which had grave consequences. Here alone the thread which stretched through all of it and found its conclusion at length after 20 July 1944 can be mentioned.

Until his dismissal, Generalfeldmarschall von Brauchitsch represented security against the endeavors of the Party to gain influence on the Army. After Hitler had assumed command of the Army himself this security was gone. The Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army failed in his initial effort to awaken in Hitler an interest in and an understanding of the inner workings of the Army and to thereby gain strong protection against undesirable influences (cf. Chapter 7). Instead, the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army had himself become the agency that had to act in this respect. His superior, Generalfeldmarschall Keitel, was no source of support for him. His own position was weak and the Wehrmacht High Command Office which should have had most to say in this question, the General Army Office, was all too ready to yield and anxious to avoid anything that perhaps could encounter the disfavor of

the Party. In Chapter 7 it has already been described how the weakness of the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command primarily worked to the detriment of the Army, to which he, as permanent deputy of the Army Commander in Chief, could give orders. Thus it came about that measures were not also carried out in the political and ideological spheres, which had come to naught before through the opposition of the Army Commander in Chief.

The battle of power between the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army and the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command has been described above (cf. Chapter 7). Politics became an important instrument in the hand of the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command in this battle. Through the General Army Office he sought to exert direct influence on the political orientation of the Wehrkreis commanders. In this manner opposition to the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army was bred and his position was undermined. The position of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army in this behind-the-scenes wrestling match proved weak from the beginning owing to the manner of his subordination, and here, too, he lost one position after another. This became clearly evident by the rearrangement of the assignment of the Wehrkreis commanders, who now received their directives in many Wehrmacht matters directly from the Wehrmacht High Command, by-passing the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, and by the increasing interference of the Reich defense commissioners (Gauleiter) in purely military matters. Later on, in the closing months of the war, this degenerated at places into grotesque forms of a disorganized command, such as the assembly and commitment of the Volkssturm and the construction

of positions by the Reich defense commissioners regardless of the wishes and intentions of the military command.

With these actions the Wehrmacht High Command pushed the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army more and more to the attention of Reich Director Bormann as the person principally opposing Army resistance to the influence of the Party.

Thus the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army came into continually sharper conflict with Bormann. He was branded as a person who was unreliable and culpable from the Party viewpoint. Things even went so far that Bormann demanded that he be present at any report made by Fromm to Hitler, a demand which at first could be fought off and later became inconsequential since the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command knew how to prevent any direct report Fromm might wish to make to Hitler.

The whole thing is a dark chapter in the history of the German military high command in World War II. The consequences after the attempt on Hitler's life on 20 July 1944 will be dealt with later (cf. Chapter 15).

13. The Discord With the Reichsfuehrer SS as a Result of the Expansion of the Waffen-SS in the Summer 1943

Organizationally, the Waffen-SS was a part of the armed forces completely separate from the Wehrmacht. Although its field units were employed under the operational supervision of the Army, the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army had nothing to do with its organization. The replacement units of the Waffen-SS did not belong to the Replacement Army and were not attached to the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander

of the Replacement Army. The functions and responsibilities which the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army exercised with respect to the Army were exercised for the Waffen-SS by the SS Main Operational Department.

Nonetheless, an expansion of the Waffen-SS was a matter which concerned the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army since the former's personnel and materiel were taken from the same armament potential as that of the Army. The Waffen-SS pre-empted the best manpower through advertisement for volunteers among the youngest age groups. The Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army had to equip the Waffen-SS formations from the available stocks and the new production of the Army.

Even in the beginning, when the number of units was still small (three Waffen-SS divisions during the France Campaign in 1940), continual difficulties arose. They were chiefly caused by the fact that the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army was rarely completely informed or informed in advance of existing plans and that these had not previously been coordinated with the requirements of the Field Army. The SS Main Operational Department usually raised new demands suddenly, which demands were always based upon direct "Fuehrer Orders" and called for preferential and expeditious fulfillment. Very often the Army General Staff had not been informed of such plans at all.

The difficulties with the Reichsfuehrer SS grew with the progressive activation of new SS-formations during and after the summer of 1941. They reached a climax when, during 1943, the Waffen-SS doubled the number of its divisions in the field and its total personnal rose from 250,000 to

about 500,000 (both figures include replacement units). That was the time when the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army had to rehabilitate by great effort the armies which had been lost in Stalingrad and in North Africa and was no longer able to make available the personnel and materiel replacements necessary for covering the losses suffered by the Eastern Army.

From the standpoint of Army organization this assembly of an "Army beside the Army" could only be regarded as poor investment of personnel and materiel. The Waffen-SS demanded especially good and selected replacements, extravagantly wasting personnel suited as commanders or subordinate commanders. Although the Waffen-SS also accepted non-German volunteers to a large extent and subsequently took over foreign units up to then activated by the Army (Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army), a large percentage of its members remained German, and the number of replacements required soon far exceeded the number of actual volunteers.

The result led first to the use of enlistment methods strongly reminiscent of "impressment" during the times of mercenary armies, but this repeatedly resulted in complaints to the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army. When at length this method did not produce the required replacements, draftees were also assigned to the Waffen-SS. With regard to materiel, the equipment of SS divisions which shot out of the ground like mushrooms was a heavy burden on the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, since he had to deduct this equipment from what he urgently needed for the Army and received only in insufficient quantities. The question whether all the SS activations really had

priority repeatedly led to serious differences of opinion, especially after the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army was no longer content with oral notification by the SS of "Fuehrer Orders" but asked that these be transmitted to him in writing through the Organizational Branch of the Army General Staff.

Worst of all was the fact that the Waffen-SS, in a manner which could not be controlled by the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, undertook the development of weapons and equipment itself and, in addition, managed to obtain deliveries directly from the armament industry out of its current production. Again and again the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army came across such doings which were intolerable within any kind of systematic control. His protests led to serious discord with the Reichsfuehrer SS without bringing about any fundamental improvement.

The determining factor was that Hitler always saw in the Waffen-SS a particularly reliable element of unquestioning loyalty toward him, not subject to the ties and influences of the old officer corps which he regarded with growing distrust. Besides, he was always ready to accept new divisions offered him. When the Reichsfuehrer SS told him that he could activate a certain number of units, Hitler agreed without considering that in the final analysis everything came out of one large pot whose contents simply no longer sufficed to make both ends meet. Resistance on the part of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army had no chance of success and served only to worsen his already weakened political position (cf. Chapter 12).

14. The Attempt on the Fuehrer's Life on 20 July 1944

On 20 July 1944 Oberst Graf von Stauffenberg carried out the well-known attempt on Hitler's life. Stauffenberg had been Chief of Staff of the General Army Office since the fall of 1943. Shortly before the attempt the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army had switched him to Chief of his own staff. An attempt to capture the government by force was part of the attempted assassination. The military head of this was General der Infanterie Olbricht, the Chief of the General Army Office. There is no room here to treat the reasons and the political consequences of this plot. The reasons must be briefly indicated, however, for the fact that the attempt originated within the sphere of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army and that the men involved in its attempted realization were numbered among his closest assistants. The principal reason is no doubt that here the picture of Germany's real situation was recognizable with particular clearness. The admissions and ideas which the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army had presented in his great memorandum (cf. Chapter 9) were familiar to the men around him. They saw in their daily work how correct these facts had been, how the prospect for a happy or even tolerable outcome of the war dwindled more and more, and how, from day to day, Germany's situation became increasingly hopeless because of its deficiencies in personnel and material. They also saw how all endeavors to bring this to the attention of Hitler and to induce him to alter his policy had been fruitless. This probably explains why precisely here honest inner conviction fostered the resolve to bring about a forcibly about-face in order to forestall the worst for Germany.

Similar recognition of the facts, of course, existed elsewhere in the highest military circles. There was the following additional factor in the sphere of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, however. In the office of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army in Berlin there existed the best opportunity to spin the threads for the execution of such a project. On the one hand it was the center of the Reich; on the other, it was removed from the restricted atmosphere of the Headquarters. This probably offers an explanation of why, among all the persons involved, it was the aforementioned two who acted.

This has little or nothing to do with the responsibilities and the position of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, which is borne out by the fact that there was no basic organizational change after 20 July. The incumbents merely changed. Proven untrue was the rumor spread by Nazi propaganda after the abortive attempt to overthrow the regime that the agencies of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, primarily the General Army Office, had withheld personnel and materiel on a large scale from the Field Army in order to strengthen the military force of the conspirators at home. Replacements and supplies were always provided the Field Army in full measure. The command mechanism of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army and the mobilization measures prepared in 1941 in the Replacement Army under the code name "Walkuere" (for quite different purposes, cf. Chapter 6) were merely used on 20 July in the attempt to seize power in the zone of the interior by military means.

The Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army,

Generaloberst Fromm, had not been initiated into the plans himself. The Gestapo investigation produced no evidence against him whatever and ended with his release. Thereupon he was placed before a special court and sentenced to death because allegedly out of cowardice he had not immediately taken resolute countermeasures against the attempted putsch. Agencies of the Wehrmacht High Command had a decisive hand in this play. The internal causes for it are obvious from what has been said in Chapter 12. The sentence was executed by a firing squad. Any comment thereon would also exceed the scope of this study. Let it only be pointed out again at this point that the person of Generaloberst Fromm is insolubly bound up with the post of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army. He was its spiritual originator. In the years from 1939 to 1944 he impressed his stamp upon it with the weight of his personality. His defeat in the internal battle against the Wehrmacht High Command and the Party also extinguished the significance of the post. With it vanished the last remainder of an independent Army High Command. Subsequently his functions and responsibilities devolved partly on the SS, partly on the Wehrmacht High Command. This phase will be dealt with in the following chapters.

15. Assumption of the Post of Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army by the Reichsfuehrer SS

Immediately after the plot of 20 July 1944, Generaloberst Fromm was relieved of his post as Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army and the Reichsfuehrer SS was named as his successor. With this a Party man and non-soldier for the first time attained an important

post in the Army High Command -- incidentally an almost logical development of the share and influence, increasing along with the steadily growing number of SS divisions, of the Waffen-SS within the fighting ground forces, but at the same time a blow to the officer corps. There had always been much talk of a possible later fusion of the Army and Waffen-SS, the only point in doubt being whether the old soldierly standpoint of the officer corps or the Party-bound, revolutionary attitude of the SS would gain supremacy.

Now Hitler's mistrust of the officer corps forced the first step, a step quite plainly in favor of the SS. The Office of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army at that time was the agency which, in addition to the Army Personnel Office, which was already under Hitler's direct control, exercised the greatest influence on the internal structure of the entire Army. It might be well to remark in passing that the influence of the Reichsfuehrer SS on the Army presently extended even further through the Volks Grenadier Division newly conceived in 1944. The units thus called, though parts of the Army, were controlled in all matters concerning the internal behavior of the troops (disciplinary and court matters, ideological education, in part even appointments of officers) by the Reichsfuehrer SS rather than the Army High Command.

In view of the high position which Himmler held in the National Socialist regime, the post of Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army of course could not continue to be assigned to the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command. It was now put under Hitler's direct command. In addition, shortly thereafter, the designation of Commander of the Replacement Army, was changed in accordance with the rank of the new incumbent to

Commander in Chief of the Replacement Army.

In practice, Himmler was not in a position to personally exercise the functions of his new post in addition to his other responsibilities in the Party and in political spheres, especially since he soon became, in addition to everything else, Commander in Chief first of an Army, then of an Army Group at the front — another example for the chaotic state of the command in the last months of the war.

As his permanent deputy as Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army Himmler immediately named SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen-SS Juettner. From the standpoint of the Army this choice could be thoroughly welcomed, for it meant that a man who, in his whole bearing, was more a soldier than a Party man assumed the practical exercise of the post. Obergruppenfuehrer Juettner had long been the head of the SS Main Operational Department and was the organizer of the Waffen-SS (cf. Chapter 13). As such he had essentially concerned himself only with the military side of the Waffen-SS and possessed considerable knowledge and experience on the subject of Army organization and equipment. Thus he could thoroughly be regarded as an expert. He had been in constant contact with the office of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army when General Fromm was in charge. Notwithstanding all conflict between the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army and the Reichsfuehrer SS, as described above in Chapter 13, the relationship between Fromm and Juettner was always pleasant even though the latter naturally had to represent the point of view of his master. He always had shown understanding for the interests of the Army, had known how

to turn off many excessive demands of the Reichsfuehrer and even after 20 July did not conceal his admiration for General Fromm.

No organizational change within the sphere of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army was connected with the appointment of Himmler. Obergruppenfuehrer Juettner, as Himmler's permanent deputy, more or less assumed the entire post and all the assignments of Generaloberst Fromm. Himmler did not take part in the armament activities at all. As Commander in Chief of the Replacement Army his activities were essentially limited to the signing of court-martial sentences which this office had to execute. Otherwise Obergruppenfuehrer Juettner tried to ward off all attempts on the part of Himmler to meddle with the affairs of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army. Juettner clearly maintained the standpoint of the Army and did not shrink from violent controversies with his master. In the beginning he was successful. But in the course of time Himmler began to give orders directly to agencies of the Replacement Army without Juettner's knowledge, mostly for the purpose of preferentially aiding the army or army group commanded by himself (cf. above). Against that even Juettner was powerless. A useful distribution to the Field Army of the Replacement Army resources, which were inadequate to begin with, was thereby rendered exceedingly difficult.

Since Juettner, on the other hand, could support his actions by the fact that they were executed on behalf of Himmler, the office of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army once again gained a strong position toward the non-military agencies. Only the manner in which the Speer Ministry had set up the armament program was he powerless to change.

16. The Role Played by the Army Staff Within the Wehrmacht High Command

To outline the final development of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army we must go back once again to the turn of the year 1941-1942. After the dismissal of Generalfeldmarschall von Brauchitsch the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command was designated by Hitler as his permanent deputy as Commander in Chief of the Army (cf. Chapter 7) and in January 1942 a new post called "Chief of Army Staff within the Wehrmacht High Command" was created. This Army Staff was initially intended to aid the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command in his new Army functions and to represent the Army interests in the Wehrmacht High Command. The Chief of Army Staff primarily had to brief the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command and the Army Commander in Chief (Hitler) on all Army problems, to clarify points and eliminate friction, to facilitate and expedite important decisions, and conversely to bring opinions and intentions of Hitler regarding any phase of the Army to the attention of all agencies concerned. He had no command authority. General Buhle, up until then Chief of the Organizations Branch of the Army General Staff, an exceedingly spirited and energetic personality, was appointed Chief of Army Staff.

It did not take long until the Chief of the Army Staff, probably primarily due to the personality of the incumbent of this post, outgrew the scope of his responsibilities, originally only informational, and became an agency with an important influence over all organizational and armament matters of the Army. Previously in such questions in the Army High Command,

the Army General Staff, as the requisitioning agency responsible for the conduct of operations, and the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, as the executive agency responsible for organization and armament, had opposed one another. Now a third agency had been interposed which, though bearing no responsibility, spoke a decisive word in all affairs.

The considerable influence of this third agency resulted from the fact that the Chief of Army Staff could usually directly refer to the intentions, opinions, and orders of Hitler, to whom he and the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command came regularly to report. This situation gave him an advantage over the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army who, at this time, was increasingly being kept away from Hitler by the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command (cf. Chapters 7, 9, 11, and 12). The position as closest adviser to the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command and the close contact between the two agencies additionally served to prejudice the Chief of Army Staff very much in favor of the Wehrmacht High Command. The impasse between Wehrmacht High Command and Army High Command Theater of Operations is mentioned only briefly in this connection (cf. Chapter 2). The representative of the Army at the Wehrmacht High Command in the end turned into an advocate of Wehrmacht High Command plans at Army headquarters.

The decisive step occurred with regard to armament. (For the effects of the Chief of Army Staff on the organizational work of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army see the study on the General Army Office, p. 107 ff.) Here we have to retrace our steps once again to a certain extent in order to get a clear view of the interrelations.

The Ordnance Office had always been the black sheep of the office of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army. It has already been related above (Chapter 3) how it had opposed being assigned as it was and had always strived for independence. The interposition of the office of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army between it and the Army Commander in Chief or the Army General Staff and between it and the Armament Ministry was decidedly disliked by the Ordnance Office, since it represented a filter preventing unimpeded passage of all wishes of the Ordnance Office. On many occasions differences of opinion resulted when the intentions of the Ordnance Office were not what the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army considered necessary from the standpoint of troops equipment. The Ordnance Office was powerless to do anything against this assignment to the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army within the Army High Command. There was another way, however, by which it could free itself, a way which had many reasonable arguments in its favor, namely the conversion of the Army Ordnance Office into a Wehrmacht Ordnance Office and its assignment to the Wehrmacht High Command.

There is no doubt that the simultaneous existence of an ordnance office for each of the three Wehrmacht branches involved uncoordinated and duplicated work and appointments in many ways that would have been avoided through the establishment of a single Wehrmacht Ordnance Office -- if such an institution had been created from the beginning. Considering how matters had developed before and even more during the war, however, the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army saw these trends with justified concern.

In the first place, the Luftwaffe and Navy would hardly be agreeable to a fusion of their ordnance offices with that of the Army into a Wehrmacht Ordnance Office and, in the second place, in view of the known attitude of the Wehrmacht High Command and its lack of authority over Luftwaffe and Navy, the assignment of the Wehrmacht Ordnance Office to the Wehrmacht High Command would always work to the detriment of the Army regardless of whether the other Wehrmacht branches would fit themselves into such Wehrmacht Ordnance Office or would retain their special ordnance offices in addition. Generaloberst Fromm, for these reasons, knew how to prevent such a development and initially was supported in this by the Chief of Army Staff.

The Ordnance Office, on the other hand, in its endeavor to eliminate the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, found support to some extent from another side, the Armament Ministry. To certain circles of this ministry the person and the office of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army seemed a thorn in the ministry's side because he tried to oppose its one-sided programs. This battle and its detrimental consequences for the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army have already been described in Chapter 11. The position of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army toward the Armament Ministry was now further weakened by the Chief of Army Staff's by-passing him, establishing a close, direct contact with the Armament Ministry, and negotiating directly with it. With that he followed the policies of Hitler.

Thus the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army

was put under fire from all sides. The fact that no Wehrmacht solution was adopted, and that even the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command rejected such a solution as late as 1944, must probably be ascribed to the fact that the man most suited to head a Wehrmacht Equipment Office, which it then would have been necessary to establish, undoubtedly would have been the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, Generaloberst Fromm, in other words, precisely the man one wanted to eliminate. Here the cat bit into its own tail. Officially there was no change in the position of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, but in practice a method was applied which eliminated him (cf. Chapter 11).

In addition to the undoubtedly justified charge that the three Wehrmacht branches in armament matters worked without coordination and in part even against one another with resultant unnecessarily large labor and personnel involvements, a particular stumbling block proved to be the Ordnance Inspectorate and its subordinate agencies (equipment offices, ammunition depots, and the like), all belonging to the General Army Office. This organization and its responsibilities have been described in the study on the General Army Office, but some further information concerning it must be given here.

Originally -- in the times of the Reichswehr -- the Ordnance Inspectorate belonged to the Ordnance Office. About 1933 it was taken out of the latter and assigned to the General Army Office. The Ordnance Office was to direct the development and procurement of weapons, ammunition and equipment. With the acceptance of new production from industry its task was completed. Administration, storage, distribution and issuance were matters of the agency responsible for organization -- and that was the General Army Office. This

Office had to be able to issue the materiel resources necessary for the accomplishment of its mission, just as it was able to assign the personnel resources. It caused useless difficulties if the General Army Office depended on another office for its requisitions. This standpoint was clearly upheld by the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, and he repudiated all attempts on the part of the Ordnance Office to have the Ordnance Inspectorate assigned to it once again. The standpoint of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army here must be regarded as absolutely correct. Whoever wishes to build a house must be able to utilize his building material himself though someone else may procure it. In the practical work during the years of the build-up of the Army and during the war the attachment of the Ordnance Inspectorate to the General Army Office proved most effective.

But the Ordnance Inspectorate was not only a pure administrative and distribution organization. Rather it prepared the weapons furnished by industry and accepted by the Ordnance Office for use in the field, in some instances assembled them from the furnished parts, fired the test rounds, and provided them with the accessories and spare parts necessary for use by the troops. In the ammunition depots it tested the ammunition and made it ready for use.

These functions now were subjected to cross-fire. The Ordnance Office considered these activities as part of procurement, hence as in its sector. The Armament Ministry felt interfered with and raised the charge that personnel and labor were being wasted, while industry could do these things much better (although industry itself actively opposed doing them). Principal

annoyance, however, sprang from the fact that the Armament Ministry always reported the figures of industrial output to Hitler immediately and that the latter then gained the false impression that these quantities were ready for immediate employment. If it then turned out that such was not the case but that the weapons first ran through the equipment offices (simply because previously they were not usable in the field at all) the most violent charges were again and again leveled against the Ordnance Inspectorate, the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, and the Army in general because of the delay.

It is impossible here to discuss all the details. No doubt several solutions are possible to these questions, and I am far from claiming that the existing distribution of tasks was the absolutely best one. Developments in Germany, however, were the cause. Individual attempts to alter it during the war produced considerable drawbacks which the outsider perhaps did not at all realize as such. The Armament Ministry, for example, tried to have an industrial firm make guns ready for field employment down to the last monkey wrench. It transferred the entire production of accessories there with the result that all guns produced elsewhere could no longer be fitted out. The equalizing work of the Ordnance Inspectorate was lacking. Incidentally, on-the-spot examinations by mixed commissions repeatedly brought to light the fact that the agencies of the Ordnance Inspectorate, owing to their good organization, actually worked with a minimum of effort attained nowhere else. Remembrance of the once-raised charges of delay and excessive labor expenditure remained, however, especially in the minds of all agencies that did not have so accurate a view of the actual conditions

as did the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army. One of these was the Chief of the Army General Staff, who completely upheld the standpoint of the Armament Ministry and in part also of the Ordnance Office.

The difficulty of presenting all such questions with regard to armament with at least some degree of clearness and lucidity in the scope of a brief treatment in itself attests to the intricacy of the problems involved.

When, as a result of the war situation (the advance of the enemy armies to the frontiers of the Reich and into German territory and the increasingly oppressive enemy air superiority), Germany's stocks of materiel dwindled more and more and when the fact became obvious to the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army through the continual crumbling of production that the end would come in the spring of 1945, the Chief of the Army General Staff and the Armament Ministry felt able to effect an improvement once again through new organizational changes.

On 7 January 1945, the post of Chief of Army Equipment which since 1939 had been combined with the Commander of the Replacement Army was disbanded by decree of Hitler — without previously consulting the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army and to the surprise of Himmler himself. The duties of this post were entrusted to the Chief of Staff, who, in this capacity, was attached directly to Hitler. In conjunction therewith the reorganization of the Army Ordnance Office as Wehrmacht Ordnance Office was ordered on 15 January 1945. (For more details see the study on the Army Ordnance Office by General der Artillerie Leeb, p. 115 ff.) Yet the new office did not become more than the old one had been, for the ordnance offices of Luftwaffe and Navy remained in operation under their respective High Commands.

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Parts of the equipment organization (the entire ammunition field) were attached to the Wehrmacht Ordnance Office, the Army plants of the equipment organization turned over to the "care" of the Armament Ministry. On 8 April 1945, the Army Staff was combined with the Wehrmacht Ordnance Office. The Chief of the Army General Staff received the designation "Chief of Wehrmacht Equipment" and was henceforth to be responsible for the entire procurement of ammunition and the control of war production.

To summarize briefly, a solution that was perhaps correct in principle was put into effect overhastily and one-sidedly with regard to the Army at a time when everything was beyond salvation. A tangle ensued which could not be resolved. Only the personal contact of a few old and experienced individuals in the various agencies made cooperation in the accustomed manner possible. The Army's organizational set-up had been smashed, that of the Wehrmacht never evolved. The Luftwaffe and the Navy did not care about it and did as they saw fit.

That was the end of the Chief of Army Equipment.

17. The Collapse

Thus from the post of Chief of Army Equipment and Commander in Chief of the Replacement Army was left — for a few more months — the Commander in Chief of the Replacement Army. The responsibilities of the post continued to be performed by Obergruppenfuehrer Juettner as permanent representative of Himmler. New activations, rehabilitation, supply of replacements proceeded as before. A new problem had emerged, however, when the ground operations began to cover the zone of the interior, which until then

had been the zone of jurisdiction of the Commander in Chief of the Replacement Army. According to hitherto customary military concepts every withdrawal of the Army would have had to be followed by a readjustment, in accordance with the situation, of the borders between the zone of interior — the sphere of the Commander in Chief of the Replacement Army — and the zone of operations — the sphere of the Field Army. That was done neither in this form nor at the right time.

At higher headquarters one shrank at first, for propaganda purposes, from clearly admitting the steadily worsening situation and gave as a reason that the population should as long as possible be saved from "the immediate exigency of land warfare.". This was an absolute fallacy, for the facts remained unchanged. Then the matter was settled in a manner which no longer recognized a zone of operations in the old sense (the entire executive authority lying in the hands of the army commanders). Maintenance of national sovereignty and all administrative functions up to the front lines remained responsibilities of the Gauleiters and Reich defense commissioners and were to be performed in accordance with directives from the Director of the Party Chancellery (Bormann) or the Reich Minister of the Interior (Himmler). Only in a "combat zone" with a depth of about twenty kilometers did the Wehrmacht have command authority over the agencies of the Gauleiters and Reich defense commissioners.

For the Wehrmacht differentiation was made within German territory between the "zone of jurisdiction of the theater commanders in chief" and the "zone of jurisdiction of the Commander in Chief of the Replacement Army." This ruling did not directly concern the Commander in Chief of the Replacement

Army because he had never had executive authority in the zone of the interior. It still did concern him after all, since the influence of Gauleiters and Reich defense commissioners had been substantially strengthened through it and they ventured more and more to interfere with even purely military matters (cf. Chapter 12).

The joining of the Wehrmacht High Command Theaters West and South with that of the East toward the rear on German territory was not exactly conducive either to clarification of conditions. In the midst of all this Himmler, as "Commissioner of the Fuehrer for the Organization of National Resistance in the East," issued his directives to the Gauleiters. In this increasing command chaos the Commander in Chief of the Replacement Army finally retained only the task of dispatching to the Field Army whatever replacements became available or continually combining them into new divisions. This possibility also decreased from day to day since, due to the development of the situation, replacement and training troops were involuntarily drawn into combat, mostly through direct cooperation of field headquarters with Wehrkreis headquarters. Since no clear directives were issued in time from above, the subordinate agencies acted on their own. The Commander in Chief of the Replacement Army could only sanction later what had happened or simply accept it as fait accompli.

In April 1945 everything hastened toward the debacle. On 17 April Hitler ordered the formation of two command outposts since the situation no longer allowed a central management of operations. Accordingly, the post of the Commander in Chief of the Replacement Army also divided itself. On 16 April the chief of staff, together with one part, went southward where

he joined the Operations Staff "B" of the Wehrmacht High Command, while Obergruppenfuehrer Juettner, with the remaining part, stayed with the Operations Staff "A" in the north. On 26 April 1945, the Army General Staff was attached to the Wehrmacht High Command which thereby assumed the over-all command. On 27 April the disbandment of the post of Commander in Chief of the Replacement Army was ordered because there was practically no more Replacement Army to command. The remnants of the post were merged with the Operations Staffs "A" and "B" of the Wehrmacht High Command, When Germany surrendered there was no longer a Commander in Chief of the Replacement Army.

E.

Conclusion

By Generalmajor Hellmuth REINHARDT

The position of Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, as it existed in World War II, was something that had not existed in the German Army in former times and, as far as I know, does not exist in this form in the armies of other countries. Many of the responsibilities of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army are comparable to those of a War Minister or Army Minister, in the form in which this office existed in the old World War I German Army and which still exists today in many other countries. The comparison is not entirely correct, however. The purely ministerial functions in the German Army of World War II were exercised by the Wehrmacht High Command; the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army had only to insure their execution within the Army and represented Army interests only in dealings with the Wehrmacht High Command and not, as in the case of a minister, with the government. On the other hand the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army had full command authority toward a part of the Army (the Replacement Army), which is not usually connected with the position of a minister.

In Sections A and B of this study one will find a description of how the basis for a combination of organizational and armament functions in the Army High Command resulted from the development of the top-level organization of the German Wehrmacht and the German Army and why and in what form

such combination was prepared for the event of war and put into effect upon mobilization in 1939.

In Section C the responsibilities and authority of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army and the organization and responsibilities of the elements of the Army High Command under his control have been outlined. Indispensable supplements to this section are the special studies on the three large offices in the Army High Command under the control of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army: "The General Army Office in the Army High Command under the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army" by Generalmajor Hellmuth Reinhardt, "The Army Ordnance Office 1938-1945" by General der Artillerie Emil Leeb and "The Responsibilities of the Army High Command in the Control of Home Resources for the Supply of the Army (Demonstrated Through Organization, Responsibilities, and Modus Operandi of the Army Administration Office)" by General der Artillerie Herbert Osterkamp. Only in conjunction with these three studies can a fairly complete view be had of the whole responsibility sphere of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army.

Section D presents the function of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army during the war. With the aid of examples it shows, on the one hand, the modus operandi of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army and, on the other, the developments through which the position and importance of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army rose in the first two war years until they reached their climax about 1941. It likewise shows how, from the turn

of 1941, his influence first gradually decreased and how from early 1942 on, he was divested of his responsibilities one after the other until, in the beginning of 1945, only the responsibilities of the Commander in Chief of the Replacement Army were left him, which post was abolished altogether shortly before the surrender because of the development of the war situation.

The whole history and function of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army contains an abundance of interesting and essential questions of Army organization, Army equipment, and wartime top-level organization. Only a part of these could be dealt with in some detail in this and the three supplementary studies; many have only been indicated, while a large part, especially those concerning special subjects, have had to be left unmentioned in order to prevent this study from becoming too voluminous and cumbersome. The threads of the multifarious problems with which the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army had to concern himself were long and intricate.

I now intend, at the end of the study, to select a few problems and subject each to a short critical examination, but the choice will be limited to the most important questions of the wartime top-level organization, questions which stretch like a red thread through the whole history of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army and which must be solved by all armed forces. These problems are as follows:

1. Relations between Armed Forces command and Army command.
2. Distribution of responsibilities within the Army command.
3. Command of Army and Armed Forces in the zone of the interior.

4. Participation of non-military top government agencies in the control of armament.
5. Influence of political parties on the Army.
6. Importance of individuals in the top-level organization.

Under any conditions, the solutions of these questions are a result of historical development and can only be understood on such a basis. Multiple solutions are possible and, depending upon conditions, one or the other may produce greater advantage. Thus, the solutions chosen in Germany can be judged only on the basis of the development of the German Wehrmacht prior to World War II. Nevertheless, the merciless struggle during almost six years of war has distinctly brought out the strengths and weaknesses of the solutions adopted, and the experience gained in the process acquires importance for all who have to cope with these problems.

Naturally no exhaustive discourse on these problems can be expected in this section which is solely a conclusion to the present study on the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army in the High Command of the German Army during World War II. Only a brief examination from the viewpoint of their effect on the position and function of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army will be given in the following.

1. Relations Between Armed Forces Command and Army Command

During the reconstruction of the German Wehrmacht before World War II a strict, centralized command of the Wehrmacht was decided against in favor of wide-spread independence for each of the three Wehrmacht branches,

Army, Navy and Luftwaffe. Section A of this study deals at greater length with this point. The result was a competitive struggle among the three Wehrmacht branches in many matters, which, in the sphere of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, chiefly affected the armament field. Another result was that among the assignments of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army there were some which he responsibly handled for the entire Wehrmacht according to exclusive directives from the Wehrmacht High Command (military recruitment, motor transportation, rations, and so forth). The disadvantages of this solution became evident in the first years of war.

Beyond some advantages it may have, such as the invigorating effect of free competition, it is no solution for a pauper. Yet Germany was a pauper in its war potential, both with respect to personnel and to materiel. In 1941 at the latest this fact became more and more apparent. The entire activity of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army was decisively affected by the constantly increasing shortage of all personnel and materiel.resources. There can be no doubt that a sharply centralized Wehrmacht command would certainly have been capable of more economical management. The prewar decision, however, had led to a weakening of the influence of the Wehrmacht High Command, thus disqualifying it, built and manned on the basis of this decision, for the exercise of strict command over the entire Wehrmacht. Even the fact that Hitler, the absolute dictator, acted as Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht changed nothing. On the contrary — however paradoxical this may sound — he thereby actually prevented a strong, unified Wehrmacht command, a phenomenon that repeated itself after Hitler's

assumption of command over the Army.

This latter measure also weakened the position of the Army High Command to such an extent (cf. Section D, Chapter 7) that a trend toward a shift of power to the Wehrmacht High Command began to grow in strength. This brought the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army into a pronounced dilemma. On the one hand he saw inherent danger for the Army in the fact that these shifts would be undertaken one-sidedly at the expense of the Army and would decisively weaken the position of the Army in relations with the Wehrmacht branches. But, on the other hand he was fully aware of the advantages of a strong, centralized Wehrmacht command and was in favor of them. Actually it could only make things easier for him if he were relieved of the always difficult and trying internal battles with the Luftwaffe and Navy and if the Wehrmacht High Command then had to fight them in his stead. Consequently he put up only half-hearted resistance. Since he found no support from above -- his superior being simultaneously the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command -- the development of events after 1942-1943 shows a transfer of one assignment after another from the hands of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army to those of the Wehrmacht High Command.

In retrospect one can say that the war has shown that particularly with regard to armament a strong Wehrmacht command would undoubtedly have been more advantageous. After the entire command structure had been based on the decision favoring the individual Wehrmacht branches, however, the transfer of individual functions to the Wehrmacht High Command, such as were undertaken successively step by step and in most cases to the disadvantage of the

Army, could bring no basic improvement. The position of the Wehrmacht High Command was not strengthened thereby, but that of the Army High Command was decisively weakened, while the other two Wehrmacht branches did not yield any phase of their independence.

Efficient organizations were ruptured although the Wehrmacht High Command was unable to replace them soon with something equivalent. It would have been necessary to build a completely new Wehrmacht High Command, strong and really equal to its tasks — a measure which probably would not have been practicable at all during the war. False decisions so profound in nature, when made in prewar times, are rarely susceptible of correction during a war. When correction is impossible it is better to let the apparatus run as it is and get the best out of it than to undertake imperfect, biased half-measures which cause confusion and damage rather than produce any help.

2. Distribution of Responsibilities Within the Army Command

Within the German Army High Command the distribution of responsibilities as prepared for the event of war and carried out upon mobilization proved a happy one. The basic combination of all functions not immediately connected with the conduct of operations, the separation of responsibility for the conduct of operations on the one hand and the organization, administration and armament on the other, proved very efficacious. The Army Personnel Office, with its precisely delineated tasks as the agency handling all officer matters, stood as third top agency beside the Army General Staff and the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army; it has

no bearing upon the present considerations. The decisive point was that, through the establishment of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, only one agency was responsible to the Army Commander in Chief for the entire field of organization, administration and armament, and that the Army Commander in Chief no longer was obliged, as he had been in the peacetime organization of the Army High Command, to personally coordinate the activities of the offices engaged in these functions.

It was essential for the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army that he had equality with the Chief of the Army General Staff and could represent his opinions and conceptions in a like manner (cf. Section B). A certain initial period was indeed necessary; it was not before the final appointment of General Fromm as Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army in the beginning of 1940 that this post gained its full importance. This initiated the period during which the Army High Command was at its best, a period which ended abruptly with the relief of Feldmarschall von Brauchitsch and Hitler's assumption of command over the Army.

Although the various components of the Army High Command remained in existence in their old form, the unity of the High Command had been ruptured by the new arrangement. Now the unified headquarters, with its elements under one head and enjoying equal rights, no longer existed, but what was left were basically only the various elements under the control of different superiors and essentially dependent upon mutual and trusted cooperation to keep the mechanism running. (Cf. Section D, Chapter 7 and the study on the General Army Office, Part III.) The fact that the mechanism kept on running

though much sand was thrown among the gears is good evidence of the understanding work on the part of all agencies which always kept the interests of the whole in mind. It now proved valuable that the most important posts within the sphere of influence of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army had been filled with well qualified and experienced general staff officers, men whose common and identically oriented education and training guaranteed work according to identical principles. The organization of the supreme command had become unbelievably bad.

A further complication in the organization and the distribution of responsibilities of the Army High Command — which no longer consisted of anything but individual elements anyhow — was the creation of the post of Inspector General of Panzer Troops in 1943. He received equal authority with the Army General Staff, the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army and the Army Personnel Office, thus constituting a fourth general post. As a man responsible for a single arm he certainly did much for its benefit. But he did not fit organically into the pattern of the High Command; perhaps one may say that he suddenly brought a vertical line into the horizontal stratification and thus caused a fracture. He received extensive authority in almost all matters, but everywhere only for the armored troops. Thus he necessarily collided within the office of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army with all agencies handling the same matters for all arms. It is obvious that this had to lead to deep-rooted friction, and considerable tact and mutual good will was required to repeatedly straighten things out and pave the way for reasonable cooperation. Without any intention of depreciating the merits

of the Inspector General and his post with regard to the promotion and the strengthening of the armored troops, it must be said from the standpoint of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army that the creation of this new post was an organizational mistake, insofar as the extensive authority was concerned, which was not compatible with the rest of the structure of the High Command.

This chapter must not be ended without having touched on the subject of training. Before the war there was no post in the Army High Command which uniformly handled training. The Arms Inspectors and Inspectorates each handled the training of their respective arms, while the Army General Staff handled the training in command and combat of combined arms. The reason for this arrangement may well have been the fact that in peacetime the training, as main task of the field units, was the special responsibility of the unit commanders and, in the case of the High Command, logically that of the Commander in Chief himself. Hence the Army Commander in Chief directly controlled the Army Inspectors. That this solution was not entirely satisfactory is revealed by the thought given by the Army High Command, even before the war and in the first war years, to the establishment of a post in the High Command responsible for the entire training according to peacetime standards. A final result has never been forthcoming.

During the war tactical and operational command rather than training became the main task for the commanders up to the Army Commander in Chief. Only in the Replacement Army did training remain a principal task. Accordingly, the Arms Inspectors were assigned to the Commander of the Replacement Army and their functions limited to the Replacement Army (cf. Section C-VII).

Training affairs of the Field Army were handled in the Training Branch of the Army General Staff. After the beginning of the war, the Arms Generals with the Army Commander in Chief (later with the Chief of Army General Staff) were added as representatives of their respective arms in the Field Army (counterparts to the Arms Inspectors of the Replacement Army).

Under the Commander of the Replacement Army, uniform handling of training was limited to a subsection of his staff. It soon turned out that this was insufficient to meet requirements. The Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army himself was not in a position to attend personally to training to the same degree as unit commanders had been able to do and had done in peacetime. This was on the one hand due to his being already very heavily burdened with all organizational, administrative and armament affairs; on the other hand it was due to his personality. Although he was personally convinced of the importance of training and always endeavored to make full allowances for it in an organizational respect (time, aids, and the like), General Fromm had neither thorough experience nor a particular interest in its practical exercise.

Not quite without pressure from outside, this led to the establishment of a top agency for training under the control of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, the "Chief of Training in the Replacement Army" (cf. Section C-IX). With this step an arrangement had been instituted that differed fundamentally from arrangements hitherto customary in the Army High Command, but which, however, was fully equal to wartime requirements, at least within the sphere of the Replacement Army. Coordination of training in the Replacement Army with that of the Field Army was attempted

by close contact between the Chief of Training in the Replacement Army, the Training Branch of the Army General Staff and the Arms Generals with the Chief of Army General Staff.

From the standpoint of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army this solution was the best one possible during the war. The endeavor on the part of the Arms Generals with the Chief of Army General Staff to acquire influence over the Replacement Army too, however, led to a retrogressive development after the departure of General Fromm. While the post of Chief of Training was now disbanded, the Arms Generals, now termed "Arms Generals in the Army High Command," achieved the approximate position and authority of peacetime Arms Inspectors. The decisive element of the peacetime organization was absent, however, namely the Army Commander in Chief, who personally occupied himself intensively with training problems. Hitler, the then Army Commander in Chief, regarded military training as absolutely useless. Hence the Army Generals had not been assigned to him directly but were subject to a double subordination, to the Chief of the Army General Staff for the Field Army, and to the Commander in Chief of the Replacement Army for the Replacement Army. Thus what should have been the very purpose of the reorganization, a unified control of training, had not been achieved. The collapse came before the reorganization could become really effective.

In summary it can be said that the creation of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army in the wartime top-level organization of the Army proved excellent in the fields of organization, administration and armament. In the very important field of training a completely satisfactory solution was not found.

3. Command of Army and Armed Forces in the Zone of the Interior

The combination of the functions of the Chief of Army Equipment with those of the Commander of the Replacement Army, in other words, the combination of the functions in the High Command with the exercise of command authority over the Replacement Army, had very great advantages from the standpoint of Army organization. In a manner which must be called almost ideal, it enabled the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army to make all forces and means of the Replacement Army available to the greatest possible degree for the constant reinforcement and maintenance of the striking power of the Field Army.

And yet the practicality of this solution must be qualified. Even when a country succeeds, as Germany did up to the last year of this war, in conducting ground operations outside of her frontiers, the enemy will nevertheless always be able, with the means of modern warfare, to also carry the war into the zone of the interior (through air raids, parachutists, airborne operations). The troops in the zone of the interior, and that includes the troops of all branches of the armed forces, must therefore always be ready and able to put up passive and active resistance against such "vertical" attacks in addition to performing their replacement and training duties. The situation was properly recognized by the German expression "Heimatkriegsgebiet" (home war zone) which was not used to describe the zone of the interior. A unified command for defensive combat was not established. But this term is as far as one went. This is explained by the weak position of the Wehrmacht High Command (cf. Chapter 1).

Since Wehrmacht High Command Theaters of Operations were created anyhow, however, the first Wehrmacht High Command Theater should have been the zone of the interior. And if in accordance with the experience gained in World War II, one is inclined to favor a strong centralized Wehrmacht Command, the almost inevitable result is the establishment of a "Commander in Chief of the Home Wehrmacht."

Then the Chief of Army Equipment will have been superseded by a Chief of Wehrmacht Equipment. Whether the latter should, at the same time, be the Commander in Chief of the Home Wehrmacht appears very doubtful. Those two sectors in which the combination of Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army proved so fruitful, that is, organization and training, would primarily remain tasks of the individual Wehrmacht branches even in the case of a strongly centralized Wehrmacht command. In view of the actual German conditions in World War II let it only be pointed out that the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, as the superior of the Wehrkreis commanders, had to concern himself extensively with Wehrmacht matters, a circumstance which caused him many difficulties and in which must be sought to a considerable part the cause of the steady downhill progression of his position in the second half of the war (cf. Sec D, Chapter 12). From this point of view the creation of a Commander in Chief of the Home Wehrmacht also appears appropriate.

4. Participation of Non-Military Top Government Agencies in the Control of Armament

Before the beginning of the war and in its first year the military top agencies (the Ordnance Offices of the Wehrmacht branches and the Military

Economy and Armament Office of the Wehrmacht High Command) cooperated in armament matters directly with private industry. In the war — 1940 — this was basically changed by the interposition of the Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions (later for Armament and War Production). The development has been described in detail both in the present work and in the study on the Army Ordnance Office. It, too, must always be regarded from the viewpoint of the historical development of the German Wehrmacht as a whole.

Upon critical analysis the control of the armament-producing part of the civilian economy by a separate, non-military ministry during wartime appears absolutely advantageous. Whether this ministry should exist in peacetime is doubtful. At least preparations should be made for its establishment in the event of war, and it should have its germ in a peacetime ministry. Its advantage, particularly in a country with limited armament potential such as Germany, lies in the stricter integration and the consequent better utilization of existing possibilities. For the military agencies its existence facilitates things greatly especially since the soldier generally cannot and does not need to have knowledge required for it. Thus, from the standpoint of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army the interposition of a civilian ministry for armament has proved thoroughly useful in this respect.

The fact that in the later course of the war the activities of the Armament Ministry wrought much harm and caused the greatest difficulties to the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army has its origin in the fundamentally erroneous shift of limits of responsibilities

existing between the military and civilian agencies. In the two large divisions of the armament field, development and procurement, the soldier must determine what is to be done while the civilian armament expert has to limit himself to who shall do it and how it shall be done. In other words, military demands must always be decisive in matters of development. In the German wartime top-level organization this development should have been determined with regard to the Army by the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army. It was a mistake that the Army was compelled to accept developments in which, for some reason, private industry or the Armament Ministry had an interest even if it were only that of a particularly favorable manufacturing possibility. Production must likewise conform to the procurement requisitions of the Wehrmacht. Only the Wehrmacht can foresee and judge what is necessary and to what extent. This was guaranteed as long as the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army had the authority to dispose of funds and raw materials. His loss of this influence in the course of the war produced the gravest disadvantages for the Army.

Regarding the question as to who should address the military demands to the Armament Ministry let me refer to what has been said above in Chapter 1 of this Section. It is important that only one agency represent the interests of the Army or the Wehrmacht. Interference of several other agencies with the functions of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army in this field contributed to the shifting the limits of responsibility to the detriment of the Army.

5. Influence of Political Parties on the Army

This point is of widely varying moment according to the constitution and the inner political structure of each individual country. It gained quite extraordinary significance in Germany after 1933 owing to the totalitarian claim of the only existing and the all-dominating Party of the State.

The German officer corps -- and the attitude of the officer corps is the decisive point in this question -- pledged clearly to the person of the Kaiser in old German monarchy, had been educated in a strictly neutral, non-political manner after the abolition of the monarchy. The transition of governmental authority to Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist German Worker's Party in 1933 had changed nothing in this attitude of the officer corps. But the Party, in slowly increasing measures, also attempted to extend its influence over the officer corps. All the battles fought in this connection do not belong in this study. But the history of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army is a mileage stone along the road. A continuing thread stretches from the removal of Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg and Hitler's assumption of command over the Wehrmacht in 1938, through the exit of Generalfeldmarschall von Brauchitsch and Hitler's assumption of command over the Army in 1941, and finally to the dismissal of Generaloberst Fromm and Himmler's appointment as Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army in 1944.

In 1938 the Wehrmacht High Command was rendered a powerless agency but the Army Commander in Chief with his High Command remained the wall against the infiltration of Party influence into the tradition-bound,

purely soldierly attitude of the Army. In 1941 the Army High Command was smashed. The Army General Staff had been greatly limited in its effectiveness through the creation of Wehrmacht High Command Theaters of Operations. The Army Personnel Office was tied by the personal union of its Chief with the Fuehrer's Adjutant.

The Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army endeavored to maintain the old attitude. He remained deliberately aloof from all questions of domestic and Party politics and tried thereby to preserve the non-political line of the Army. His assignment to the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command placed him in a weak position in this respect from the very beginning (cf. Section D, Chapter 13). The events on 20 July 1944 set the finishing stroke to this development and fully opened the door to Party influence (cf. Section D, Chapters 14 and 15). This attempt on the part of a few officers, who, as they had grown up in the old military traditions, certainly resolved to forcibly overthrow the government of the Nazi Party only after heavy inner conflicts and at the verge of despair, had, as a result of its failure, an effect contrary to that expected on the Army.

This can, in the final analysis, be regarded as proof for the correctness of the principle that the Wehrmacht should keep out of all party politics and serve only the State. This reasoning requires conversely, however, that the national government prevent from the beginning all attempts by a party — even if it be a party that regards itself as the State Party — to gain influence over the Wehrmacht. There is only one case in which the Wehrmacht must intervene, and that is when a party attempts a revolution

in the State by armed force. The Wehrmacht itself must never undertake such an attempt.

6. Importance of Individuals in the Top-Level Organization

Any organization acquires life only through the individuals which are employed in it. In Section B it has been shown how the personalities of the Chief of the Army General Staff and the Chief of the General Army Office decisively influenced the reconstruction of the German Army and how the personality of the Army Commander in Chief was sufficient to control the forces inherent in those two individuals for the good of the whole. After the beginning of the war nothing was changed at first, with the exception that with the appointment of General Fromm, hitherto Chief of the General Army Office, as Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, the general received a more extensive area of responsibilities which corresponded more to his abilities.

With the dismissal of Feldmarschall von Brauchitsch and the assignment of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army to the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command, the function of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army was primarily conditioned by the counterplay of the personalities of General Fromm and Feldmarschall Keitel. Of these two Generaloberst Fromm was the far stronger and more able personality. (For a personal sketch of Fromm cf. pp. of this study. Keitel's life is familiar enough that a detailed sketch appears superfluous.) Here it turned out, however, that fundamental mistakes of organization cannot be completely redeemed by the strength of an individual,

unless this individual is able to effect a change of organization de jure or at least de facto. Because he could not do that, or perhaps did not wish to do that, Fromm was at last defeated in this battle.

The office of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army was the work of General Fromm. He completely filled it with his spirit and knew in masterly fashion how to use this instrument. Even after the smash of the Army High Command in the winter of 1941-1942 and in spite of the now completely confused top-level organization, his organization still accomplished all that was humanly possible to bolster the Field Army.

When the point of gravity in the whole armament field inevitably shifted more and more to the Wehrmacht High Command from the Army, Generaloberst Fromm would undoubtedly have been the proper man to assume control of the entire Wehrmacht equipment field. And in 1942 certain influential individuals in the Army did indeed consider making Generaloberst Fromm Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command. Such ideas were also made known to him. But it is characteristic of him that he himself totally refused to support such tendencies in any way. He would have felt such an action to be disloyal, and disloyal conduct toward his immediate superior was unthinkable for him. So in all battles and differences of opinion in general, whether with the Chief of the Army General Staff, the Army Commander in Chief, or the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command, he always endeavored to act loyally and, because of his basic soldierly attitude, always respected the strict laws of military subordination. In addition, the question remains whether Hitler would have agreed to a transfer of duties from

Keitel to Fromm; it is hardly likely since Hitler did not want a strong man in this post. This doubt and the aversion to exposing himself to rejection may have additionally determined Fromm's attitude. His attempt to effect through Hitler a change of the disorganized top-level organization (Memorandum "At the Height of Power and Glory" written in the fall of 1942, cf. Section D, Chapter 9) failed and caused his practical alimination from affairs of importance. The subversive attempt of 20 July 1944, in which he had no part, but against which he took countermeasures only after he had clearly recognized its failure, provided his antagonists with the desired opportunity to liquidate him forever.

In the history of the German Army in World War II the concept of the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army will always be bound up with the name of Fromm, an example of the importance of an individual for the efficiency of an organization. His tragic end, however, is, at the same time, an example of the calamitous effects of disorganization emanating from above.

Acknowledgement

The present study on the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army within the Army High Command was begun by General der Kavallerie Koehler in the manner outlined in his preface and prepared as far as Section C (except for two chapters). Lack of time owing to his start in a new occupation prevented General Koehler from completing the missing sections. On instructions from the Historical Division the author of the last two Sections D and E had undertaken the completion

of the study. Chapters VIII and IX of Section C were written by Colonel Zerbel. In the preparation of this remaining portion the intents and preliminary sketches of General Koehler were taken over in full by the authors, the synopsis outlined by General Koehler was retained without change.

/s/ Hellmuth Reinhardt

Chief of Army Equipment and Commander
of the Replacement Training Army

Appendix 1

a) Peacetime Top-Level Organization
of the Army High Command



b) Wartime Top-Level Organization
1939/1941



Chief Army Equipment Within the Army High Command

Appendix 2



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Chief Army Equipment Within the Army High Command

Appendix 3

Army Raw Materials Branch

Army Budget Branch

Chief Army Equipment
Commander Replacement Army

Staff

Gen for Special Employment

Army Judge Advocat General

Chief of Training

Chief of General Army Office

Staff of General Army Office

Staff of Army Ordnance Office

Chief of Army Ordnance Office

Chief of Army Administration Office

Army Replacement Affairs Group

Gp for Officials & Civilian Employees (Ag V I)

Arms Inspectors

Infantry

Riding & Driving

Artillery

Engineers

Mobile Troops

Transport Troops

Signal Troops

Chemical Troops

Arms Branches

Infantry

Riding & Driving

Artillery

Engineers

Panzer Troops

Transpport & Supply Troops

Signal Troops

Chemical Troops

Railway Engineers

Technical Troops

Motor Vehicle Troops

Army Antiaircraft Troops

Rocket Weapons

Arms Testing Branches

Ballistical & Ammunition Branch

Infantry

Chief Engineers

Artillery

Engineers & Fortresses

Panzer, Motor Vehicles, Motors

Signal Branch

Surveying, Optics, Meteorology

Gas Protection Branch

Antiaircraft Branch

Research Branch

Branch for Experimentall Grounds

Br for Army Officials (V 1)

Br for Employees

Br for Administration of Training Grounds (V 6)

Rations & Procurement Group (Ag V III)

Army Rations Br (V 3)

Army Procurement Br (V 5)

Medical Inspectors

Veterinary Inspectors

Medical Inspectorate

Veterinary Inspectorate

Arms Procurement Branch

Army Equipment Branch

Army Weapons Branch

Br for Real Estate of Garrisons and Procurement of Quarters (V 2)

Riding & Driving

Artillery

Engineers

Mobile Troops

Transport Troops

Signal Troops

Chemical Troops

Medical Inspectors

Veterinary Inspectors

Fortress Inspector

Riding & Driving

Artillery

Engineers

Panzer Troops

Transpprt & Supply Troops

Signal Troops

Chemical Troops

Railway Engineers

Technical Troops

Motor Vehicle Troops

Army Antiaircraft Troops

Rocket Weapons

Medical Inspectorate

Veterinary Inspectorate

Fortress Inspectorate

Ordnance

Inspectorate

Infantry

Chief Engineers

Artillery

Engineers & Fortresses

Panzer, Motor Vehicles, Motors

Signal Branch

Surveying, Optics, Meteorology

Gas Protection Branch

Antiaircraft Branch

Research Branch

Branch for Experimental Grounds

Arms Procurement Branch

Army Equipment Branch

Army Weapons Branch

Ammunition Branch

Manufacturing Branch

Organizations Branch

Procurement Branch for Tanks

Procurement Branch for Signal Equipment

Branch for Powder & Explosives

Arms Acceptance Branch

Arms Chief Engineer

Arms Regulations Branch

Research Branch

Br for Employees

Br for Administration of Training Grounds (V 6)

Rations & Procurement Group (Ag V III)

Army Rations Br (V 3)

Army Procurement Br (V 5)

Br for Real Estate of Garrisons and Procurement of Quarters (V 2)

Br for Adm of Army Construction (V 4)

Chief of Army Equipment Within the Army High Command

Appendix 4



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
Chief of Army Equipment Within the Replacement Army